Virtually real : problems of authenticity in religion on the internet by Alberts, Thomas
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 











Problems of Authenticity in Religion on the Internet 
By 
Thomas Alberts ALBTHOOO 1 
A dissertation submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the award 
of the 
Declaration 
Degree of Master of Social Sciences 
Department of Religious Studies 
University of Cape Town 
2003 
This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. 
It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from 














This study explores the vexed problem of authenticity in religion. In making that 
exploration, the study uses for its data the multitude of diverse and disparate religious 
formations found in the relatively disordered and anarchic spaces created with Internet 
technologies, formations that I have tentatively called virtual religions. The theoretical 
framework applied here is developed from the unique and original critical theory of 
Walter Benjamin. This study is therefore located at a number of important intersections: 
between religion and popular culture, between religion and politics, between religion and 
philosophy, and between religion and art. 
The argument is comprised of three major parts, corresponding to Chapters Two, Three 
and Four respectively. The first part approaches authenticity from the perspective of 
empiricism, with its scientific methods of verification and falsification. The keyword here 
is forensics because it implies both the scientific paradigm and police detection. This 
second implication is an important addition to the first because it draws attention to 
power in the vexed problem of religious authenticity. The suggestion that authenticity 
involves detection shifts attention to the problem of identifying inauthenticity. The 
forensic detection of inauthenticity draws critical attention to the discourses and 
discursive strategies that maintain an idea of authenticity against the constant threat of 










mean to distinguish and separate authentic from inauthentic. The limits of empiricism, 
and consequently, the limits of the approach's usefulness to exploring the problem of 
authenticity in religion, is found where contradictory and paradoxical objects coexist that 
scientific procedures are unable to separate. 
The second part of the argument develops an alternative approach to the problem of 
authenticity in religion. Rather than interrogating the claims of objects of disputed 
authenticity, the argument developed here acknowledges that the boundary distinguishing 
and separating authentic from inauthentic is unstable and porous. Consequently, the 
argument advanced in this part of the study is that a fruitful exploration of authenticity 
needs to work productively with the tensions that describe this indeterminate and shifting 
boundary. The argument develops and applies Walter Benjamin's theory of dialectics at a 
standstill. Benjamin's theory is useful not merely because it accommodates instability 
and porous boundaries in its structure of dialectics, but because it develops and even 
reinvigorates a Marxist-Hegelian critique of modernity by working productively with the 
tensions between its unstable and ambivalent dialectical poles. As applied in the present 
study, the dialectic developed here is between authentic and fake religion, the latter being 
the most intensified form of inauthentic religion. At the same time that this dialectic 
traces a series of constellating movements through a case-study developed in Chapter 
Three, Benjamin's critique of modernity becomes in the present discussion a focussed 
critique of empiricism and the scientific method, signified by the keyword forensics. This 











because it connotes regimes that authorise what is and what is not of authentic religion, 
that polices the boundaries, to speak. 
In the third part of the argument, corresponding to Chapter Four, these twin concerns, an 
exploration of authenticity in religion that finds its method in Benjaminian dialectics and 
a critique of modernity's valorisation of the scientific method, converge. That 
convergence involves locating Benjamin's theory of dialectics within the aspirations of 
his unfinished life's work on the Parisian arcades of the 19th century, and more broadly, 
relating dialectics at a standstill to his critique of modernity. Crucial here is Benjamin's 
refutation of the idea of authenticity, understood as a quantitative and independent 
attribute of objects, in favour of the idea of critique; for Benjamin, there is no such thing 
as authenticity, only authentic critique. Far from being a procedure of abstract and 
rational reflection, Benjamin thought that authentic critique requires the involvement of 
the body of the perceiver in the image they perceive. In other words, bodily involvement 
is Benjamin's measure of authenticity in critique, a measure he theorises through his 
notion of tactile appropriation. The convergence is achieved when it is recognised that 
virtual religions on the Internet often, if not usually, provoke laughter. The argument 
developed here is that this uncontrollable bodily eruption suggests a kind of bodily 
involvement with the image of critique and evidences a measure of tactile appropriation 
that in tum authenticates the critique conveyed by the dialectic between authenticity and 
fakery in religion. Far from dismissing virtual religions on the World Wide Web as jokes 
conceived by people with too much time on their hands, these religious formations 











modernity, including late-modernity, which I prefer to the designation post-modernity. 
The discussion of humour in religion is built around Peter Berger's theory of redeeming 
laughter. Berger's thesis is that the experience of the comic is an adumbration of religious 
experience and that in the moment of humorous experience the separation from the divine 
is temporarily overcome. In other words, the comic signals transcendence. Following 
Berger's theory, it would seem that there are two registers in which virtual religions can 
be authentic; the first pertains to a critical orientation toward modernity while the second 
obtains in a theological reading of humour. The culmination of the argument is the 
matching of Berger's theory of the comic with Benjamin's political messianism. 
The concluding chapter of this study amplifies the c1aim introduced in Chapter One and 
that is a subtext throughout the three main parts of this study, that the problem of 
authenticity in religion has historically and continues to present an opportunity to the 
discipline of religious studies. That opportunity consists in the demonstration that religion 
offers a significant and unique critical orientation toward modernity, and especially late-
modernity, which is an intensification of the former. This thesis should therefore be read 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
It is a common approach when writing about the World Wide Web to emphasise the dramatic 
impact that Internet technologies have wrought on society and the world at large. Inevitably, 
talking about the World Wide Web is linked with globalisation. Globalisation is generally 
characterised as a process whereby the world effectively shrinks in time and space and the World 
Wide Web is often cited as the example par excellence of this kind of shrinkage. I Though these 
technologies have undoubtedly dramatically changed the world in which we live, and setting 
aside for the moment considerations of different degrees of access to these new technologies or 
the differential benefits derived from these technologies by different people around the shrinking 
world, shouldn't the celebration of the newness of these technologies be waning rather than 
persisting? Has the World Wide Web not become for many people what microwave ovens 
became for middle class homes many years ago already: technology so familiar that we cannot 
remember how we made do without it? It is worth noting that many people today recall posting 
and receiving hand written letters with nostalgia as for a previous age. A decade after the public 
launch of the World Wide Web, it might be time to recognise that already a generation has grown 
up with net access. The average undergraduate university student today, at least in the developed 
world, does not remember a world without the web. Indeed, since the launch of the web, the 
! I use "often" here to envoke the idea of a knee-jerk tendency that evidences the essence of globalisation as the 
intensification of connectedness by pointing to how Internet technologies give expression and substance to 
interconnectedness. Recently, this tendency has received the critical attention it deserves. See for example 
Christopher Lloyd, "Globalization: Beyond the Ultra-Modernist Narrative to a Critical Realist Perspective on 












world has already witnessed an economic boom and bust and news agencies are speculating that a 
second economic cycle relating to "new technology" is about to imitate the dot.com cycle of the 
late nineties.2 It might be time to recognise that the World Wide Web has been with us for some 
time already. 
Of course, religion has been with us far longer. Yet religion and the Internet's relative difference 
in age and experience has not tempered their enthusiasm for one another. Religion has 
proliferated on the Internet and reciprocally, religion has contributed to the prolific expansion of 
the Internet; statistics that a quarter of web users in the United States are searching for religious 
and spiritual materials bodes well for both the expansion of religion and the expansion of the 
Internet.3 In light of this, it is perhaps appropriate that a large part of the scholarly reflection on 
this intersection is concerned with how religious traditions in the offline world use the Internet 
technologies of cyberspace as a strategic resource for their religious activities in realspace, for 
want of a better word. Another portion of the scholarship looks at the migration of religion onto 
the World Wide Web and explores how religion is actually practiced online. I will look at this 
scholarship in greater detail later in this introduction. For the moment, however, I want to note 
that this kind of scholarship is premised on a working concept of what religion is. It is a central 
contention of this dissertation that one of the crucial dimensions of the intersection between 
religion and the World Wide Web is the manner in which many religious claims articulated on 
the web draw critical attention to the problem of authenticity in religion. Further, I submit that 
2 See, Tim Weber, "Wi-fi Will be 'Next dot.com Crash,'" BBC News, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.ukJ2Ihi/business/3006740.stm (accessed: 16 August 2003). 
1 See Gill Donovan, "A Quarter of Web Surfers are Looking for Religion," National Catholic Reporter, vol. 38, no. 











attention to this problem is underrepresented in the scholarship on religion'S intersection with 
Internet technologies and with popular culture. 
1.1 Religion and Authenticity 
As "new" as Internet technology may be, the kind of challenges it poses to how we understand 
religion is not necessarily as recent. Throughout its history, religion has had to contend with 
challenges to its bounded space and controversies over what does and what does not count as 
religion surely date back as far as the recognition of religious difference. For it is religious 
difference that is crucial here, that makes all the difference here, so to speak. Defining religion is 
not merely a question of separating a religious sphere from a secular one; it is that and more. 
Attendant to the indeterminacy of the boundary's location is a question of separating authentic 
religion from inauthentic religion. In previous ages, such separations were made by religious and 
political authorities. But with the advent of the European enlightenment and that continent's 
subsequent age of imperialism, a new constellation of authority emerged. Imperial power was 
wedded with the authority of reason and the methods of empirical science. The emerging 
disciplines of the natural sciences thrived in their confluences and as the European empires 
expanded, Europe's intellectual elite enjoyed no shortage of things to sort and classify. It was in 












Yet as David Chidester has expertly shown,4 if religion was theorised by European 
comparativists at the metropolitan centre, these comparativists used for their raw materials the 
reports and travel writings of missionaries, colonial agents, and travellers on the colonial 
frontiers. Comparative religion that found its theoretical exposition at the metropolitan centre 
found its practice on the frontiers of difference. For it was on these frontiers, the indeterminate 
and porous boundary between "savage" and "civilised" societies, between colonized and still-to-
be colonized territories, between indigenous and alien orientations toward the world and people's 
place in it, where difference remained palpable, which is to say, embodied. At the metropolitan 
centres of knowledge production, difference was not embodied, or at least, this was not the form 
of its exposition. There its form was extensive treatise that, through sorting and classifying, 
outlined totalising theories of religion's evolution and relation to the trajectory of human 
progress, not coincidently fitting in neatly with the imperial project's underpinnings in natural 
history. The frontiers of difference, however, were the location of comparative religion'S 
discursive practices. Not surprisingly, the overarching comparative practice at this location was 
between what was thought to be authentic religion and what was not. As Chidester has argued, 
the contours of this emerging discourse paralleled the changing contours of colonial control. 
Simply put, prior to the closing of the colonial frontier and the imposition of the colonial 
administration's authority, it was denied that indigenous people had any kind of religion. After 
authority had been extended over these territories, indigenous people subjugated, the frontier 
closed, and a fixed boundary established, local people were discovered to have religion after all. 
We will have reason to return to Chidester's work on frontier comparative religion later in this 
introduction. For the moment, however, I want to note that disputes over religious authenticity go 
4 David Chidester, Savage Systems: Colonialism and Comparative Religion in Southern A/rica (Charlottesville and 











to the heart of the academic, comparative study of religion and are implicated in its discourses 
from its founding moment. I also want to note that power is implicated in these discourses -
hardly a novel assertion, but nevertheless of the greatest significance, as will become apparent. 
Lastly, I want to hold on to this image of a porous frontier, an indeterminate contact zone of 
discursive denials and discoveries, for I think it captures much of what is at stake in the present 
inquiry. 
Controversies over religious authenticity in the modem era have not been limited to the origins of 
comparative religion on the colonial frontiers. If in the colonial era the authentic religion of 
European conquerors was contrasted with the superstitious beliefs of indigenous communities, in 
the late 20th century authentic religion is contrasted with coercive, brainwashing cults. The cult 
controversies of the 1970s and more recently the examples of the Branch Davidians and Heavens 
Gate, again raised the problem of authenticity in religion. This distinction between authentic and 
inauthentic and the designation of the inauthentic as cult behaviour or superstitious belief has not 
dissipated in the popular imagination. Though the formal organisation and influence of the anti-
cult movement has mostly fallen apart, one need only recall the morbid fascination David Koresh 
or Marshall Applewhite seem to exert in the popular imagination. Should the Raelians sect, who 
claim to have cloned a number of humans, ever come to a violent end, Claude Vorilhon, a.k.a. 
Rael, will likely become a similar object of fascination. Outside of Western Europe and North 
America, Aum Shinrikyo, responsible for the Tokyo subway gas attack in 1995, and Falun Gong 
in China, attract similar fascination. Yet it has long since been appreciated that the designations 
"cult" and "sect" when used in opposition to "religion" are problematic terms and more often 
than not betray the pejorative and partisan positions of their users. At any rate, they are of very 











yet the ease with which these categories perfonn their separating labours surely reveals 
something about how religion is imagined. 
It seems that agreement on examples of inauthentic religion is more easily achieved than 
agreement on what constitutes authentic religion. Perhaps this is a case of comparing apples with 
pears; comparing examples of in authenticity with authenticity's constituting elements. I do not 
propose such a comparison. I'm looking for an alternative way into the vexed problem of 
religious authenticity and note that perhaps a better way in is via inauthenticity on which there 
seems to be greater agreement, than via authentic religion, in which confusion and disagreement 
persists. The challenge posed by inauthentic religion to religious authenticity - and remember that 
these categories are produced out of collective social agreement and are empirically arbitrary - is 
one of accommodation. Of course, the rub is that while these categories are empirically arbitrary, 
collective social agreement is not politically neutral. The problem of accommodating Heaven's 
Gate, the Branch Davidians, or for that matter the Peoples Temple of Jim Jones in the 1970s and 
especially following the catastrophe in Guyana in 1979 within the space of authentic religion, is 
not merely a question of criteria and constituting elements. As the disputes over religious 
authenticity on the colonial frontier demonstrate so well, this kind of accommodation that calls 
for defining anew the territory of authentic religion is a question of managing and administering 
boundaries. On empirical grounds, the challenge posed to authentic religion is whether it can 
accommodate within its authentic self-understanding a religious fonnation that appears different 
from itself. But the perception of difference is the grounds for political mobilisation and more 












The designation "fake religion" might be helpful here because it denotes exactly those formations 
that appear to be religious in character but in which agreement as to their essential inauthenticity 
seems easily achieved. In this sense, fake religions are similar to cults and sects. Indeed, cults 
such as the Branch Davidians and Heaven's Gate might also be called fake religions. Yet I have 
in mind examples of religious formations in which agreement as to their essential inauthenticity 
likely comes even more easily. The Church of Bulls hi to logy, for example, is "a religion based 
entirely on falsehood." McChurch describes itself as "a real religion ... that makes membership 
as easy as picking up a burger and fries on the way home from work." The Center for Duck 
Studies advocates the pursuit of Duck Consciousness and the attainment of Duck Mind. The 
Church of Virus variously described itself as "a memetically engineered atheistic religion," 
"Darwin's dangerous idea out of control," and "an extended phenotype of the Virion Council." 
The Church of Bullshitology, McChurch, the Center for Duck Studies, and the Church of Virus 
are virtual religions. The designation virtual religion describes a range of religious innovations 
found at various web sites on the World Wide Web. In describing that range, I follow David 
Chidester's extensive survey. 5 All of these virtual religions look like religion, in the sense that 
they display features of historical religions, such as founders, belief systems, mythical narratives, 
ritual objects, deities, sacred texts, and so on. Yet one cannot shake the nagging suspicion that, as 
Chidester says, they may be messing with us. Take for example the Church of Reality that works 
out their belief system with the simple assertion: "if it's real, we believe in it!,,6 It is this kind of 
5 David Chidester, "Fake Religion: Ordeals of Authenticity in Virtual Religions on the Internet," Journal for the 
Study of Religion, vol. 16, no. 2 (forthcoming 2003). The following discussion adopts the typology devised by 
Chidester and used to structure his survey. Citations of specific virtual religions in the following discussion will 
refer to the urI of that religion's website. 











ambiguity that I find so intriguing. Perhaps most significantly, it is also this kind of ambiguity 
that destabilises the ease with which the cybernaut might be accustomed to adjudicating 
questions of authenticity in religion. Standing on its own, it might seem easy to dismiss the 
Church of Reality as a parody or satire of religion, as the hobby of someone skilled in Internet 
technology and with too much time on their hands, or perhaps nothing more than an oddball 
invention of a solitary soul in cyberspace. While any of these assumptions might be true, the 
collective social agreement that might dismiss virtual religions such as the Church of Reality as 
inauthentic becomes more difficult to negotiate when this religious articulation is contextualised 
among a range of similarly ambiguous formations. Taken together, the proliferation of virtual 
religions on the Internet should cause some hesitancy among those who would rush to agree that 
they lack authenticity. It will become apparent as the survey proceeds that fake religions are 
inherently ambivalent forms. Chidester observes that central to this ambivalence is a question as 
to whether these religious formations are in opposition, in counterpoint, or in collaboration with 
the religious formations they imitate. In following Chidester's survey, the reader is alerted to this 
recurring question. 
1.2 Virtual Religion 
Chidester groups fake religions into the following categories: communities bound by particular 
beliefs, symbols, myths, and traditions; communities bound by anti-belief systems; satirical 
imitations of Christian themes; imitations of New Age, spiritual, or consciousness-raising 
movements; imitations or satires of cults; religions located in popular culture, including film, 











consumerism, commodities, and money; sacred animals and sacred objects; and religions related 
to science. A brief survey of these categories will provide an overview of virtual religion on the 
Internet. 
The first category refers to communities and traditions that express a belief system. The 
distinguishing feature common to religions in this category is their emphasis on community. 
Demonstrating this point and by far the largest such community is that united in Discordianism. 
Discordianism, we are told, began in southern California in 1957 when two friends sipping coffee 
in a bowling alley "experienced a dramatic break in the time-space continuum." In the space of 
that rupture they realized that the underlying principle in everything is chaos. This realization was 
reinforced by a vision of Eris, the ancient Greek goddess of discord, conflict, and chaos. 
Significantly, Eris is not only the source of chaos, but also of the "happy anarchy" of freedom, 
creativity, and laughter. All this is revealed in the many editions of Discordianism's central text, 
The Principia Discordia. During the 1980s the new religion of Discord ian ism was spread through 
cabals established across the US. But it was the invention of the World Wide Web that most 
dramatically expanded the Discordianist community. Today there are numerous Discordianism 
related websites. Discordianism claims that everybody is a member, even if they don't know it 
yet, making it the world's fastest growing religion because it grows at the exact same rate as the 
population. In this regard it competes with similar claims from other religions, such as The 
Universal Life Church, which is a legally recognised religious institution in the US. The 
Illuminated Knights of Otis illustrates an interesting intervention in the notion of authentic 
religious community united in common worship. Every week they choose a different sacred 
object to worship. The object is "celebrated in a two color (read 'black and white') Xerox 











ignored. Other examples of religions in this category are: The Abstract Ministry, dedicated to the 
worship of the god Ikon; Andersianism, that simply affirms that Anders is God; Asaism, a word 
for word copy of Andersianism, except for its central belief that Asa is God; Superchurch, that 
believes in The Benign All that flows through all good things; and Church of the Holy Spork that 
believes that God is a spork (a spoon and fork in one) because like God, sporks are perfect.? 
In contrast to this category, Chidester introduces a category for religious communities and 
traditions expounding what he terms anti-belief systems. These religions are distinguished by the 
absence and renunciation of doctrine. So for example, the Agnostic Church claims to hold 
"VERY STRONG" religious beliefs that 'Just happen to be of the agnostic persuasion." The Last 
Chance Cathedral and Discount House of Worship ask the question: "is NOTHING sacred 
anymore?" "The answer of course is a resounding NO." The Church of Nothing at All has no 
congregation and no ordained priesthood and recommend this prayer to God: "Thou art a big fat 
zero and are not there at all. Amen." As Chidester observes, religions in this category use ethical 
considerations, ritual observances, or performance to subvert formal doctrine. Wauism, for 
example, advises prospective members: "all you have to do is whatever you want." Similarly, 
The Church of the Covert Cosmos encourages members to design their own belief system. They 
offer a list of items members may blend together into a kind of "roIl-your-own catechism." The 
First Church of the Last Laugh is dedicated to S1. Stupid and appropriately celebrates its holy day 
7 Universal Life Church: http://www.ulc.net; Illuminated Knights of Otis: http://www.ighf.orgliko.html; Abstract 
Ministry: http://www.geocities.comlCapitolHiII/9183/araman.html; Andersianism: http://www.d.kth.sel-nv91-
asalandersianism.html (accessed: 21 April 2002); Asaism: 
http://www.users.wineasy.se/johanssonslMikaellasaismlasaism.html; Superchurch: http://www.superchurch.net; 
Church of the Holy Spork: http://www.geocities.comffimesSquarelLabyrinthl7275/00index.html. Except where 











on 1 st April. This ritual celebration takes the form of a festive parade through the streets of San 
Francisco. The performance aspect to the parade emphasises costumes, musical instruments, and 
chanting. During the 2000 parade, marchers chanted, "we're here, we're stupid, we're not going 
away." During the 2001 parade, marchers chanted, "no more chanting, no more chanting."g 
As Chidester observes, whether one emphasises complex mythological narratives, worship, ritual, 
performance, or the promotion of ethical norms, any of the religions examined above can look 
like religion and would appear to be making claims on the legitimacy and authority of authentic 
religion. Yet in other situations, some web sites would appear to be intervening in the legitimacy 
and authority normally vested in authentic religion via parodies and satires of religious 
authenticity. There has emerged an entire genre of satires on Christian religious formations, a 
category Chidester calls Christianesque fake religion. 
Religious innovations in the mould of Christian tradition sometimes construct alternative 
histories that then intervene in those histories authorised by the Christian church. For example, 
the websites of True Catholic Church and His Holiness Pope Gregory XVII separately accuse the 
papacy in Rome of fraudulently usurping the chair of St. Peter and both claim to represent the 
authentic Roman Catholic Church. The Landover Baptist Church admits to being a satire of 
firebrand Baptist ministries typical of the southern United States. Yet a glance at their mail, 
which they dutifully publish on their website, reveals that many visitors to their site fail to 
8 Agnostic Church: http://www.agnostic.org; Last Chance Cathedral and Discount House of Worship: 
http://dragonet.comlallsaint; Church of Nothing at All: http://www.geocities.comlSoHo/SquareI1692/church.html; 
Wauism: http://www.tftb.comldeify/wauism.htm; Church of the Covert Cosmos: 
http://home.onestop.netlbraxton/cotcc (accessed: 3 December 2002); First Church of the Last Laugh: 











recognise the parody and interpret their outrageous, provocative, and often extremely funny 
articles and religious claims to be an authentic reflection of this church's faith. 9 A different 
intervention in authentic Christian tradition sees Jesus Christ posting an advertisement online in 
the form of a personal advertisement for "a special woman" who "would rather have an authentic 
life instead of one guided by the pursuit of modem trends." According to Jesus, he has created 
"the most extravagant personal ad in the history of civilization" because the "rare woman" he 
seeks is "unlikely to be found without great effort." On his website, Jesus endorses to a range of 
products in categories ranging from "fruit juices as a symbol of capitalism's spiritual resignation," 
including R.W. Knudsen's juice that "keeps the wisdom of the past alive," to "well designed 
products that make life easier" such as I-D Glide, "a wonderful water-based, latex-friendly 
lubricant for people who enjoy the slippery side of life." Perhaps the most startling statement on 
Jesus' homepage is the offer to bathe with Jesus, though a shower can be exchanged for the usual 
bubble bath if requested. Jesus confirms that he is willing to speak about spirituality if that is his 
bathing partner's wish. However, if they are not spiritual, he is quite willing to "share a beer and 
pleasant existential banter.',10 
In a different category of fake religions, though no less ambivalent, are those websites that appear 
to be imitating new age, spiritual, or consciousness-raising movements. Vendramism, for 
example, advocates the pursuit of spiritual enlightenment through the pleasures of eating food, 
enjoying sex, smoking tobacco, and watching television. Enjoying these pleasures represents the 
9 True Catholic: http://www.truecatholic.org; His Holiness Pope Gregory XVII: 
http://www.geocities.com/Area51/LairI7170/ibio I.hlm; Landover Baptist: http://www.landoverbaptist.org. Both 
these websites were available online on J 9 August 2003. 
10 http://www.jesus.com(28November2002).This site has since been removed from the Internet and the uri 











slow way to enlightenment. The fast way involves much of the same, but requires the 
renunciation of family and possessions except one's pipe, lighter, and tobacco pouch, and taking 
up residency in a Vendramist ashram at least one hundred kilometres from home. As Chidester 
has noted, partaking in food, sex, tobacco, and television here involves a transformation of 
normal pleasures into sacred techniques. He notes a similar kind of transformation in the 
worldviews of Alchodise, the Beer Church, and the Church of Our Lady of Malted Barley and 
Hops where the consumption of beer is the object of ritual devotion. I I Other virtual religions in 
this category include two websites dedicated to the mysticism of poet William Blake, Blakeism 
and Blaketashi Darwish, the Temple of the True Inner Light, and the Society for the Attainment 
of Total Abstinence. 12 
Chidester designates the next category of fake religions "cults." These religious formations are 
especially interesting because if cults demonstrate an intervention in authentic religion, as noted 
earlier, then these fake cults intervene in that intervention. Where conventional anti-cult websites 
allege brainwashing, corruption, political subversion, and sexual perversion, fake cults intervene 
in cult controversies by imaginative imitation. As Chidester has noted, Scientology is a target of 
ridicule for many fake cults and is imaginatively reconfigured as Diarrhetics, Clearity is 
Confusion, First Church of Appliantology, Dianetech: Applied Spiritual Linguistic Technology, 
II Vendramism: http://members.tripod.coml-vendral; Alchodise: www.alchodise.coml; Church of Beer: 
www.beerchurch.coml; Church of Our Lady of Malted Barley and Hops: http://www.branwen.comlOl. cited in 
Chidester, "Fake Religion," are no longer available on the web. Vendramism. Akhodise, and the Church of Beer, 
were available online on 19 August 2003. 
12 Blakeism: http://blakeism.homestead.comlindex.html(accessed: 15 October 200 I); Blaketashi Darwish: 
http://www.blaketashi.co.uk (accessed: 15 October 2001); Temple of the True Inner Light: 
http://members.tripod.coml-psychede (accessed: 19 August 2003); Society for the Attainment of Total Abstinence: 











and Apelomatics: The Modem Pseudoscience of Mental Dentistry. Yet the archetypal parody of 
cults must be The Kick-Ass Post-Apocalyptic Doomsday Cult of Love. This cult is formed 
around the charismatic personality of "Demented Psychopathic Meglomaniac" Rev. Sum Dum 
Guy who leads a band of heavily armed "toadies and sheep," pictured in white robes, above a 
notice informing us that all the weapons pictured are "fully licensed" and that explosives and 
nerve toxins are "kept securely under lock and key in our impregnable bunker of death." Also 
pictured on the site are the reverend's five wives, similarly clothed in white robes, below a sign 
informing the prospective convert that they will do anything to get you to join the cult, but "once 
your're in and brainwashed they won't even give you the time of day." Finally, below pictures of 
the cult's children, photographed in karate uniforms and fighting poses, the cult's homepage 
informs us that the children are the cult's most valuable asset because "if we really get hard up 
for money, we can sell them." As Chidester notes, though the The Kick-Ass Post-Apocalyptic 
Doomsday Cult of Love is not a genuine religion, its satirical intervention in the cult 
controversies does assert a real position on the legitimacy of new religious movements. In this 
sense, even satires perform a kind of religious labour. 13 
In counterpoint to these attempts to limit what might count as religion, another category of virtual 
religions expands the circumscribed space of religion by celebrating the industries of film, 
television, music, and sports as if they were religious enterprises. Leading the field here are those 
13 Diarrhetics: http://home.snafu.de/tilmanlcosJun/diarrhetics/lampl.html; Clearity is Confusion: 
http://home.earthlink.neti-imfalse!hcu_annex.html; First Church of Appliantology: 
http://home.online.no/-corneliulextreme.html; Dianetech: 
http://www.geocities.coml Athens/Oracle/5616/main.htm; Apelomatics: http://www.apelord.comlapead.html; Kick-
Ass Post-Apocalyptic Doomsday Cult of Love: http://welcome.to/doomsdaycult. All these websites were available 











religions devoted to Elvis Presley, the King, including the Church of Elvis, the 24 Hour Church 
of Elvis, the church at The Elvis Underground, The First Church of Elvis, The First Church of 
Jesus Christ Elvis, and the First Presleyterian Church of Elvis the Divine.14 While some religions 
find inspiration in the visual mediums of film and television, such as the First Church of 
Shatnerology, the Second National Church of Shatnerology and the Jedi Religion originating in 
Star Trek and Star Wars respectively,15 other fake religions find religious inspiration in the aural 
medium of rock and rolL Examples here include the Church of AntiChrist Superstar devoted to 
Marilyn Manson, the David Bowie Temple, and the Partridge Family Temple, the latter devoted 
to an entirely fictional, made-for-television family of musicians. 16 Other religions in this category 
include the Church of the Heavenly Wood, dedicated to the B-movie maker Edward D. Wood, Jr, 
and the First Church of Tiger Woods, dedicated to the supernatural abilities of the world's best 
golfer. 17 As Chidester notes and as these religions demonstrate, popular culture can appear to be 
religious. 
14 Church of Elvis: http://www.churchofelvis.net. (accessed: 27 November 2002); 24 Hour Church of Elvis: 
http://www.frankwu.comlelvisl.html; church at The Elvis Underground: http://www.elvisunderground.org; First 
Church of Elvis: http://bulldumpshock.comlsr/fcoe.html; The First Church of Jesus Christ Elvis: 
http://jubaLwestnet.comlhyperdiscordiaisacred_heart_elvis,html; First Presleyterian Church of Elvis the Divine: 
http://www.geocities.comlpresleyterian_church. Except where indicated, these websites were available online on 
19 August 2003. 
IS www.shatnerology.com; http://www.geocities.com!HoIlywoodiSetlI93I1shatner.html; http://www.jediism.org. 
These websites were available online on 19 August 2003. 
16 Church of AntiChrist Superstar: http://www.dewn.comlmm; David Bowie Temple: 
http://members.tripod.coml-DragonLadyLldbtemple.html; Partiridge Family Temple: 
http://www.partridgefamilytemple.com. These websites were available online on 19 August 2003. 
17 Church of the Heavenly Wood: http://www.geocities.comlReverendSteveG; First Church of Tiger Woods 











A different orientation toward the transcendent is found at the Church of the Almighty Dollar 
who find in money a reminder of who we really are and what it means to be human. As the 
currency that redeems our souls, money is a token of God's affection and his way of making us 
feel good about ourselves. Yet as a reminder that in God we trust, money is also God's way of 
thinking about himself. Money is God's way of telling us to make more money and ultimately is 
the meaning and mystery oflife. If the Church of the Almighty Dollar suggests that money is the 
essential bond between human beings and God, the Church of the Profit$ attacks how religion 
can appear to be a money-making business. The main tenet of this religion is Truth, says Rev. 
John L. Ferri; "You give me money, and I keep it - similar to most other religions, except I'm 
honest about it." 18 As the Church of the Almighty Dollar and the Church of the Profit$ 
demonstrate, religion can also appear as if it were essentially about money, commodities, and 
consumerism. In this category of fake religions, as Chidester notes, religion appears as a 
consumer product and consumerism appears as a religion. At the Holy Temple of Mass 
Consumption, the Shrine of Our Lady of Mass Consumption, and Jesus Christ Superstore, 
adherents of this kind of religious faith can revel in the ecstasy of commodity consumption. In 
counterpoint to this kind of religious orientation, however, is the Church of Stop Shopping that 
assumes a religious stance against the religion of the market. Between a religious fervour for 
consumption and a religious opposition to consumption is the Church of Secularistic Holidayism 
that suggests that, as Chidester puts it, "moments of relief from the cycle of production and 
consumption is all that we have left of the sacred." Yet if these orientations find religion at 
different moments in the economic arc between production and consumption, still another 
religion sees the levels of productivity and efficiency achieved by modem transnational 
13 Church of the Almighty Dollar: http://www.museumofconceptualart.comlchurch.html; Church of the Profit$: 











corporations operating within that arc as an inspiration to their own religious efforts; 
consequently, McChurch endeavours to make mcworship as easy as picking up a burger and fries 
on the way home from work. 19 
If, as Chidester speculates, these religions emerge out of the prevailing discourse of the late-
capitalist market economy, it is not surprising that a number of Internet religions single out a 
specific commodity object for worship. Examples here might include the Church of 
Volkswagenism and the Cult of Macintosh, dedicated to Volkswagen motor cars and Apple 
Macintosh computers respectively. Yet these examples properly belong to another category of 
Internet religions gathered around sacred objects, sacred animals, and sacred foods. What is 
surprising here is the extent and diversity of religious innovation evidenced here. For example, 
among religions devoted to sacred objects we find the Church of the Big Plastic Fork, the Church 
of the Chainsaw, the Church of the Rotate Your Envelope Stock, the First United Church of the 
Fisher-Price Record Player, and of course the Church of Volkswagen ism, and the Cult of 
Macintosh.20 Among religions venerating sacred animals are the Center for Duck Studies, the 
Church of Beaver Christ, The Church of the Bunny, The Church of the Gerbil, the Church of the 
19 Holy Temple of Mass Consumption: http://www4.ncsu.edul-aikeni; Our Lady of Mass Consumption: 
http://members.aol.comlolomc/olomc.htm; Jesus Christ Superstore: http://www.jesuschristsuperstore.net; Church 
of Stop Shopping: http://www.revbilIy.com; Church of Secularistic Holidayism: 
http://tisiphone.dhs.orgl-tschap/coshl; McChurch: http://mcchurch.com. All these websites were available online 
on 19 August 2003. 
20 Church of the Big Plastic Fork: http://bigplasticfork.faithweb.com; Church of the Chainsaw: 
http://clubs.yahoo.comlclubs/churchofthechainsaw (accessed: I 0 October 200 I); Church of the Rotate Your 
Envelope Stock: http://www.globe-guardian.comldogma.htm; First United Church of the Fisher-Price Record 
Player: http://www.misty.comlpeople/penny/church.html; Church of Volkswagen ism: www.mvoc.comlvwism; 
Cult of Macintosh: http://web.singnet.com.sgl-taipan/cult. Except where indicated, these websites were available 











Quivering Otter, the Cult of the Great Serpent, The Dolphin Sky Foundation, the Holy Church of 
Moo, the Holy Refonned Church Of The Later Day 'Roos, Holy Turtle, the KuIt ofHamstur, a 
range of denominations of the Invisible Pink Unicorn, including the Holy Religion of the 
Invisible Pink Unicorn, the Virtual Temple of the Invisible Pink Unicorn, the Invisible Pink 
Unicorns Exist, and The IPU Lives, the Restored Church of the Star Goat, the Sea Monkey(r) 
Worship Page, the Temple of the Sacred Cat, and the Virtual Church of the Blind Chihuahua.21 
And finally, among sacred foods we find the Church of the Avocado, the Church of the Burnt 
Onion Ring, the Church of Beer, the Church ofIce Cream, the Church of Saint John the Baptist 
of the Alien Artichoke, and a site instructing visitors to worship the Potato, "as he is known to his 
friends.'.22 
21 Centre for Duck Studie: http://www.jagaimo.com/duckl; Church of Beaver Christ: 
http://www.geocities.comlSoHo/Studiosl5284Ibeaver.html(accessed: 10 October 200 I}; Church of the Bunny: 
http://www.themightyorgan.comlshort_storLbunny.html; Church of the Gerbil: http://www.corg.orglmain.htm; 
Church of the Quivering Otter: http://triggur.orglcoqo; Cult of the Great Serpent: 
http://pages.prodigy.netfsnake_worshipper/greatserpent.htmI; Dolphin Sky Foundation: 
http://www.eyeotbawaii.comldolphinsky/index.html; Holy Church of Moo: 
http://members.aol.comIDailyCow/indexhcom.htm; Holy Reformed Church Of The Later Day 'Roos: 
http://www.fi.uib.no/-alsakerISkippy; Holy Turtle: www.angelfire.comlma2/holyturtle; Kult of Hamstur: 
http://www.end.coml-nikorrextslkult.html; Holy Religion of the Invisible Pink Unicorn: 
http://www.palmyra.demon.co.uk!humour/ipu.htm; Virtual Temple of the Invisible Pink Unicorn: 
http://www.geocities.comlipu_temple; Invisible Pink Unicorns Exist: 
http://www.geocities.comlSiliconValleylBitf6458/pinkunicorns.html; The IPU Lives: 
http://world.std.coml-apl/Humorlshat.html; Restored Church of the Star Goat: 
http://www.skeptictank.orglhslstargoat.htm; Sea Monkey(r} Worship Page: http://www.seamonkeyworship.com; 
Temple of the Sacred Cat: http://www.vcnet.comlvalkatftemple.html; Virtual Church of the Blind Chihuahua: 
http://www.dogchurch.org. Except where indicated, these websites were available online on 19 August 2003. 
22 Church of the Avocado: http://members.tripod.coml-cotav; Church of the Burnt Onion Ring: 
http://zcbor.fateback.com; Church of Beer: http://www.churchofbeer.com; Church of Ice Cream: 
http://members.aol.comlNailheadOO/index.html(accessed: 10 October 200 I}; Church of Saint John the Baptist of 











If these religions manage to transform ordinary objects, animals, and foods into extraordinary 
religious orientations, a different kind of intervention transforms an apparent opposition between 
religion and science into a religion of science. For example, a website dedicated to Lord Kelvin 
celebrates the absolute truths that Kelvin has bestowed on humanity, through his reflections on 
the laws of thermodynamics, entropy, and the "knotic rether." It is with deference to Lord Kelvin 
that the absolute temperature has been seen at 0 0 Kelvin. If the Lord Kelvin website celebrates 
Lord Kelvin's commitment to conserving humanity from entropy, the Church of Euthanasia 
advances a different kind of interest in humanity's well-being. Build around the four pillars of 
suicide, abortion, cannibalism, and sodomy, the church has only one commandment: "thou shalt 
not procreate." As Chidester as noted, the church advances an environmental agenda with its 
slogan, "save the planet, kill yourself." Contrasted with this kind of advocacy, the Church of 
Virus, dedicated to the reproductive capabilities of memetics, advocates the pursuit of 
immortality. Drawing on the transhumanist discourses of Extropianism, the church melds 
evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins' theory of memes with a contemporary utopianism 
premised on the promises of recent advances in computer technologies and artificial life research. 
Between the opposing interventions in humanity's well-being advanced by the Church of 
Euthanasia and the Church of Virus, Digitalism defines itself as "an acceptance of the state of 
your mind." 23 Clearly, for some virtual religions, science does appear as a religion. 
http://www.angelfire.comlpa2/potatogod. Except where indicated, these websites were available online on 19 
August 2003. 
23 Lord Kelvin: http://zapatopLnetllordkelvin.html; Church of Euthanasia: http://www.churchofeuthanasia.org; 
Church ofYirus: www.lucifer.comlvirus; Digitalism: http://digitalism.8m.com. These websites were available 











1.3 Religion, Popular Culture, and the Internet 
These kinds of virtual religions clearly involve aspects of both religion and popular culture. The 
religious aspects are self-evident, though their essential authenticity might be disputed. Yet as 
participations in popular culture, virtual religions pose a challenge to how we might relate their 
kind of popular culture with religion. One way of thinking through that relationship might be to 
think of virtual religion as a kind of popular religion, a grouping of religious expressions and 
formations originating in the organic religious life of the ordinary people rather than the clergy, 
the lower classes rather than the elite, the rural peasantry rather than the urban citizenry.24 Of 
course, one can hardly imagine a rural peasantry inventing any of the religions surveyed above. 
Yet the implication that these virtual religions might exist in an oppositional relationship with 
another kind of religion that can be said to hold sway over the territorial integrity of authentic 
religion is a useful way to begin thinking about virtual religion on the Internet. Virtual religions 
therefore stand not only at the intersection of religion and popular culture, but also at an 
intersection between religion and politics. 
In his introductory essay to a volume he jointly edits with Jeffrey Mahan, 25 Bruce Forbes echoes 
this idea of the popular when he suggests that "the notion of 'popular culture' draws out attention 
to the widespread, common, frequently commercial, and often entertaining aspects of our cultural 
24 Chidester, "Fake Religion." See also Charles H. Long, "Popular Religion," in Mercea Eliade, ed., The 
Encyclopaedia o/Religion (New York: Macmillan, 1987), II: 442-452. 
25 David Bruce Forbes and Jeffrey H. Mahan, eds., Religion and Popular Culture in America (Berkeley and Los 











context as worthy of attention and reflection.,,26 Forbes is interested specifically in the 
intersection between religion and popular culture and notes that "approaching the study of 
religion through popular culture can help us learn more about widespread perceptions of religion, 
and the role religion plays in the everyday lives ofpeople.,,27 Forbes and Mahan develop a four-
way typology that describes this intersection. Their first type they name "religion in popular 
culture." This kind of intersection refers to representations of religion in the different media of 
popular culture, including movies (Cecil B. DeMille's The Ten Commandments; Martin 
Scorsese's The Last Temptation of Christ, Bernardo Bertolucci's Little Buddha), television (The 
Simpsons' Christian neighbour Ned Flanders), and music (the legendary band Black Sabbath, 
Madonna's hit "Like a Virgin"). The second type, popular culture in religion, refers to "the 
appropriation of aspects of popular culture by religious groups and institutions. ,,28 Forbes gives 
televangelism as an example. He also notes that these kinds of appropriations often go hand in 
hand with the commercialisation of religion and the marketing of "new age" doctrines. Forbes' 
example is Leonard Sweet's The Jesus Prescriptionfor a Healthy Life.29 The third type they 
name "popular culture as religion." Here we see how "popular culture serves as religion or 
functions like religion for many people:,3o An obvious example is Star Trek fandom. More 
recently, the resurgence of interest in George Lucas's Star Wars series saw Jedi Knights gaining 
official recognition for the purposes of the general census of the United Kingdom in 2001. 31 
Forbes gives other examples of this type; the pilgrimage to Graceland undertaken every year by 
26 Bruce David Forbes, "Introduction," in ibid, p. 4. 
27 Ibid., p. 2. 
28 Ibid., p. 12. 
29 Ibid., p. 13. 
JOlbid.,p.14. 
31 uJedi makes the Census List," BBC News, 9 October 200!. Available at 











fans of Elvis Presley and the fanatical enthusiasm shown by many fans for their favourite sports 
teams. The fourth and final type is named "religion and popular culture in dialogue" and refers to 
the exchanges between religion and popular culture that don't necessary fit easily into the other 
three categories. Forbes' gives a good example in the issue of representations of violence in the 
popular media, for which religion often criticises popular culture. 32 It might be worth noting that 
in this and the other examples Forbes gives, the conversation seems decidedly one way, more of a 
monologue than a dialogue, with religion more often than not taking a critical position against 
popular culture. At any rate, Forbes does not give any examples of popular culture explicitly 
addressing religion. Yet recalling the first type of intersection, it may be argued that 
representations of religion in popular culture amounts to a degree of reciprocity and exchange in 
that such representations might be considered a form of popular culture talking back to religion. 
In attempting to relate religion and popular culture, Forbes and Mahan have set themselves a 
formidable challenge. Yet their work is not especially theoretically innovative. As one reviewer 
put it, their four-way typology "offers few surprises and does not go far in providing an 
overarching framework of interpretation. ,,33 That said, a footnote to Forbes' introductory essay 
does provide a theoretical innovation that might in turn assist in situating virtual religions at an 
intersection of religion and popular culture. Forbes introduces the possibility of a 5th type of 
relationship that he tentatively calls "religion as popular culture." If popular culture can function 
as religion, Forbes asks whether it is possible that "religious activity not only take on the features 
32 Bruce David Forbes, "Introduction," p. 15.16. 
33 R. Marie Griffith, review of Religion and Popular Culture in America. by David Bruce Forbes and Jeffrey H. 











of popular culture, but function fully as popular culture?,,34 Though he briefly points to pre-
Lentern festivals in medieval Europe and camp meetings in nineteenth century America as 
examples of religious activity that is simultaneously of popular culture, to the detriment of their 
book, Forbes unfortunately leaves this question unexplored. Nevertheless, of all of Forbes and 
Mahan's types, I think that this fifth type most accurately describes the kind of intersections 
between religion and popular culture that virtual religions on the Internet represent. Religion as 
popular culture offers the broadest understanding of what might constitute religion and it captures 
the qualities of indeterminacy and ambivalence that virtual religions seem to revel in. This 
characterisation of the intersection of religion and popular culture is also appropriate to the 
political implications of popular religion not only because its broad concept of religion 
assimilates the organic developments within the popular faster than narrower concepts can, but 
also because that assimilating advantage positions it in critical relation with narrower concepts of 
religion. 
Unfortunately, much literature that explores specifically the relationship between religion and the 
World Wide Web seems reticent to expand the scope of what might legitimately count as 
religion. Though there is a willingness to acknowledge that Internet technology is changing the 
way that we think about religion, this interest appears to stop short of actually acknowledging 
that Internet technology might be changing what we think religion actually is. To put it 
differently, much of the (English, western) discourse about religion and the Internet transposes a 
narrow understanding of what constitutes religious activity in realspace onto cyberspace to 
explore how the enhanced communications afforded by Internet technology might benefit or 











otherwise impact offline religious formations. This kind of discourse might be said to take it's 
cue from Pope John Paul II's message on World Communications Day in 1989: "It is clear that 
the Church must also avail herself of the new resources provided by human exploration in 
computer and satellite technology for her ever pressing task of evangelization.,,35 Though not 
focussed exclusively on the proselytising opportunities provided by Internet technology, much of 
the discourse reflects on how religious communities in the offline world use cyberspace as a 
resource in their religious lives, from advertising their services online to using online 
communications to organise offline gatherings, and of course as a means to fulfil "the prophetic 
vision of God's Kingdom or Presence on earth.,,36 A related branch of this discourse looks at how 
religious communities that don't necessarily exist in realspace gather and are sustained in 
cyberspace. For example, much of the recent scholarship on neo-paganism's resurgence notes 
that it is a resurgence located primarily in cyberspace, and further, that where it is practiced in the 
offline world, it draws on online resources.37 It is but a small step from here to looking at 
participation in religion via the Internet. In this regard, some attention has been given to the 
3S Pope John Paul II, message on the occasion of World Communications Day, available at 
http://www.vatican.valholy_father/john....Paul_ii/ messages/communications/documentslhfjp-
ii_mes_24011990_ world-communications-day_en.html (accessed: 25 August 2003). 
36 See for example Charles Ess, "Prophetic Communities Online? Threat and Promise for the Church in Cyberspace," 
available are http://www.drury.edu/esS/church/church.html(accessed: 25 August 2003). See also Reid 
Goldsborough and Loraine Page, "When Technology and Spirituality Meet," Information Today, vol. 20, no. 6 
(June 2003): 41-3; Phil Zabriskie and Nelly Sindayen, "I Once Was Lost, But Now I'm Wired," Time Europe, vol. 
157, no. 22 (6/4/2001): 82-3; Lome L. Lawson, "Doing Religion in Cyberspace: The Promise and the Perils," 
Council of Societies for the Study of Religion Bulletin vol. 30, no. I (2001): 3-9; Stephen D. O'Leary, "Cyberspace 
as Sacred Space: Communicating Religion on Computer Networks," Journal of the American Academy of Religion 
vol. 64 (Winter 1996): 781-808. 
37 See for example, Bruce B. Lawrence, "God On Line: Locating the Pagan/Asian Soul of America in Cyberspace, in 
Susan L. Mizruchi (ed.), Religion and Cultural Studies (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton, 2001); Shawn Arthur, 
"Technophilia and Nature Religion: the Growth of a Paradox," Religion, vol. 32, no. 4 (October 2002): 303-14; 











performance of ritual and ceremony in cyberspace.38 In much of these discussions, an implicit 
question is how these performances manage to retain their efficacy and authenticity when 
transported from offline environments to online environments. This kind of implication is typical 
of much of the general discussion on religion and the Internet; the approach assumes a concept of 
religion that it transposes onto an Internet environment and then sets about exploring how the 
concept holds up in disembodied cyberspace. Of course, not all approaches are as cynical; 
sometimes the intention is to examine how religion adjusts to the needs of this new environment 
and capitalises on its possibilities. Brenda Brasher's recent book Give Me The Online Religion is 
a case in point. Brasher claims that online religion holds a "revolutionary importance" and 
acknowledges that "online religion triggers notable changes in religious experience that cannot 
help but transform the character of religion itself.,,39 These discussions are important and useful, 
but it is equally important to recognise that they are limited by their assumptions about what 
counts as religion. Brasher is actually conservative in her assessments of Internet religions, 
claiming that "against the onslaught of commercialisation in cyberspace, online religion could 
rapidly become an Internet endangered species. ,,40 Her concern leads her to advocate that Internet 
religion should be protected by legislation comparable to the kind of "public acknowledgement" 
and institutional support given to offline religion in the form of tax rebates and similar 
protections.41 Brasher works with a narrow definition of religion. Though she does not define 
38 See for example Helland's category "online-religion," in Christopher Helland, "Surfing for Salvation," Religion, 
vol. 31, no. 4 (October 2002): 293-303; Mark W. MacWilliams, "Virtual Pilgrimages on the Internet," Religion, 
vol. 32, no. 4 (October 2002): 315-35; Susan L. Mizruchi (ed.), Religion and Cultural Studies (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton, 2001); Brasher, Give Me That Online Religion; David Bruce Forbes and Jeffrey H. Mahan, eds., 
Religion and Popular Culture in America (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of Cali fomi a, 2000). 
39 Brenda E. Brasher, Give Me That Online Religion (San Fransisco: Jossey-Bass, 2001). 
4Q Brenda E. Brasher, Give Me That Online Religion (San Fransisco: lossey-Bass, 2001): II. 











religion, she is clearly interested in religions that fall within the ambit of social formations 
collectively acknowledged to be of authentic religion. These kinds of limitations in the 
scholarship, however, can be seen to be a by-product of their focussed enquiries; they are carried 
over from the offline world where a collective social agreement about what is and what is not 
religion provides a kind of working definition for investigations into religious things on this "new 
frontier," as one reviewer recently put it.42 
Against this background, I think it is important to recognize that the Internet is challenging not 
only the "character of religion," but is foregrounding again a historical problem that has 
shadowed the study of religions through all of its achievements and failures since its founding 
moment on the colonial frontiers. In a sense, the advent of the World Wide Web has opened 
another and a different kind of frontier in struggles over religious authenticity. As Chidester has 
noted, indigenous religion, popular religion, and folk religion have always born the burden of 
authenticity.43 Virtual religion, which is a kind of popular religion, finds itself similarly 
burdened. And like many similar instances drawn from indigenous and folk religions where the 
essential authenticity of their formations is doubted, virtual religions have risen to the challenge. 
When Discordianism found itself classified under "Parody Religion" in Yahoo's search 
directories, Discordianists inundated Yahoo with emaiIs demanding that their religion be 
reclassified under "Religions and Faiths." Three weeks later they won a partial victory when 
Yahoo reclassified them under "Entertainment," a compromise found to be far more agreeable; as 
one Discordianist noted, "Well, we are funny ... " Despite not winning the classification they 
42 Peter L. Edman, review of Give Me That Online Religion, by Brenda E. Brasher, Christianity Today 43. no. 10(8 
June 200 I): 69-70. 











demanded, Discordianists celebrated that the word parody does not appear anywhere in their new 
classification.44 Yet this kind of compromise also marks a distinction between disputes over 
religious authenticity in virtual religions and similar disputes found in indigenous or folk religion. 
With the latter, it is usually implicit that indigenous and folk religions take themselves very 
seriously as they contest claims against their authenticity. Yet it is far from certain that any of the 
virtual religions surveyed previously share the same attitude toward their claims to authenticity. 
This is one of virtual religion's most interesting and most significant features: that while visiting 
their websites and participating in their practices, one is not entirely sure whether they are serious 
in their claims. Take for example The Illuminated Knights of Otis. It is difficult to shake a 
nagging suspicion that they may not be entirely serious in following their weekly ritual 
observance of circulating among the faithful a photocopied image of an object that then becomes 
the focus of worship for that week before being replaced by the next week's sacred object. In 
response to this problem of seriousness as a requirement for authenticity in religion, the Center 
for Duck Studies hosts a page dedicated to "the question on everyone's mind," and it is worth 
noting that again the burden of authenticity is carried by virtual religion. The desire to know with 
certainty whether the Center for Duck Studies is serious or joking, suggests the author of this 
page, stems "from assumptions that religion must be boring or stable to be real." Yet the duck 
must contend with "the random wind and the changing nature of the water;" "even land is in a 
constant state of flux." Therefore, suggests the anonymous author, while everything else around it 
is changing, it is only the duck that remains stable; "If you take the Duck seriously, then It is 
serious. If you take the Duck as a joke, It is a joke. It remains the Duck." On the problem of 












Comedians make us laugh sometimes, but no one is seriously challenging their existence ... " Yet 
at the same time, s/he continues, we cannot assume that what makes us laugh is true. They go on: 
"But if a religion doesn't have the power to make us laugh, what power does it have? If the truth 
is never funny, why would anyone want to discover the truth?" 
An attempt to engage virtual religions as the subject of serious inquiry needs to accommodate 
this kind of instability and indeterminacy if it hopes to be fruitful. What is required is an 
approach to these religious formations that accepts them on their own terms. The success of 
Richard Lloyd Smith's attempt is limited because he fails to take this imperative adequately into 
account. Smith attempts to make sense of the religious claims of Discordianism, The Church of 
the Subgenius, and the various movements devoted to Cthulthu.45 Yet in developing a descriptive 
theoretical framework, he applies to these religions Starke and Bainbridge's category of 
"audience cults," an application that brings with it many of the assumptions that underscored 
Starke and Bainbridge's work and that cause for Smith many of the same problems for which 
Starke and Bainbridge were criticized when their text was published eleven years previously.46 
Smith's method is a kind of participant observation. He would hang around online discussion 
forums and chat rooms to see what he could discover. Implicit in Smith's interest is his 
questioning of whether these groups are in fact religious. As he observes: 
45 Richard Lloyd Smith III, "Neophilic Irreligions: Audience Cults and the World Wide Web" (masters diss., 
University of Virginia, 1996), available at http://religiousmovements.lib.virginia.edulnrmslneophile.html 
(accessed: 25 August 2003). 
46 See for example, Steve Bruce, review of The Future 0/ Religion: Secularization, Revival. and Cult Formation, by 
Rodney Starke and William Sims Bainbridge, Journal/or the Scientific Study 0/ Religion, vol. 25, no. 3 (Sept 
1986): 387; John A. Saliba, review of The Future 0/ Religion: Secularization. Revival. and Cult Formation, by 











They have beliefs in supernatural forces, are organized to the extent that they can be named, 
and are committed to chaos. They've been around for a while and have enough resolution 
among members to keep dialogue, gatherings and literature in the public domain. Yet they 
frown upon stability, spit upon dogma, and continue to change scripture held 'sacred' by 
members. They gather together, but never at periodic sessions (except on the Web, which is 
itself not fixed in any spectrum except the use of programming language). Anyone can 
declare themselves a Reverend in either Discordianism or the Church ofthe SubGenius. 
Anyone can take the risk of reciting arcane magickal spells in the name of Cthulhu. In the 
end, it is the groups themselves that decide whether they're religions. 
But Smith has his suspicions. Smith works with a concept of religious authenticity that includes 
commitment, solidarity, stability, and security. On a few occasions, he devises a series of 
questions that he posts on the discussion forums of these respective groups questioning members 
about these indicators of religious authenticity. For example, on the Discordianism message 
board, he posts: "I don't get it. If you guys call yourselves a religion, how can you foster 
commitment among members if you like chaos so much? A faith is built upon solidarity and 
stability, not discord and strife." On another occasion he posts: "A faith needs to provide stability 
and security among its members, not spread discord, strife, and confusion." Smith is not being 
deliberately provocative; he outlines his interest in what commitment, solidarity, stability, and 
security means to these groups under a section of his paper ominously titled "Religious 
newsgroups madness and irreverent rants." So he is understandably frustrated at the "classic, 
ironic, tongue-in-cheek glibness" that characterises much of the response to his questions. He 
sounds relieved when he says: "George finally got around to responding seriously to my message 











Church of the Subgenius is one of the first religions (palatable to western tastes) that emphasizes 
what YOU believe, not what is written in official texts" (original emphasis). 
In trying to fit Starke and Bainbridge's category to virtual religions, Smith adjusts the category 
and renames it "neophilic irreligions." This designation "refers to the quality in individuals that 
accepts or relishes the 'new' or unfamiliar by actively participating in its construction. The 
neophile is not opposed to altering this belief structure, or the organizational structure of his 
group, so long as it aids in the dispersal of stagnation and eternal truths." While Smith's 
theoretical innovation contributes to the legacy of Starke and Bainbridge's work and in a sense 
updates it for the Internet age, I don't think it is particularly helpful or useful as an approach to 
the problem of authenticity in religion. For one thing, his category addresses only three virtual 
religions, and as the earlier survey of these religions demonstrates, virtual religions are numerous 
and diverse. What this category suggests of these groups in terms of playful dispersals of absolute 
truths does carry some merit in some cases, but noting this playfulness and determination to 
destabilize eternal truth, so often taken to be the currency of authentic religion, only begins to 
pick up on the potential significance of these kinds of religions formations. Essentially, Smith is 
interested in what sense these three virtual religions think of themselves as religious. He then 
devises a marginal category to accommodate their religious claims. In contrast to this approach, I 
am interested in how virtual religions, in all there breadth, challenge the discursive ways religion 
is imagined to operate in popular culture. Virtual religions that carry the burden of authenticity 
thereby assume a critical position in relation to religious authenticity. This kind of critical 
positioning is independent of their intentions; whether they are intended seriously or as a joke, it 
is their inherent ambivalence that causes pause and consideration. In a sense, the arguments 











In developing these arguments, I also use a category, borrowed from Chidester.47 I use the 
designation "fake religion" to describe any of the virtual religions introduced earlier. Though 
"fake religion" is not a technical term in any sense and is of very limited substantive descriptive 
value, it does describe the basic tension between these virtual religions and the concept of 
authentic religion that causes us to wonder whether these fakes are serious or joking, or perhaps 
serous about joking. Besides describing this basic tension, the designation "fake" also describes a 
crucial feature of these kinds of "ordeals of authenticity,.48 that distinguishes it from other, similar 
disputes. A significant portion of the mystery and intrigue surrounding virtual religions is their 
mimetic quality. Quite simply, virtual religions look like authentic religions and seem to be self-
consciously imitating authentic religion. This poses a problem: if a good fake is difficult to 
distinguish from the authentic thing of which it is a copy, then how is one to know what is 
authentic religion? Though popular religions, indigenous religions, and folk religions all carry the 
burden of authenticity in relation to the concept of authentic religion, ordeals of authenticity 
involving virtual religion as a kind of popular religion differs from similar ordeals involving 
indigenous and folk religion. The difference is that where indigenous and folk religions make 
claims on the status of authenticity from their relatively marginal positions on the periphery, 
thereby involving themselves in disputes with authenticity's defenders at the centre that would 
keep them at bay, virtual religion deposits its challenge at the centre to be grappled with there. By 
their nature fake religions are already located at the centre; they assume the status of authentic 
religion as part and parcel of their mimicry; recall Discordianism's outrage at Yahoo's 
classification and their partial victory after a campaign premised on the essential truth of their 












claim to authenticity. Indeed, the most important attribute of authentic religion that fake religion 
imitates is its claim to the status of the authentic. In an essential way, it is this most crucial aspect 
of its mimicry that makes it fake. To put it another way, if indigenous and folk religions mount a 
frontal assault on authenticity from the peripheries of its bounded territory, or at least are 
perceived to do so by authenticity's defenders, fake religion is like a Trojan horse; it uses 
mimicry as a kind of camouflage that penetrates to authenticity's centre. It is in this sense that the 
World Wide Web is a different kind of frontier between the discursive spaces of authentic and 
inauthentic religion than the frontiers on which indigenous and folk religions struggle. It is the 
all-consuming nature of fake things that they are similar to and lack distinction from authentic 
things of which they are a copy. Mimicry therefore becomes a key term for this discussion. The 
difficulty in distinguishing fake things from authentic things introduces ambivalence as another 
key term. But ambivalence is crucial here not only because it causes hesitancy amid the 
automaticity of collective social agreements about fake religion's essential lack of authenticity. I 
use ambivalence here to exert a critical leverage in the vexed problem of authenticity in religion. 
The argument developed here is this: The point of distinction between authentic and fake is 
empirically indeterminable. A distinction is maintained by way of a collective social agreement 
that is empirically arbitrary but politically relevant. Setting the political question aside for the 
moment, if authenticity's distinction from inauthenticity is empirically inconclusive, then the 
separating boundary between their two territories can be characterised as a kind of contact zone, 
an ambivalent threshold that might unwittingly be traversed back and forth. The mimetic flow of 
ambivalent images of authentic religion back and forth across this threshold signifies this kind of 
unwitting movement. What makes the problem of religious authenticity so ambivalent is not only 











indeterminable, but that - and this is the political problem - this movement across the boundary 
goes both ways. Recognising this dialectic between authenticity and fakery introduces the 
possibility that a locus of authenticity in fake religions might be found in its critique of authentic 
religion. It is with this locus that the present discussion is concerned. 
1.4 Chapter Overview 
Chapter Two begins with an exploration of authenticity from an empirical perspective. The key 
word here is forensics because its dual connotation of science and police work describes the 
empirical paradigm that sees fakery as a matter of detection. The intention with this discussion is 
to find the limits of empiricism's usefulness as an approach to the problem of authenticity 
generally. If the methods of independent verification and falsification are useful at all, they are 
limited by the difficulties of temporal contingencies and the affective properties of objects of 
disputed authenticity. To put it plainly, the status pertaining to the authenticity of an object can 
change with time; objects previously thought to be authentic are later discovered to be fake. 
Perhaps more interesting are those objects of disputed authenticity that begin life as fake but gain 
authenticity with the passage of time. An object's affective properties can leave the forensic 
detective guessing as to the motives or intentions of the author of the disputed object. At least 
these variables - and no doubt there are more - frustrate empiricism's demand that all doubt be 
eliminated and conclusive statements and definitive adjudications be forthcoming. Having 
determined at least some of the limits of a forensic method, the problem of authenticity in 











authenticity still out of reach, but the most popular approach to resolving its challenge is shown 
to be limited and therefore unsuitable. 
The second half of the chapter begins with a close reading of Michael Taussig's essay on the 
apparently harmonious co-existence of faith and scepticism in Kwakiutl shamanism. In the 
context of the double problem presented by authenticity and empiricism, Taussig's essay is useful 
because at the centre of his discussion is a paradox that would seem to make a case for 
inauthenticity, yet does not because its constituent terms manage a harmonious coexistence, 
despite an empirical method that demands they be separated. The discussion of Taussig's analysis 
ofKwakiutl shamanism I link with his work on defacement and sacrilegious unmasking thereby 
setting the parameters of the argument development through Chapters Three and Four. The key 
idea that Taussig, following Walter Benjamin, introduces and that runs through the argument 
developed here is that exposure along the lines of forensic detection destroys authenticity. 
Instead, for authenticity to be meaningful requires what Benjamin calls a just revelation. Such a 
revelation in tum requires that authenticity be imagined as a dialectic between revelation and 
concealment. The concealing aspect of authenticity is the quality of deception and mimicry in 
objects of disputed authenticity and the sense in which one is simply uncertain of an object's 
status pertaining to authenticity. In this sense, concealment is related to ambivalence. Since the 
problem of authenticity in religion is more often characterised by ambivalence than by confident 
pronouncements on an object's authenticity, the appearance of an object can be understood as a 
concealing surface. The just revelation of authenticity means a showing on the surface of 
appearance the mysterious movements within its concealed depths. This showing, though more 
frequent than we might assume, requires a certain kind of vision that has lost its currency in an 











certain techniques of vision. It is a casestudy of such a showing that is the subject of Chapter 
Three. 
The visual technique required here is given theoretical expression by Walter Benjamin in his 
notion of dialectics at a standstill. Chapter Three begins with an exposition of Benjamin's theory, 
before applying it to a particular constellation of authenticity and fakery configured around the 
case of Landover Baptist Ministries. Mimicry and ambivalence are key terms here, for where the 
mimetic aspect establishes the dialectical relation between fakery and authenticity, the 
ambivalent aspect characterises the tensions that structures that relation. Dialectical tension is 
essential to Benjamin's critical theory because it is the ambivalent tensions inherent in the 
mimetic flow back and forth across a threshold between dialectical opposites that powers the 
reconstellating movements of the dialectic. According to Benjamin's theory, when the dialectic 
becomes saturated with tensions, it comes to a sudden standstill, thereby creating the conditions 
for authenticity's revelation. The discussion traces a dialectic between authenticity and fakery 
through a series of constellating movements involving the websites of Landover Baptists, 
Objective Christian Ministries, Adult Christianity, Blessed Quietness, and even the popular 
Internet search engine Google. Yet though the conditions for authenticity's revelation are 
implicated in dialectics at a standstill, the revelation itself is dependent on both the dialectical 
composition of the image of perception as well as the involvement of the perceiver with the 
image perceived. The importance of the perceiver in the drama of authenticity's revelation is the 
subject of Chapter Four. 
Benjamin uses the notion of tactile appropriation to theorise the importance of bodily 











theory of authentic critique and a discussion of the importance of tactile appropriation to that 
theory. Thereafter, the discussion explores how humorous laughter as a response to fake religions 
might evidence the kind of tactile appropriation that Benjamin's theory argues is necessary if the 
revelation is to be successful. The second and third discussions of the chapter reflect on the 
theological and critical messianic possibilities of laughter. If the key word for Chapter Three is 
dialectics, the key word in Chapter Four is incongruity, for it is an incongruity theory of 
humorous laughter that the chapter develops. Picking up on Peter Berger's suggestion that comic 
experience is an adumbration of religious experience, the discussion revisits the Benjaminian 
suggestion that in the modem era, instead of authenticity there remains only authentic critique. 
The argument developed here affirms Benjamin's suggestion by matching Berger's theory of 
comic experience with Benjamin's political messianism. 
Having travelled through forensic investigations into authenticity, explored authenticity's 
dialectic with fakery, and reflected on the critical possibilities afforded by dwelling in 
incongruity, Chapter Five concludes the argument. A recurring theme running through these 
discussions is a critique of reason and empiricism. This critique is first introduced in Chapter 
Two and then subsumed under Benjamin's general critique of modernity, developed in Chapters 
Three and Four. Chapter Five relates this critique to the problem of authenticity in religion by 
making the argument that authenticity is fundamentally implicated with critical reflection. 
Authenticity in fake religions resides in their capacity to draw attention to the non-dialectical 
claims to authenticity advanced by so-called world religion and to critically challenge the manner 
in which empirical reason is called upon to deny the veracity of alternative claims, at the same 
time that this distorted virsion of authenticity obfuscates empiricism's unsuitability to the 











argument that virtual religions issue a critique against religious authenticity, the concluding 
discussion also develops an argument for authenticity in religion that is aligned with the concept 
of authenticity in art. 
In religious studies scholarship of the past few decades, there has lingered a sense in which 
religious studies needs to justify and defend its disciplinary integrity against a combination of 
arguments that it is merely a branch of cultural studies and that creeping secularisation will 
gradually shrink the religious realm, until eventually it will disappear in a puff oflogic, to borrow 
a phrase from Terry Pratchet. And though the secularisation thesis has been comprehensively 
disproved by events, the modernist sentiment that religion is an irrational, illogical, and 
unreasonable hangover from a previous age and is destined to disappear still persists. 
Consequently, under the coercive influence of these and similar sentiments, the study of religion 
is often pursued with apology. The problem of authenticity in religion therefore offers an 
important opportunity to religious studies. If the critique of modernity, in all its manifestations, is 
the overarching critical philosophical enterprise of the humanities, critical reflection on the 
problem of authenticity in religion makes an important contribution. That contribution, while of 
considerable benefit to the on-going critique of modernity, turns the table on modernity, so to 
speak, and also thereby presents a special opportunity to religious studies. The critique of 
modernity, implicit and explicit in critical reflection on the problem of authenticity in religion, is 
a kind of critique that can be issued only if it is simultaneous with a disciplinary commitment to 
religion as a legitimate and important field of study, no matter how interdisciplinary the 
approach. This kind of commitment is not simply by default of the critique; it entails recognising 
and ratifying that religion can assume a non-theological and intellectually rigorous critical 











premises, and its view of the world and human destiny. In this sense, perhaps it is more accurate 
to say that it is not the table that has turned, but rather the seating at the table that has been 
switched. For like the duck, the table remains a table; it is only our orientations that change. The 
problem of authenticity in religion, while presenting an important opportunity for reflecting on 
that orientation, fundamentally demonstrates the continuing importance of religion as a seat of 











Chapter Two: Forensics 
We ought never to allow ourselves to be persuaded of anything unless on the 
evidence of our reason. I 
As to proofs of authenticity or fakery, the matter involves confession, 
testimony and forensics.2 
The key word here is "forensics" because it signifies the methodological framework that 
reason, evidence, testimony, confession, and proof establish. Forensics in its noun form refers 
to "the use of science and technology to investigate and establish facts in criminal or civil 
courts oflaw," or in a related definition, "the art or study of formal debate; argumentation.',3 
"Technology" here is variously understood as "a body of knowledge" or "a discipline ... of 
applying scientific knowledge so solving practical problems.'.4 A "problem" here is "a 
question posed for solution.us Authenticity therefore is a question that demands resolution; it 
is posed with the assumed confidence that it can be proved scientifically. Proofis arrived at 
by reasoned argument, of which the juridical realm, with its confession and testimony, is 
exemplary. Authenticity therefore is something that can be proved, can be established, as a 
fact, by way of reasoned argument. In this scientific formulation, authenticity's opposite is 
fakery and can be similarly determined as a fact by a forensic method. Authenticity and 
1 Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method, trans. Laurence J. Lefleur (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1950), part iv. 
2 Seymour Howard, "Fakes, Intention, Proofs and the Impulsion to Know: The Case of Cavaceppi and the 
Clones," in Mark Jones (ed.), Why Fakes Matter: Essays in Problems of Authenticity (London: British 
Museum, 1992), p. 52. 













fakery are understood as opposite sides to the same coin and can therefore be distinguished as 
easily and definitively as the gambler distinguishes heads from tails. Such positivist ideals of 
authenticity also need to be recognised as allied with moral ideals; the aspiration to 
authenticity is simultaneously a rejection of deception and fakery's currency in fraud is 
abhorred for exactly this quality. And so proofs of authenticity and especially fakery 
necessarily involve confession, not only because confession aids the forensic inquiry, but 
because confession aids redemption. I take first Descartes' axiomatic statement on the method 
of reason and then Howard's statement on the method of testimony, confession and forensics 
that is the formers' descendent to be emblematic of a prevailing notion of authenticity that 
assumes authenticity and its opposite, fakery, to be knowable, accessible, and transparent, that 
operates in the singular, and that therefore treats authenticity as if it were the object of 
forensic inquiry, in other words, emblematic of the notion that the pursuit of authenticity is 
similar to police work. 
In this chapter I will develop a critique ofthis formulation to show that rather than knowable, 
accessible, and transparent, authenticity can in certain, even most, circumstances appear 
illusive, secretive, and opaque; that rather than operating in the exclusive singular, 
authenticity may be inclusive and plural; that rather than abhorring contradiction, authenticity 
can accommodate paradox. In short, I want to show that authenticity is a significantly less 
stable object of inquiry than is often assumed. More than that, I want to show that the very 
notion of authenticity is inherently ambivalent. In making this my intention however, I do not 
intend to be disparaging of authenticity's usefulness as a description attributed to objects. 
Rather, this problematising of authenticity's ambivalence at the limits of forensic science fits 
in with a larger claim pursued throughout this dissertation: that if authenticity is to retain its 











accommodate in its authentic self-understanding a dynamic quality and an ability to be 
flexible and adaptable. 
The present chapter therefore is structured into two parts. The first pursues the limits of 
authenticity in search of authenticity's inherent ambivalence. The discussion that follows here 
will begin by looking at different objects of disputed authenticity comparatively so as to play 
up contradictions for which forensic methods are unable to account. As the discussion will 
demonstrate, these contradictions stem from the differing emphases of two methods employed 
to establish scientifically, that is to say, to prove, an object's authentic status. The first of 
these seeks a locus of authenticity in the content of the object itself by means of independent 
verification. The second method is falsification and is focussed on the origins of the object. In 
pursuing that exploration, I will begin with the infamous case of George Psalmanazar who, in 
1704, published An Historical and Geographical Description of Formosa. That brief taster of 
authenticity's vexations is followed by the case of Emmanuel Swedenborg and his science of 
correspondences, a complex and ingenious metaphysical scheme he received through an 
extended discourse with angels as well as in the course of his own visitations to and travels in 
heavenly realms. These two examples illustrate how proofs of authenticity pursued through 
attempts to independently verify claims implicit and explicit in an objects' content can 
become very difficult. They also introduce the possibility that some relief from these 
frustrations may be provided by attempts to falsify claims of origination, thus falsifying 
claims to authenticity and arriving at a scientific solution. Yet the example of Carlos 
Castaneda demonstrates the difficulties that this approach can encounter. The pursuit of 
Castaneda's controversial Don Juan takes us from Mexico's Sonoran Desert in the 1960s, to 











The comparison betwe~n proofs of authenticity pursued through independent verification of 
an object's content and proofs pursued through falsification of claims to origin introduces the 
possibility that authenticity is neither stable nor consistent. By way of reflection on this 
possibility, I will explore two particular aspects of authenticity that aid such instability and 
inconsistency. The first of these is authenticity's temporal contingencies. An object's 
authentic status is responsive to the changing circumstances of its environment. The turbulent 
moods of fashion, and the march of technological advancement and science may suddenly 
make appear new knowledge, at a moment's notice showing objects once considered 
authentic to be fake. More troubling is those rare instances (though arguably decreasingly so) 
where previously fake things become authentic. Here the discussion will explore the once 
entirely fictional language of Kling on, a collection of arbitrary noises uttered by actors 
portraying the fierce, war-mongering aliens of the same name in the fantastical galaxy of Star 
Trek. After thirty years of Star Trek fandom, Klingon is today a systematised, spoken and 
written language with its own language institute, expanding list of publications in Klingon, 
and an increasing number of speakers. 
The significance of temporal contingencies to the pursuit of authenticity is that it breaks the 
either or binary of authenticity and fakery. While authenticity and fakery remain opposites, 
there is a quality of indeterminacy introduced here and along with it a sense of relish as agents 
to this problem apparently deliberately play with this indeterminacy in self-consciously ironic 
ways. This kind of self-reflective subversion is linked with a second category of examples that 
fiustrates the confidence invested in scientific methods. Whether an object is ironic, or 
satirical, or is a parody or caricature of something else, introduces a critical concern with an 











simultaneously introduces the possibility that forensic methods that focus Oil objectivity to the 
exclusion of subjectivity may be methodologically flawed. 
This first part of the chapter is structured into four parts: the first looks at independent 
verification of an object's content; the second, at falsification of an object's origins; the third, 
at authenticity's temporal contingencies; and the fourth, at affective aspects that then 
introduces the problem of sUbjectivity. The exploration of contents and origins finds the limits 
of forensic methods. This grouping stands in contrast with temporal contingencies and 
subjectivity which together point to the territory where authenticity's locus may lie. But 
before rushing headlong into that territory, I want to dwell on the threshold a little longer 
because I suspect that some indication of the way forward may lurk here. At the limits of 
science and reason, the forensic method faces a paradox for which it is unable to account. The 
starkest formulation of this paradox in both theory and practice is where authenticity can be 
seen to coexist harmoniously with fakery. Much of the playful relish remarked on a moment 
ago stems from this incongruity and is the source of ambivalence in authentic 
pronouncements. But if a way can be found whereby such a coexistence is possible, then the 
limits are transcended and a way forward is found. 
The second part ofthis chapter dwells at that limit. Here I follow Michael Taussig's excellent 
essay on the coexistence of faith with scepticism, a seemingly intractable paradox at the heart 
ofKwakiutl shamanism. From this essay as well as his work on defacement and sacrilegious 
unmasking, I distil certain key ideas that I suggest indicate an alternative approach to the 
vexed question of authenticity in religion. These I collect together at the conclusion of this 












One way of defining authenticity is to describe it as a quality attached to objects that 
distinguishes those objects from fake objects. Whether this is a useful definition can be 
debated, but it does allow us a way to begin thinking about authenticity because it asserts that 
authenticity is distinguishable, not just in itself, but from something else. It is in the act of 
distinguishing, in this space between the authentic and the fake, that an image of authenticity 
takes form. One way of distinguishing authentic things from fake things, which is to say a 
strategy to interrogate an object's claim to authenticity, is to look at the contents of the object, 
what it consists in. In the case of say a pair of athletic shoes, one could examine the materials 
used in its construction, the pattern of its stitching, the quality of its soles. A trained 
investigator would quickly distinguish the fake sports trainer from the genuine article. Indeed, 
branding, the purview of the advertising industry, is often intimately related to the promotion 
of the quality and uniqueness of the materials used in the production of a particular line of 
consumer products. Yet the seeming ease with which assessments of authenticity may be 
conducted on these and similar objects can be attributed to the availability of certified genuine 
objects with which objects of disputed authenticity may be compared. A difficulty emerges 
when one considers objects for which such authenticating benchmarks do not exist. For 
example, how does one assess the authenticity of accounts of people's adventures where little 
or no data exists independently, of which the archetypical example is the fish that got away? 
How does one establish the authentic status of an object by independent verification without 











One can imagine that this kind of difficulty occupied tht:: popular imagination of European 
society in the era of that continent's encounter with North and South America, Africa south of 
the Sahara, the Far East, Australasia, and the South Pacific, as travellers returned with 
accounts of what they had seen as well as artefacts possessed along the way. No doubt much 
of what these accounts claimed was embellished and imaginatively elaborated. And no doubt 
European audiences, suspecting as much, did not believe everything they heard. Yet accounts 
of exotic places and people surely presented a particular problem to the European 
imagination: to what extent should such accounts be taken as factually accurate and truthful? 
This ambivalence inherent in the expanding genre of the exotic can be usefully positioned 
alongside the confidence invested in the nascent genre of the ethnographic record. The 
practice of ethnographic research that was so firmly grounded in the shift toward positivism 
meant that the emerging standards of social scientific research added an aura of authenticity to 
accounts of exotic things presented under the banner of ethnographic description. 
This brings to mind the particular example of George Psalmanazar, author of An Historical 
and Geographical Description of Formosa, first published in 1704. Psalmanazar, who 
claimed to be a Fromosan, went into considerable detail in his account; The Description was 
some 182 pages long, spanned 32 chapters, and covered subjects including: government, 
religion, fasting days, ceremonies, priests, objects of worship, postures of adoration, 
ceremonies at birth, marriages and deaths, afterlife, vestments, manners and customs, physical 
appearance, clothes, habituations, commodities, weights and measures, superstitions, diseases, 
revenues, natural produce, foodstuffs, animals, language, shipping, money, weapons, musical 
instruments, education, liberal and mechanical arts, and the vice-regal retinue.6 There is 
clearly considerable data with which to make an assessment of the authenticity of 
6 Rodney Needham, "Psaimanazar, Confidence-man," Exemplars (Berkeley: University of Calif ami a Press, 











Psalmanazar's account. The difficulty of course was the lack of reliable accounts with which 
to compare it. There did exist prior to Psalmanazar's a handful of descriptions of Formosan 
society and customs, provided by missionaries, travellers and traders. Yet none of these 
seemed as complete nor comprehensive as Psalmanazar's, whose account of Formosa enjoyed 
the added authority that its author (Psalmanazar) claimed to have been born there, spoke the 
Formosan language fluently, and continued in his daily life the Formosan customs of eating 
uncooked roots and raw meat. 7 The sheer magnitude and detail of The Description aided its 
plausibility, not least because of the assumed difficulty of inventing an entire society and 
social system. Faced with little previously verified data on Formosa, it must have been 
tempting to accept this detailed description, presented by a self-authenticated Formosan, as 
what it claimed to be: a detailed description of the island and its people, an ethnography of 
Formosa. 
As is now so infamously known, The Description was entirely a fiction, a product of 
Psalmanazar's imagination. Even his name was not his birth name, but adopted, presumably 
for its exotic sound, to improve the plausibility of his account.s It has never been established 
who the man history knows as Psalmanazar in actual fact was, though from his own memoirs 
wherein he admits his deception, it appears he came from somewhere between A vignon and 
Rome.9 In the years since, there has been considerable debate as to how successful 
7 Ibid., p. 80; Susan Stewart, Crimes of Writing: Problems in the Containment of Representation (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1994), p. 34. 
8 It seems that Psalmanazar acquired his name from the Assyrian king Shalmaneser named in 2 King 17:3. 
Exactly how a Japanese living in Europe came to be named after an Assyrian king Psalmanazar never 
explained. though it doesn't seem to have caused him too much trouble in his lifetime. As for as his name 
adding to the plausibility of his account, clearly it was its exotic qualities that performed certain authenticating 
labours here. For a full discussion, see Stewart, Crimes of Writing, pp. 31-65; and Needham, "Psalmanazar," 
pp.80-84. 











Psalmanazar's fraud was, thought there is a fair amount of evidence to urge hesitancy. The 
Description was greeted with skepticism when it first appeared in 1704 and the Preface to the 
1705 edition contained answers to objections provoked by the first. For a number of years it 
seems public opinion remained undecided, but ultimately, facing incredulity and ridicule from 
many quarters, Psalmanazar withdrew from public notice, later finding employment as a tutor, 
fan painter, and literary assistant to a printer. Yet despite his fraud weighing heavily on his 
sense of personal integrity, The Description seems to have met with some commercial 
success: the first edition sold out (prompting the second edition in 1705), a French translation 
was prepared and printed in 1708 and again in 1712, and a German edition in 1712 and 1716. 
Despite this, Psalmanazar recorded in his memoirs that he "deserved no other name that that 
of imposter." 10 
The example ofPsalmanazar demonstrates one version of the difficulty inherent in assessing 
an object's claim to authenticity by independent verification of its content when authenticated, 
independent data is not available for comparative purposes. We will have cause to return to 
this example again in a moment. But there is a second version of this problem, one that finds 
endless examples in the realm of things religious, though not exclusively so. The problem is 
how does one assess the authenticity of transcendent claims, that Jesus was the Son of God; 
that Mohammed was the last in a series of God's prophets traced back to the patriarch 
Abraham; or the countless claims over the centuries of a personal, intimate, and profound 
relationship with God, angels, demons, the dead. The problem here is that the transcendent 
nature of the claim means that no scientific procedure can verify its authenticity. Take for 
example the case of Emmanuel Swedenborg (1688 - 1772) who, in a series of publications 
printed at his own expense, presented a carefully worked out metaphysics of correspondences 











between divine things and natural things, such that: "there is not a thing that is not a type, 
image and likeness of some one among spiritual things, all of which are exemplars.,,11 
Swedenborg's metaphysical scheme contained in his science of correspondences is far to 
elaborate to give an account of here and contributes little to the present concern with 
authenticity. From the point of view of the present discussion however, what is interesting 
about his metaphysics is his concomitant claim that this doctrine was revealed to him by 
angels with whom he had frequent and lengthy conversations. It might have been tempting to 
Swedenborg's contemporaries to dismiss him as mad, as was done with so many before and 
so many since, yet this option must have been tempered by the reputation and stature of the 
man: a student of astronomy and anatomy and a leading mathematician, a Cartesian rationalist 
and natural philosopher, an assessor to the Royal College of Mines, a social reformer in the 
House of Nobles, and an engineer of considerable repute. 12 
Far from being dismissed as mad, Swedenborg's claims found fertile ground in America 
between the 18th and nineteenth centuries. There his claims found extensive support amid 
protestant revival movements that placed much emphasis on material manifestations ofthe 
divine. Swedenborg's claims sat well with these trends in religious practice and his work 
attracted considerable admiration. Yet ifSwedenborg's accounts were often cited to lend 
credibility to similar claims emerging in American Protestant devotional ism, it is not 
surprising that we find among these claims descriptions of encounters with Swedenborg's 
spirit toO.13 The issue at stake is authenticating authority. For the revivalists, that authority 
II Swedenborg, quoted in Rodney Needham, "Swedenborg and the Science of Correspondences: God's Secret 
Dictionary," Exemplars (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1985), p.12!. 
12 Needham, "Swedenborg and the Science of Correspondences," p. 118; Leigh Eric Schmidt, Hearing Things: 
Religion. Illusion. and the American Enlightenment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 
204. 











resides in heaven. And so every material manifestation reasserts and legitimates that 
authority. Contrasted with the authority of heaven is the authority of reason, championed by 
enlightenment rationalists. 
Yet Swedenborg and surely thousands of similar examples demonstrate where this authority 
reaches a limit, for it is clear that to proceed by a method of independent verification is not to 
proceed at all. Obviously, Swedenborg's claims cannot be verified, not even hypothetically, 
as was the case with Psalmanazar in his day who impudently replied to a detractor: ''The best 
advice I can give him is, to go to Formosa, and, ifhe can, confute me.,,14 This is not to say 
that reason has lost its authority. There remains an alternative scientific method. For if it can 
be shown that Swedenborg derived his doctrine from a source other that angels, or that the 
voice of a channelled spirit did not emanate from the "speaking trumpet" as many American 
protestant devotionalists claimed, I 5 the case for inauthenticity could be made and the question 
of authenticity settled. In contrast with a method that seeks to independently verify the content 
in which a disputed object consists, this approach, which can be named falsification, examines 
the source and origin of the disputed object. 
Falsifying Origins 
It seems reasonable that something claiming a source or origin that in fact is not its own is 
inauthentic. The obvious category of example is plagiarism. But things are seldom clean-cut 
and assessments of authenticity conducted by methods of falsification, like assessments via 
methods of independent verification, are also marked by ambivalent grey areas. Something 
does not come from nothing; the imagination must have something to work with, some speck 
\4 Quoted in Needham, "Psalmanazar," p. 94. 











of an image or concept that will serve as inspired catalyst for a creative idea. So then creations 
are in some sense constructions, the bringing together of already existing things to produce 
new formations in their confluences. As "new" as these new formations may be, they are 
nevertheless derived of pre-existing ideas, concepts, objects, things themselves the products 
of similar creative processes. An example of this kind oflogic comes to mind in the case of an 
artist who ceased her creative output altogether, incapacitated by the sudden realization of the 
impossibility of authentic originality. Yet it would be a grave error to conclude that because 
everything is in some sense derived of pre-existing things, or combinations of such things, 
that authenticity is therefore an impossibility. Such a conclusion would be forced to dismiss 
outright any notion of uniqueness, a patently absurd proposition. For in forgetting the 
imagination that brings pre-existing things into proximity with one another, such a conclusion 
against the possibility of authenticity denies the specific and unique authorship of these 
constellations, authorships that open authentically original spaces where new meanings may 
take shape, new formations derived of pre-existing ideas. Still, if such constellations are at 
least partially derivative, in the sense that a creation exists as a constellation of pre-existing 
things prior to a catalytic moment that opens uniquely original spaces, then what is the critical 
mass at which an imaginative constellation of things becomes an authentically new and 
unique creation? Following this inductive method for the moment, I want to pursue this 
problem of origin in the search for a locus of authenticity and propose doing so by reversing 
the question just arrived at by asking: what is the critical mass, the moment, when something 
loses its authenticity and slips into fakery? The problem of plagiarism is useful here exactly 
because the plagiarized work is an object that misrepresents its source or sources, a case of 
fakery located not with the object's content, but with its origins. The example of plagiarism 
demonstrates the kind of ambivalent tensions between derivation and originality alluded to 











demands in assessments of authenticity. Take for example the case of Carlos Castaneda, 
celebrated author of the Don Juan saga. Beginning with The Teachings of Don Juan: A Yaqui 
Way of Knowledge, first published in 1968 (hereafter referred to as The Teachings), the story 
continued with the 1971 publication of A Separate Reality, and Journey to Ixtlan: The Lessons 
of Don Juan in 1972. There have been more titles, 16 but for the purposes of the present 
discussion, these three will suffice. In addition to earning their author a Master's degree in 
anthropology from the University of California at Berkely (The Teachings consisted of his 
dissertation submission), the series made Castaneda a millionaire and celebrity hero among 
the counter-culture of the late 1960s and 1970s. The stories of Castaneda's adventures with 
Don Juan are presented as a true and accurate account of Castaneda's experiences with Juan 
Mathus, the hero of the narratives, in Mexico's Sonoran Dessert. They include accounts of 
hallucinogenic and similar other-worldly experiences that precipitated sharp and profound 
insights into the nature of reality and our lived engagement with our existence. 
In his excellent essay on Castaneda, Rodney Needham observes that in many ways the Don 
Juan books reflect the difficulties and challenges their contemporary audiences struggled 
with. According to Needham, there is a strong correlation between the themes and other 
aspects of content in each book and the dominant concerns of its particular audience: The 
Teachings echoed the anti-establishment emphasis of the drug culture and sought alternative 
realities; A Separate Reality reflected, in its careful structure of explicit "lessons," .. a move in 
youth culture ... toward a more sober and reflective approach to the quandaries oflife;" The 
16 These first three titles were followed by Sorcery: A Description of the World (1973); Tales of Power (1974); 
The Second Ring of Power (1977); The Art of Dreaming (1977); The Way of the Shaman (1980); The Eagles 
Gift (1981); The Fire From Within (1984); The Power of Silence: Further Lessons of Don Juan (1987); The 
Art of Dreaming (1993); Magical Passes; The Practical Wisdom of the Shamans of Ancient Mexico (1999); 
The Active Side of Infinity (2000); The Wheel of Time: The Shamans of Ancient Mexico. Their Thoughts Abollt 











Eagle's Gift, published "in a time of forceful feminism," gives the leading part after 
Castaneda as narrator to a woman and contains more female characters than earlier books. 
Needham concludes: " ... it is as though the potential readers first voiced their concerns and 
the ethnographer then responded to them.,,17 Such reciprocity is not in itself objectionable, a 
point Needham concedes, but it does warrant notice in a text that claims to be written as a true 
account of actual people and events. With notice comes scrutiny and from the first publication 
the Don Juan books quickly became the focus of close inspection. The most forceful and 
sustained critique issued from Richard de Mille in his book Castaneda's Journey: The Power 
and the Allegory and then in a volume De Mille edited ominously titled The Don Juan 
Papers: Further Castaneda Controversies. 18 In these and other publications the essential truth 
of Castaneda's account is challenged by employing the method of falsification, identifying 
instances of remarkable similarity between features and anecdotes contained in Castaneda's 
narrative and literary works pre-dating Castaneda's. The suggestion in these and other, similar 
articles and monographs is that Castaneda invented Juan Mathus / Don Juan and the 
experiences, adventures, and insights attributed to him, first for the purposes of his studies, 
and then for personal gain. In his essay "An Ally for Castaneda," Rodney Needham implies a 
similar charge, though his purposes for doing so stem from a different line of inquiry than 
simply testing the veracity of Castaneda's claims. Setting aside Needham's interest to 
Castaneda for moment, his essay is of particular interest for the present inquiry into the 
origins of textual objects as a basis for assessing their authenticity because his analysis takes 
matters a step further, as will become apparent in a moment. In doing so Needham 
demonstrates the problematic relation of originality to authenticity and thereby throws into 
17 Rodney Needham, "An Ally for Castaneda," Exemplars (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985) p. 
190-1. 
18 Richard de Mille, Castaneda's Journey: The Power and the Allegory (London: Sphere Books, 1978); Richard 












greater relief the difficulties and ambivalences of authenticity, both as ideal and as attribute of 
objects. 
Needham notes marked similarities between the Don Juan writings of Castaneda and two texts 
on Zen Buddhism written by Eugene Herrigel. Working from the reasonable assumption that 
Castaneda did not read German, Needham only concerns himself with the English translations 
ofHerrigel's books. The first of these is Zen and the Art of Archery (1953) (hereafter referred 
to as "The Art of Archery"). The second, published five years after his death, is The Method of 
Zen (1960) (hereafter referred to as "The Method"). With regard The Art of Archery, Needham 
contends that "there are such correspondences between Herrigel's monograph and the first 
two Castaneda titles as to make it appear that the former may have been a prime source of 
certain characteristic features of the latter.,,19 As regards The Method, Needham suggests that 
it "also could have been a formative influence on Castaneda's description of Don Juan and his 
teachings.,,2o The points of correlation set down by Needham are many and do make for a 
strong argument,21 but in themselves they are not of concern here, suffice to recognize that 
they do call into question the authenticity of Castaneda's project. What is more interesting 
about Needham's discussion from the point of view of the present inquiry, is the manner in 
which Needham, having dispatched with Castaneda, turns his critical eye toward Herrigel, 
subjecting Herrigel's texts to the same penetrating analysis previously metered out against 
Castaneda. 
The German-born philosopher Eugene Herrigel traveled to Japan in 1924 where he stayed 
until 1929. During his tenure at Tohoku University he took up the practice of archery, under 
19 Needham, "An Ally for Castaneda," p. 195. 
20 Ibid., p. 195. 











the tutorship of Master Kenzo Awa. It is out of this experience that Herrigel's knowledge of 
Zen method and its relationship to archery proceed. The first apparent cause for doubting the 
veracity of Herrigel's accounts is immediately apparent even from this brief bit of 
background: Herrigel's first book recounting this experience was published two decades after 
what it describes actually transpired. (The original German edition of The Art of Archery 
appeared in 1949.) Yet in it Herrigel quotes conversations between himself and his master 
verbatim. The first edition of The Method, compiled of Herrigel's papers left at his death, was 
published posthumously in 1958, without the benefit ofHerrigel, or Kenzo Awa for that 
matter, confirming its accuracy. There is also the problem of language and translation. 
Herrigel did not speak Japanese before arriving in Japan and was forced to resort to a 
translator until he acquired the necessary language skills. Also, Herrigel wrote his accounts in 
Gennan, with the first English translation appearing only two years before his death, and the 
second translation, of a book he never saw in its entirety, appearing in 1960. Amid all these 
translative acts, first from Japanese to Gennan, later into Herrigel's "unforgettable memories 
and notes which I made at the time:,22 then decades later from these memories and notes, 
which we can reasonably assume were recorded in Herrigel's native Gennan, into the first 
Gennan edition of The Art of Archery, from this edition into an English edition, and finally, 
after Herrigel' s death, by his editor, again from Herrigel' s notes, into The Method. It seems 
reasonable to acknowledge that a gap may have widened between what factually transpired 
between master and student and what Herrigel, his translators, and editors decades later report 
transpired. But if these and other observations offered by Needham speculatively pose the 
question of authenticity without offering conclusive evidence to doubt Herrigel's account, the 
most interesting aspect of Needham's discussion follows. Needham identifies a possible 
source of Herrigel's anecdotes and metaphorical images in Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, the 











Getman physicist and aphorist admired by such Getman philosophers as Goethe, 
Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Wittgenstein, and almost certainly well known to Herrigel, the 
Getman philosopher reflecting on his Japanese education. Needham points to a number of 
anecdotes offered by Herrigel and attributed to his master, who Herrigel quotes verbatim in 
his attribution. Needham remarks on their "distracting echo," the sense in which they have 
been heard previously, before going on to identify identical images in the writings of 
Lichtenberg, phrased with uncanny similarity and dated around 1784.23 Needham's essay 
draws a parallel between the fotmative influences ofHerrigel on Castaneda's work and in its 
turn the similar influences of Lichtenberg on Herrigel's monographs; Lichtenberg is to 
Herrigel as Herrigel is to Castaneda. 
It has not been an intention of the preceding discussion to charge either Castaneda or Herrigel 
with plagiarism. Plagiarism implies deliberate intention to deceive. In the case of first 
Castaneda and then Herrigel, the evidence cited by Needham is far from conclusive on this 
point. Rather, the discussion has sought to show just how tricky, nuanced, and often outright 
ambivalent, is the adjudication of authenticity on criteria of an object's origins. For if it is 
argued that Herrigel's monograph is essentially inauthentic, on account of its similarity to 
Lichtenberg's work, and in its turn Castaneda's work is inauthentic on account of its 
similarity to Herrigel's work, are we to conclude that Castaneda's work is therefore a fake of 
a fake? What is a fake of a fake and how are such objects positioned in relation to 
authenticity? Is a fake of a fake more or less authentic than a fake of something authentic, the 
imitation of an imitation of an original more or less authentic than an imitation of an original? 
Or is Don Juan a sort of bastard cousin, a fake Lichtenberg once removed? And how does the 
adjudication of authenticity on criteria of an object's origins weigh against a similar 











adjudication on criteria of an object's content? For if the crucial criterion in the case ufthe 
fonner is the object's uniqueness, the corresponding criterion in the mode of content analysis 
is the object's factuality, which is to say that it's content exists authentically and 
independently elsewhere, such that that which is posited as fact may be measured against this 
benchmark. Enter the problem of the original fake, for which Psalmanazar's ethnography is a 
good example. The Description is beyond any doubt a fake on account of it being entirely a 
fiction, made-up, a product ofPsalmanazar's imagination. Yet these are the same qualities we 
seek in that mode of authenticity that privileges originality as the arbiter of authenticity's 
status. 
This brief discussion of dimensions of content and origin in adjudications of authenticity 
seems to suggest that far from the transparent and conclusive ideals to which notions of 
authenticity so often aspire, authenticity is actually more complex in its finer nuances and 
more often beset by contradictory tensions. And authenticity is still more difficult, for not 
only is it embroiled in internal contradictions and tensions, the very possibility of authenticity 
is inherently unstable, as is well demonstrated by the hugely popular and successful television 
and film series Star Trek. 
The phenomenon that is Star Trek has received much attention from an array of disciplines in 
the nearly 30 years since the first episode appeared, including psychology,24 industry and 
consumption,25 ethics,26 feminism,27 identity and representation,28 and sexual violence.29 A 
24 Debra L. Long and Chantel S. Prat, "Memory for Star Trek: The Role of Prior Knowledge in Recognition 
Revisited," in Journal of Experimental Psychology, vol. 28, no. 6 (2002): 1073-1082. 
25 Gary Westfahl, "Where No Market Has Gone Before: 'The Science Fiction Industry' and the Star Trek 











great deal of this attention has also explored religious aspects of Star Trek fandom.30 Different 
though related discussions have explored problems of authenticity in Star Trek fandom, trying 
to make sense of affirmations of authenticity implied in fans dressing as and otherwise 
imitating Star Trek characters, maintaining networks of fan clubs that are referred to as 
individual "starships" operating in different "sectors" and internally structured by hierarchies 
of commanders, lieutenants and so on. Fans themselves are very conscious of their reputations 
as "nerds" and "geeks" who need to "get a life." Consequently they are sensitive to their 
portrayal in the popular media. Admiral Arizhel zantai Kehoaz (a.k.a. Teresa Tyler) warns her 
club members: "sections of the press and the media are always on the lookout for the nerdier 
specimens of Trek fans that they can ridicule and use to make any science fiction follower 
look socially deprived." In dealing with the media, she advises club members to "concentrate 
on the fact that you know it is all fantasy, that you are just in it for the fun and to help raise 
26 Judith Barad, with Ed Robertson, The Ethics of Star Trek (New York: HarperCollins, 2000); James J. Hughes 
and John D. Lantos, "Medical Ethics Through the Star Trek Lens," Literature and Medicine, vol. 20, no. 1 
(2001): 26-38. 
27 Lynne Joyrich, "Feminist Enterprise? Star Trek: The Next Generation and the Occupation of Femininity," 
Cinema Journal, vol. 35, no. 2, (Winter 1996): 61-84. 
28 Kathy Ferguson, "This Species Which Is Not One: Identity Practices in Star Trek: Deep Space Nine," 
Strategies: Journal of Theory, Culture & Politics, vol. 15, no. 2 (2002): 181-195; Taylor Harrison, and Sarah 
Projansky, Kent A. Ono, and Elyce Rae Helford, (eds.), Enterprise Zones: Critical Positions on Star Trek 
(Bolder: Westview Press, 1996); Ziauddin Sardar, "Orientalism in Star Trek Voyager," New Statesman, vol. 
128, no. 4438 (May 31 1999): 35-7. 
29 Robin Roberts, "Rape, Romance, and Consent in Star Trek: The Next Generation," Extrapolation, vol. 40, no. 
1, (Spring 1999): 21-35. 
30 See for example: Michael Jindra, "Star Trek Fandom as a Religious Phenomenon," Sociology of Religion, vol. 
55, no. 1 (1994): 27-51; Thomas Richards, The Meaning of Star Trek: An Excursion into the Myth and Marvel 
of the Star Trek Universe (New York: Doubleday, 1997); Jennifer E. Porter, and Darcee L. McLaren, (eds.), 
Star Trek and Sacred Ground: £rpiorations of Star Trek, Religion, and American Culture (New York: State 
University of New York, 1999); Brian J. Walsh and J. Richard Middleton, The Transforming Vision: Shaping 
a Christian World View (Downer's Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1984); Jon Wagner and Jan Lundeen, Deep 











money for charity.,,3! There can be little doubt that fans enjoy being fans. Similarly, there 
isn't any doubt that vast amounts of money have been raised for charities through Star Trek 
related fan activities, including charity auctions and charity premiers. Whether "it is all 
fantasy" however, is less clear. Firstly, it is less than clear just what the "it" in this advice 
refers to, and secondly, it is far from clear just what "fantasy" means in this context. For if 
fantasy means something in opposition to reality, something that is made up, that is a fiction, 
that doesn't really exist as a tangible thing, what can we say about the massive range of Star 
Trek merchandise, manufactured by tangible machines, earning their manufacturers authentic 
money to be spent on other tangible products, representing authentic currency as commodities 
for either trade or purchase? What do we make of all the charity work carried out with funds 
donated by the labours of others' fantasies? 
A simple way out of this quandary is to assert that fantasy and authenticity are not 
incompatible; something that is fantasy may still be authentic. A way into this proposition is 
to look at the "real" consequences of "imaginary" things, for which the fundraising labours 
performed by fans is a good example. Perhaps a better example is the massive industry 
sustained by the imaginations of Star Trek fans, an economy of millions, perhaps billions, of 
dollars spent and earned over many decades. One way in which objects of fantasy can become 
objects of reality therefore is through the tangible and otherwise measureable and quantifiable 
consequences of the labours ofthe fantastical imagination. This perspective might even issue 
a challenge to the assertion that the Star Trek universe does not exist. Yet this question of real 
consequences flowing from imaginary things itself flows from a more fundamental 
observation, which is that the status of authenticity is able to change with time: fake things 
31 Teresa Tyler, "The Image We Don't Want," Beyond The Lines: The Magazine o/the Klingon Strike Force, 












can become authentic. The consequences flowing from this observation are simply shattering 
to that notion of authenticity that confidently assures us of a given-for-all-time quality to 
authenticity. The entire project that seeks a locus of authenticity determined by established 
criteria is thrown into doubt. It means that any pronouncements on an object's authentic status 
can be no more than a snapshot, a moment in that object's unstable history. Star Trek again 
offers an exemplary case ofthis kind of problem. 
Temporal Contingencies and Affective Uncertainties 
In the Star Trek universe, the fierce, war-mongering Klingons are cast as the antagonists to 
the Federation of Planets, who envision an alliance between different civilizations that will 
facilitate the further exploration of space, "to boldly go where no man has gone before. ,,32 
Klingons specifically have stimulated their own cult following among Star Trek fans, or 
Trekkies as they are generally known. Like other Trekkies, Klingon fans participate in 
fandom by imitating the objects of their fascination, which means dressing up as Klingons and 
even talking like Klingons, imitating their language. Given the fierce temperament of 
authentic Klingons, it seems only natural that Klingon fans dressed as Klingons should 
provide the requisite security at Star Trek conventions; another example of real consequences 
flowing from fake things. But in what fol!ows I would like to focus on the Klingon language 
as an example of how fake things may become authentic with the passage of time. For 
Klingon that started as a series of arbitrary grunts, groans, hisses and similar sounds uttered 
32 As Star Trek's patriarchal configurations changed, this famously stated objective was rephrased in the 1990s 
to state: "To boldly go where no-one has gone before." For a discussion of how women are portrayed in Star 
Trek, see Gwen Kelly and Edwina Kelly, "Refusing the Ruby Slippers: Women in Star Trek's Fictive Space," 
Outskirts, vol. I, May 1996, available at 












by James Doohan ("Scotty" in the first Star Trek movie) and thought to be in keeping with the 
ferociousness of Kling on nature, is today a systematized language, spoken fluently by a few 
"Klingonologists" and read extensively by a few hundred more enthusiasts. There has even 
been published a Klingon-English English-Klingon dictionary as well as translations in 
Klingon of a number of Shakespeare's plays and other literary works, including portions of 
the Christian bible. 
The movement of the Klingon language from an exotic, alien language devoid of a particular 
structure to the systematic, internally consistent language that it is today has largely been due 
to the efforts of linguist Marc Okrand. Okrand became involved with Star Trek in 1984 when 
he was asked to "create realistic sounding dialogue" for Star Trek III: The Search for Spock. 33 
"The first thing I had to do," he explains, "was make sure the language matched any Klingon 
spoken before I got involved" (interview: 13).34 Referring to the earliest Klingon spoken by 
Doohan, Okran continues: "I took those lines as a starting point and added sounds and 
imposed a grammatical structure" (interview: 16). He recalls that while on set he realized the 
extent of interest in things Klingon and so pitched a proposal for a Klingon dictionary to 
publishers Pocket Books. The proposal was accepted and an English I Klingon Klingon I 
English dictionary was published in 1985 and reprinted in 1992. The dictionary provided 
much vocabulary to the rules worked out by Okrand and together offered anyone interested 
resources with which to explore and develop the language further. More resources followed in 
33 Greg Oliver, 1996, "va) tlhlngan HoI Da)atlh 'e' DaneH (So You Want To Speak Klingon)," available at 
http://www.canoe.calJamBooksFeatures/okrand_marc.html (accessed: 19 January 2003). 
34 Marc Okrand was interviewed online on 13 August 1996. Where the transcript of this interview is referenced, 
the convention will be to indicate "interview" followed a number, which will refer to Okrand's statement in 
the order corresponding to the 53 statements he contributed to that discussion. A full transcript of the interview 












the fonn of books and audiotapes: The Klingon Way: A Warrior's Guide (1996), Klingonfor 
the Galactic Traveller (1997), Conversational Klingon (audio cassette, 1992), and Power 
Klingon: Mastering the Language of the Warriors (audio cassette, 1993). Okrand is the first 
to recognize the importance of users to the success of Kling on: "For the language to grow and 
work, you have to have a bunch of people who are using it.,,35 But he is just as quick to credit 
the Internet, presumably for the practical assistance of bringing that bunch of people together 
as well as for facilitating the easy distribution of Kling on resources: "The Internet is the thing 
that's making it work, there's no question about that. Ifthere weren't an Internet, it wouldn't 
be growing the way it is.,,36 
The largest community of Klingon language enthusiasts is found online at the Klingon 
Language Institute (hereafter referred to as the KLI).37 The KLI is a not-for-profit, public 
service corporation based in Philadelphia, USA. Started in 1992, the KLI is into its second 
decade with more than 1500 paying members. The site positions itself as a hub for the 
scholarly study of the Klingon language. The KLI's founder and director is Dr. Lawrence M. 
Schoen, previously a psychology professor at Chestnut Hill College in Philadelphia and a Star 
Trek fan since adolescence.38 A sense of the seriousness with which the KLI go about their 
mission of "bringing together individuals interested in the study of Klingon linguistics and 
culture and providing a forum for discussion and the exchange of ideas .. 39 can be gathered 
from the research projects of the institute. The Klingon Shakespeare Restoration Project 
(hereafter the KLI) sees as its goal "the restoration of the complete works of Shakespeare to 
35 Okrand, quoted in Oliver, "vaj tlhlngan Hoi Dajatlh 'e' DaneH (So You Want To Speak Klingon}." 
36 Okrand, quoted in Ibid. 
37 The website of the Klingon Language Institute is at www.kli.org. 
38 http://www.bobw.com.aulBOBW5/Lawrence.htm (3 February, 2003); 
http://higbee.cots.netl-holtejlklingonlhamlet.htm (3 February, 2003). 











the original Klingon". This goal fllllows the claim by Chancellor Gorkon, former leader ofthe 
Klingon Empire, made in Star Trek Xl: The Undiscovered Country, that Shakespeare 
originally wrote his verses in Klingon. The accuracy and essential truth of that claim may be 
disputed, but the outputs of the KLI cannot; Hamlet, Prince of Denmark: The Restored 
Klingon Version (Pocket Books, 2000) and paghmo' tIn mIS, which translates literally as "the 
confusion is great because of nothing," Nick Nicholas's "restoration" of Much Ado About 
Nothing (Wildside Press, 2001). A Klingon restoration of MacBeth is also proceeding. Not 
confined to restoration, the KSRP staged a performance, in Klingon, of act five scene two 
from Hamlet at their annual qep'a' (general meeting) in 1996. The Klingon Bible Translation 
Project is similarly ambitious: "the immense task" of translating both the old and new 
testaments into Klingon, "a project worthy of our efforts for purely secular reasons." The 
Klingon Writing Project encourages and supports the writing of original compositions, 
whether epics, stories, songs or poetry, in "the warrior's tongue." The Klingon Writing 
Project publishes an annual literary supplement Jatmey compiled of the project's work. 
Finally, the Extended Corpus Project consists in "an effort to compile a comprehensive 
glossary of all Klingon names, terms, and phrases from the multitude of canonical fiction 
published. ,.40 
In addition to the publications produced by these projects, the KLI publishes HoIQeD, a 
quarterly scholarly journal of "artwork, feature articles, and regular columns discussing 
Klingon linguistics, language, and culture.'.41 HolQeD is now in its eleventh year and is 
registered with the Library of Congress and catalogued by the Modem Languages 
Association. Compiled from the first four years of HoI QeD and available for purchase though 
the KLI online is The Grammarian's Desk: A Collection of Grammatical Opinion and 
40 http://www.kli.orglstuff/projects.html(accessed: 3 February, 2003). 











Wisdom o/the Warrior's Tongue (Klingon Language Institute, 1997), later released in & 
limited run Deluxe Edition, and GhIlghameS, a translation of the ancient Sumerian classic The 
Epic o/Gilgamesh (Wildside Press, December 2000). The institute's website also promotes 
Simon & Schuster's range of Kling on- related publications, including three instructional and 
reference books by Okrand, three audiotapes featuring Okrand, Michael Dom (who plays the 
Klingon character "Lieutenant Commander Worf' in the television series) and Roxann Bigg 
Dawson (who plays the Klingon character "Lieutenant B 'Elanna Torres" also in the television 
series), two novels useful for understanding some of the background, and an interactive CD-
ROM with language instruction.42 Clearly the KLI takes itself and its subject very seriously 
and have invested a great deal of time, effort, and resources into the promotion ofthe Klingon 
language. So how successful is the Klingon language? In 1996, when the KLI was only four 
years old, Okrand estimated that "probably 700 people, maybe more ... have been studying 
the language in one form or another" [interview: 5], later clarifying that "the number of 
people who can speak somewhat or that can read easily and who are getting better ... is in the 
hundreds [interview: 41]. "A group of them" he claims "are really expert speakers," 
[interview: 6] substantiating his claim later by describing the language skills of a few he has 
met as 'just amazing" [interview: 41]. Still, the number of really fluent speakers is probably 
under ten" [interview: 41]. But that was in 1996. In 2002 the KLI membership stood in excess 
of 1500. And the KLI is not the only association of Kling on language enthusiasts. 
The Interstellar Language School (ILS) is the initiative of Glen F. Proechel, a licensed 
language teacher from Minnesota, USA. The ILS states as its aim simply "to teach the 
Warrior Tongue and to create materials pertinent to its use and mastery.,,43 The ILS is 
markedly more focused than the KLI in pursuing this aim, in the sense that the ILS seems 
42 http://www.kli.orgistuff/Merchant.html (accessed: 3 February, 2003). 











solely occupied with translation work. Unconstrained by the labours of maintairling an 
extensive website offering online transactions, funding and administering discrete research 
projects, or compiling, revising, and submitting financial and other reports in compliance with 
the legislation under which the KLI exists, the ILS can get on with translating as many texts 
into Klingon as they are able. To this end they have reportedly published a three-volume 
series ofteaching materials and literature called tlhlngan Hoi: Alien Language Primer, a 
translation of the new testament called Good News for the Warrior Race, their own translation 
of Hamlet, called Homlet: Prince of Denmark (sic), a phrasebook Warrior Tongue at Warp 
Speed, and an exercise and colouring book. On the way are A Warrior's Unabridged 
Dictionary, an epic poem Kahless Cycle, a Klingon translation of "The Adventures of 
Huckleberry Finn" called K 'huq tai Fin' as well as a Klingon translation of Chaucer's 
works.44 The personage of Glen Proechel, however, is as interesting as the labours of his 
language school. In addition to being a language teacher, Proechel, is also an ordained 
Lutheran minister who reportedly claims to have delivered sermons as well as conducted a 
choir in Klingon.45 Proechel's interest in the religious possibilities of Kling on has in the past 
come up against the secular, intellectual aspirations of the Klingon Bible Translation Project 
at the KLI. The Wall Street Journal reported on a controversy raging between Proechel and 
Schoen relating to how to translate the bible into Klingon. Proechel reportedly resigned from 
the collaborative effort, led by the Klingon Bible Translation Project, citing "deep 
philosophical differences with fellow scholars." Proechel objected to the literal translation 
advocated by Schoen, arguing that the literal translation "will be describing things that don't 
exist in their [Klingon's] culture." So for example where literalists substitute for loaves and 
fish generalised terms like "grain food" and "water animal," Proechel advocates using 
44 http://www.members.aol.comJJPKlingonlkfaq.htm (accessed: 16 January 2003). 
45 Reported in the diary of Roger Nygard, maker of the documentary Trekkies, on 10 October 1996. The diary is 











concepts Klingons would be more familiar with: "serpent worms" and "blood pies." A 
suitable term for "lamb" presents a particular problem for biblical translations because of the 
frequency ofits occurance. Proechel suggests "targh," "a vicious, furry, piglike animal.,,46 
Silly or irreverent as this dispute may appear, it does demonstrate just how independent of its 
television and film origins the Klingon language has become. Joel Anderson, a security co-
ordinator at the University of Minnesota and a Klingon language enthusiast, offers this 
warning on his personal website about television Klingon: "Televised Klingon is known far 
and wide throughout the galaxy for constructing terrible Klingon phrases. I mean 
REALLLL Y. Stinko. Klingon gutter talk, absolutely wrong and absolutely incorrect 
grarnmar.'.47 Marc Okrand puts similar distance between Klingon written and spoken by 
enthusiasts and Klingon seen written and spoken on television: "When I write Klingon, I use 
the regular Roman alphabet ... I don't know who invented the fancy letters that you see on the 
Klingon ships and such" [interview: 19,20]. The writing system used to represent Klingon 
sounds is the area of greatest discrepancy between television Klingon and Klingon taught by 
the KLI and ILS and used in the numerous Klingon translations already published. The 
Klingon used by the latter was devised by Okrand, uses a Romanised alphabet, and reads from 
left to write. But Okrand concedes that he isn't certain whether Klingons would use an 
alphabet; their writing system might use a character set, like Chinese. The written Klingon 
characters depicted on television is the work of graphic designer Mike Okuda who Okrand 
reports is similarly undecided whether Klingon is read from left to right or from right to left. 
Okrand and Okuda have discussed the issue and according to Okrand, "Mike likes the idea of 
starting in the middle and reading out towards the ends" [interview: 23]. There are two 
46 http://ussgryphon.freewebsites.comlI994-1O/23.htm (accessed: 16 January, 2003); 
http://www.oreilly.comlpeople/staff/sierraifluml9406.htm (accessed: 16 January, 2003). 











movements here. The first is a marked divergence and const:quent tension between television 
Klingon and off-screen Klingon. The second is a seemingly deliberate playfulness that works 
with this tension, oscillating between the contradictory trajectories of this divergence. Yet the 
divergence is in some senses limited because television representations need to appear 
plausible to audiences to avoid reducing into farce. In other words, the divergence cannot be 
so great as to loose its tension. And it is this tension, or perhaps this tension-filled space 
opened between, that presents the challenge to scientific adjudications of authenticity. For one 
is never sure which way the tension is tugging; is Okuda serious? Afterall, why shouldn't 
aliens from another galaxy read their lines from the middle outwards? And yet there is a sense 
that Okrand, reporting Okuda's suggestion, is winking at his audience. 
This presents a particular kind of problem: how to relate an object's affective properties to the 
proof of its authenticity. Or more interestingly - though following Howard's championing of 
forensic science, it amounts to the same thing - how are an object's affective properties 
related to the proof of its fakery? Is Okrand being deliberately ironic when he taunts his 
audience of avid Trekkies and Klingonologists with this insider information? D. C. Muecke 
notes that irony "is the art of saying something without really saying it.'.48 Is Okrand being 
ironic? There is a tone here that suggests he is revealing something by concealing it. Perhaps 
in a roundabout sort of way he is saying nothing more profound than that Star Trek is all 
made-up. Yet I think there is something to his conspiratorial wink here; Okrand is the 
architect behind the language, the instigator of this hoax, if that is what it is. And after all, the 
suggestion that Klingons may read their lines from the middle to the two ends is only 
rendered plausible by the assumption that these aliens read and write, as ifthis and sign 
language were the only form of non-verbal communication in a fantastical universe of infinite 











possibilities. It is almost disappointing that of all the ways the creators of Star Trek could 
imagine Klingons communicating non-verbally, reading from the middle outwards was the 
best they could come up with. And so is revealed that these aliens may not be so alien after 
all. Minus their foreheads and squinting eyes, authentic Klingons may as well be humans, 
dressed as aliens, imitating humans. If that is so, then fans' imitation ofKlingons conceals a 
hidden truth. It is this reciprocity in the viewer's complicity with the viewed that in its 
mutually implicating movements casts a simulacrum of authenticity about objects that allows 
the really made-up to become efficacious in a world no less made-up and no less real. Irony, 
as Muecke reminds us, "is an art that gets its effect from below the surface, and this gives it a 
quality that resembles the depth and resonance of great art triumphantly saying much more 
that it seems to be saying.'.49 Okrand's wink seems to me to be playing on this secret 
knowledge secreted in the deceptively lazy loopings, to borrow a phrase from Michael 
Taussig, between a profound knowledge of this artifice concealed in hidden depths and a 
superficial knowledge that allows us to go about our daily lives. 
All this talk of divergences and tensions, surfaces and depths, illustrates the limitations of 
forensic science that confidently promises to distinguish authenticity from fakery. At the same 
time, exploring this problem has introduced some concepts that may provide the crucial terms 
for an alternative attitude toward authenticity and its relation to fakery: tension and reciprocity 
between surfaces and depths might mediate the movements of revelations and concealment; 
transparency and opacity in this spatial metaphor might mediate secrecy and revelation. In 
this second part ofthe chapter, I want to distil a theoretical framework that may give 
expression to this alternative attitude. Here I will follow a close reading of Michael Taussig's 











essay on "Viscerality, Faith and Skepticism ... 50 In this excellent essay Taussig sets about 
tackling "the vexatious problem of faith, as in religious and magical faith" by drawing 
attention to ''the fact that faith often seems to coexist with scepticism ... a relation ... that has 
escaped notice in some classic illustrations of magical healing made famous, indeed iconic, by 
an earlier anthropology."sl Taussig is being polite when he suggests it escaped the notice of 
such eminent investigators as Franz Boas and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, for his discussion seeks 
to resolve what Boas and his peers encountered as an intractable paradox for which their 
science could not account. Such a paradoxical coexistence exists exactly at the limits of 
scientific empiricism, and it is fitting that this is where Taussig begins. 
Faith and Scepticism can Coexist 
Lucas Bridges in Tierra Del Fuego among the Ona,52 Waldemar Bogoras in Siberia among the 
Chukchee and Franz Boas among the Kwakiutl each report on a seemingly intractable 
paradox at the centre of these community'S respective shaman practices. Bridges reports a 
"fear of magic and the power of magicians, even on the part of those who, professing that art, 
must have known that they themselves are humbugs. They had great fear of the power of 
others."s3 Says Franz Boas: "It is perfectly well known by all concerned that a great deal of 
the shamanistic procedure is based on fraud; still it is believed in by the shaman as well as by 
his patients and their friends. Exposures do not weaken the belief in the 'true' power of 
shamanism. Owing to his peculiar state of mind, the shaman himself is doubtful in regard to 
50 Michael Taussig, "Viscerality, Faith, and Skepticism: Another Theory of Magic," in Nicholas B. Dirks (ed.), 
In Near Ruins: Cultural Theory at the End of the Century (University of Minnesota: Minneappolis, 1998). 
5 I Ibid., p. 221. 
52 The Ona are also knovill as the Selk'nam. In Taussig's subsequent book Defacement he uses the name 
Selk'nam by convention. 











his powers and is always ready to bolster them up with fraud."s4 In Bogoras's account: ''To 
describe any considerable number of tricks carried out by the shaman, both Chukchee and 
Eskimo, would require too much space.,,55 The paradox reported here Taussig relates as the 
coexistence of faith with scepticism, the problem being why faith in magical healing is 
continued simultaneous with a public knowledge that such healing practices are predicated on 
deception and fraud. We would do well to note that this is not an abstract problem, but a pre-
eminently material problem. The locus of this paradox is the body itself: healing efficacy is 
addressed to the body, and so it is in and on the body that this problem of an apparent 
paradoxical coexistence of faith with scepticism works itself out, the abstract qualities of faith 
and scepticism embodied in skin and flesh. 
In seeking a way into this problem Taussig casts about for "strategies one might pursue to 
understand the fraudulent as not only true but efficacious, the trick as technique."s6 Taussig 
briefly identifies four strategies that we can label statistical, linguistic, institutional and 
mimetic. He skirts across the first three, giving each no more than a sentence or two. A 
statistical approach looks at quantitative proportions to suggest that "not all but only a (great) 
part of the shamanistic procedure" is fraudulent, hoping that "the lesser may tum out to be the 
more important.,,57 A linguistic strategy centralises the meaning of "belief' as in the 
conundrum of believing in magical healing while affirming knowledge of fraud. Such a 
strategy would force the distinction "between belief as a personal psychological state and 
belief as 'tradition' .,,58 A third strategy centralises the institution of shamanism, applying 
procedures of verification or falsification to the efficacy of magical healing. Such an approach 
54 Boas, quoted in Taussig, "Viscerality, Faith, and Scepticism," p. 228. 
55 Bogoras, quoted in Taussig, "Visceraiity, Faith, and Scepticism," p. 228. 
56 Taussig, "Visceraiity, Faith, and Scepticism," p. 229. 
57 Ibid., p. 229. 











Taussig observes would likdy conclude that while particular shamans may be frauds, th~ 
institution of shamanism rem~ins valid. 59 Though each of these strategies can accommodate 
the coexistence of faith with scepticism, they require some contortion to achieve a 
comfortable co-existence. Yet none of these candidates hold much strategic appeal for 
Taussig, who opts rather for a strategy that substitutes for the word fraud the word simulation 
or mimesis. The practitioner of magical healing acts mimetically, rather than fraudulently, "a 
performance that through its perfection, spirits will copy:.6Q With this strategic substitution 
the paradox seems to evaporate; "the tricks turn out to be models or scenes for the spirits to 
follow, and it is the spirits who ultimately supply the cure.,,61 This does seem a neat 
manoeuvre with which Taussig unslips this knotted paradox at the limits of scientific accounts 
of shaman healing practices. 
While this brief example is not remarkable in itself, its importance lies with its demonstration 
of a way of approaching things differently, thinking through things differently. It anticipates 
the different kind of approach the vexed question of authenticity in religion might require. 
Tellingly, Taussig notes "the remarkable fallout poetically no less than philosophically,.62 
resulting from his neat substitution. This remarkability is the locus of the difference between 
Taussig's preferred mimetic strategy and rejected alternatives. We have a hint at the direction 
Taussig is taking when he alludes to its poetic and philosophical implications. More clues 
emerge later when he remarks: "It is as if the paradox is an artefact of the Enlightenment, of 
the way of looking at human and social phenomena that comes from a disenchantment with 
the world and that therefore, so the stream of thought goes, spirits are to be explained rather 
59 Ibid., p. 230. 
60 Ibid., p. 235. 
61 Ibid., p. 235. 











than providing the explanation.'.63 Emmanuel Swedenborg might have replied with the same 
to critics of his science of correspondences. Both Taussig's comments anticipate that implicit 
and explicit in this different vision of the world is a critique of Enlightenment reason. Also 
implicit here is a hint as to the origins of that critique as well as the origins and formulation of 
this alternative vision. I state these questions here at the outset because they usefully 
contextualise the image of theory that will be developed in the discussion that follows. These 
questions of a critique implicit in what follows, a critique against an image of authenticity 
received as an inheritance of Enlightenment reason, will be revisited in greater detail in a 
moment. 
In his discussion ofthe implications, "poetically no less than philosophically," two key ideas 
emerge. The first of these is movement, what Taussig terms flow, as in the movement of the 
shaman as slhe performs their tricks, now understood as mimetically charged therapeutic 
techniques. Stanley Walens, who, following Boas, also studied Kwakiutl Indians, emphasises 
movement when he urges that "[the] critical part of the cure is the fluidity, skill, and physical 
perfection with which the shaman performs his tricks, for it is the motions of the tricks 
(reinforced by their exact duplication by the spirits) that effect the cure.',64 It is the "motions 
of the tricks" that effects the cure. The trick, understood as mimetic technique, needs to be 
understood as movement, with an emphasis on concealment rather than deception, if we in 
turn are to understand healing efficacy. The second key idea in Taussig's discussion is his 
notion of bodied ness, particularly a metonymic power that flows from the body. He says: 
"This reminder as to flow and its immense importance in building the simulacrum that is the 
trick that is technique has the merit of sensitising us to the play of metonymy with and 
extending beyond metaphor, in other words to a certain play ofbodiedness, contagion, and 
63 Ibid., p. 235. 











physical cmmection as the co-component of the mimetic alongside the iJea, the symbol, the 
distanced visual or quasi-visual dimension ofthings.'.65 
Taussig's discussion of the paradoxical coexistence of faith with scepticism in Kwakiutl 
shamanism, a discussion that usefully problematises a theoretical concern with movement in 
relation to the metonymic powers of the body, should be read as a precursor to and continuous 
with the body of theory he develops more comprehensively in his subsequent book 
Defacement: Public Secrecy and the Labour of the Negative.66 In what essentially amounts to 
an anthropology of the aesthetic of sacrilege, Taussig elaborates on the poetic and 
philosophical fallout resulting from tracing the movements of meanings, invoking the 
metonymic powers of the body in making those tracings. Therefore in what follows I will 
draw on both his discussion of viscerality, faith and scepticism as well as his subsequent 
discussion of defacement, distilling from both conceptual resources that will assist with the 
development of theoretical tools more useful to the present inquiry into religious authenticity 
than those limited tools offered by a scientific, forensic method. 
Defacement develops an anthropology of what Taussig terms "the labour of the negative," 
looking at what happens when something precious is despoiled. Taussig is very aware that by 
looking at precious things he is moving on the terrain of the extra-ordinary, and from the 
outset frames his endeavour in terms ofthe sacred, stating his subject quite simply as "the 
characterisation of negation as sacred surplus.,,67 Taussig observes that in defacement, in the 
act of negation, there is a suddenness of movement, the negated object being activated and 
65 Ibid., p. 236. 
66 Michael Taussig, Defacement: Public Secrecy and the Labour of the Negative (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1999). 











becoming animated. By way of example Taussig looks at monuments. Pointing to how these 
usually large, cold, inanimate objects become contested and charged in the moment oftheir 
defacement, Taussig notes that this ''uncanny capacity to animate dead matter" works by 
"magically fusing the representation with what it represents.,,68 Here Taussig looks at statues, 
that special kind of monumental representation. A particular example catches his critical eye 
in the incident of Australian artist Greg Taylor's statue of the British royals naked. The statue 
of the queen and her consort were created in cement and painted with an iron oxide material 
to promote the onset of rust and decay. The statue was installed beside the waters of Lake 
Burley Griffin, in front of Australian's two houses of parliament and on the opposite shore 
from the National War Memorial. On the one side stands the High Court and National 
Gallery, on the other, the National Library and National Science and Technology Centre. 
Installing a representation of naked and rusting British royalty on the topography of 
Australian colonial history and postcolonial nationalism clearly sharpened its comment, 
Taylor summing up: "They're just sitting there rusting away and I love it. They don't even 
know they are irrelevant. ,,69 
And herein lies the magic that fuses the representation with what it represents: Greg Taylor 
loves that the Queen and her consort are irrelevantly rusting away in the centre of Australia's 
postcolonial nationalism, as if it really is the queen and her husband sitting naked beside the 
lake. And it is in this magic, in this fusing of the representation with the represented, where 
we find surfacing a power that animates inanimate objects, presencing the real thing behind 
the object-representation. Greg Taylor's SCUlpture provoked a nation-wide outrage and was 
variously described as "profanity," "vulgar," "grotesque," "rot," "a distasteful effigy of my 
68 Ibid., p. 52. 











queen," "a revolting display.,,7o Then came the attacks. Typifying the kind of response in the 
popular press at the time, one journalist wrote: "The attacks began on Thursday evening when 
the queen was beheaded. By early yesterday she had lost her legs. On Friday night vandals 
attacked Prince Philip's head, leaving it dangling until event organisers took it off with a 
hacksaw. By yesterday his left arm also had been severed and his chest smashed.,,71 In these 
and similar descriptions, there is a certain playful oscillation, describing the representation in 
a way that draws on the powers of the represented in such a way as to set up a humorous, if 
not grizzly, contradiction. And so, invoking the fantastic imagery of that other representation 
of royalty described in The Adventures of Alice in Wonderland, the queen is beheaded, while 
Prince Phillip has his head smashed and finally removed with a hacksaw blade. Thus is the 
defacement defaced in a magical suspension of disbelief that allows the statuary to really be 
what it formally represents. 
One could argue that the example of statues is a suggestive example of objects activated and 
animated by this labour of the negative because usually there is a real person signified by the 
monument, behind its monumental representation. This question of the magical presencing of 
an object behind can be perplexing in the case of representations that don't have a tangible 
object-thing behind them, as is the case say with national flags or money. Picking up on this, 
Taussig pointedly asks: "what life, what real reality, lies behind these fetish objects spoliated 
by the defacing act that all the more effectively establishes their fetish status?,,72 Taussig 
suggests that the notion of fetish here involves an active forgetting; that through repeated 
usage, familiarity dulls us to the knowledge that "the very facts of our existence are not facts, 
7() Ibid., p. 26, 
71 Ibid" p, 31, 











but artefacts.,,73 In other words, the more fixed and inflexible these meanings attached to 
objects become, so do they take on a more augmented fetish character, at once both becoming 
what they previously merely signified, thereby establishing the given facts of existence, and 
simultaneously masking the artifice that lies behind them. 
But if such a form of fetish is a mask, such a mask is also a surface, concealing depth. Taussig 
posits the face as an ideal type for thinking through this problem of surface and depth, 
because the face that is both mask and window to the soul stands at the intersection of 
revelation and concealment. From here Taussig develops a notion of de-facement as a 
crossing of the face, a tearing at the surface, a cutting across the active-forgetting that 
maintains the habitual and mundane, that hardens "the mysteries and fragilities of fantasies" 
into "workaday facts,,,74 that fetishises artifice into the given facts of existence. Furthermore, 
Taussig suggests this notion of defacement is appealing exactly because it desires 
transgression. This paradoxical character at the heart ofthe labour of the negative Taussig 
names the Law of the Base; self-consciously he plays on the word base "as both substantial 
support and as obscene or abject which, in a cavalier gesture, I regard as the base of holiness 
itself." He continues: "such a 'law' defines taboo not simply as prohibition ... but as the 
prohibition that ... contains hidden yearning, an appeal, even a demand, within itself to 
transgress that which it prohibits." This, he emphasises, "is the whole and consuming 
point;,,75 his subject: "the characterisation of negation as sacred surplus.,,76 Defacement, 
spoiling something precious, desecrating something of extra-ordinary power, unmasks this 
artifice fetishised as the given facts of existence in the production and reproduction of 
73 Ibid., p. 54. 
74 Ibid., p. 54. 
75 Ibid., p. 53. 











meaning. In the rush of surfacing, anilnating energy that welds the object behind the fetish 
mask to its representation is a momentary liberation from the power of the fetish that portrays 
itself as the given facts of existence. For in the movements of defacement we catch a glimpse 
of the internal workings of objects, a momentary vision that alerts us to the knowledge that 
the cement statue of the queen and her consort is produced out of a tension between an 
apparent surface and the movements within a hidden void, and that this is constantly 
reproducing itself as the statue that defaces British royalty is defaced to protect royalty, then 
in its defaced form becomes a monument to intolerance, before eventually being removed 
from the bench where weeks later people are still gathering to look at the empty seats. 
Transgression that tears at the surface, that cuts into the fetish that is mask, penetrates into a 
hiddenness behind. Truth that is so crucial to scientific accounts of authenticity must reside 
here, in the hidden depths, below the surface, behind the mask. Thus we may speak of truth as 
secret, hidden and concealed. This seems counterintuitive; automatically we think of truth as 
surface, available to our ready apprehension, or at the very least we claim that truth ought to 
be transparently apprehendable. But herein lies the critique. Following Taussig, this familiar 
notion of truth as surface skates across the mask that is the habitual and mundane. Part of the 
fetish that transforms artifice into workaday facts is the deception that renders this mask as 
The Transparent Truth, on the surface of things. But this deception is discovered in its 
inability to account for mystery, for whence the animating power, the surplus of sacredness 
that surfaces from within defaced objects, producing a suddenness of movement in the 
moment of transgression? A reading oftruth as secret offers a critique against a central 
premise of scientific methods: that truth may be arrived at by way of reason and forensic 











Here our theorist is Walter Benjamin who suggests that the Platonic understanding of 
the relationship of beauty and truth is indispensable to any definition of truth itself.77 
For Benjamin, as for Eros, truth is not a process of exposure which destroys the secret, 
but a revelation which does justice to it.78 Benjamin sets up a tension between a reading 
oftruth as secret that requires ajust revelation and truth as an object of knowledge. The 
fonner conveys a critique against the latter, where he suggests an error lies in the 
equation of truth with objective knowledge.79 Benjamin's critique resonates with 
Taussig's approach toward understanding the paradoxical coexistence of faith with 
scepticism in Kwakiutl shamanism, demonstrating and amplifying the critique implicit 
in Taussig's choice of a mimetic strategy to understand the paradox reported by Boas 
and his peers over strategies that emphasise statistical, linguistic or institutional aspects. 
Following Benjamin, we could group these three strategies rejected by Taussig under 
the rubric of exposure, and associate Taussig's preferred mimetic strategy with 
Benjamin's notion of just revelation. 
Recall Boas' observation that "exposures do not weaken the beliefin the 'true' power of 
shamanism;n8o recall Stanley Walens' centering of "the motions of the tricks,,81 in his 
account; recall Taussig's rendering of the trick as mimetic technique and the sense in which 
the paradox seemed to evaporate with Taussig's substitution of fraud with mimesis; recall that 
truth might be more usefully understood as secret, concealed in a hiddenness beneath the 
familiar surface of appearance, behind the fetish mask of the habitual and mundane. I think 
that theatricality emerges here as a key problem, specifically, a momentum that derives from 
77 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne (London: NLB, 1977), p. 30. 
78 Ibid., p. 31. 
79 Ibid., p. 32. 
80 Boas, quoted in Taussig, "Viscerality, Faith, and Skepticism," p. 228. 











the motion of a theatre of skilled revelation of skilled concealment. This statenlent bears some 
elaboration. We can begin with concealment. Shaman healing therapies involve concealment 
of a trick, not a deceptive trick, but a trick in which the motions of its perfect performance 
would cast a simulacrum about this theatre such that the trick becomes technique, activating a 
mimetic correspondence between shaman, spirits, and afflicted body. The motions of this trick 
as technique animate a momentum within this simulacrum emanating no longer from the 
shaman at the centre of this performance, but from within the object ofthis theatre itself, a 
theatre that now extends beyond the triangulation of shaman, spirit, and afflicted body to 
include the community of which they are a part. As faithful and sceptical participants in this 
theatre of revelation of a hiddenness activated and animated by the movement of mimetic 
technique, it is they who render this revelation visceral and efficacious. Where Boas and his 
peers erred was in understanding the concealment of a trick as a concealment of deceptive 
fraud. They failed to understand how a community who acknowledged the concealment of a 
trick might understand the trick differently, understand the skill of the movements of this 
performance of concealment as crucial to the perfection of a mimetic technique that would 
bring about a successful revelation and therewith a cure. This failing on their part inevitably 
led Boas and his peers to perceive an intractable paradox. But where these anthropologists and 
ethnographers perceive a paradox and the deception of truth, an analysis that begins with the 
notion of truth as secret comes to perceive instead of paradox, a dramatic theatre of skilled 
revelation of skilled concealment. 
For Taussig secrecy is tied to sacrality in a similar way that secrecy is tied to truth. 
Commenting on the theatre of skilled revelation of skilled concealment at the heart of the 
mimetic workings of Kwakiutl shamanism, Taussig observes: "secrecy is infinitely 











a hiddenness within the theatricality that mediates between the real and the really made up, no 
less than between trick and technique and therapeutic efficacy.,,82 This mediating role 
performed by this theatre, a kind of meta-theatre in which theatricality itself plays the leading 
role, is familiar and continuous with the preceding discussion, as is the notion of a hiddenness 
residing within this theatre, necessary if the movements between revelation and concealment 
are to be efficacious. Yet Taussig's claim that this hiddenness is sacred in character, and 
further, that secrecy is creative of this sacredness, is continuous with his theorising of 
defacement, what he relates as sacrilegious unmasking, a transgression of the fetish surface 
that masks the infinite hidden depths behind the appearance of the habitual and mundane. As 
noted previously, in the moment of defacement there is a suddenness of movement, the 
defaced object animated. This Taussig suggests is because defacement releases a surplus of 
sacred energy from deep within the defaced object itself, a sacredness concealed behind the 
mask, a surfacing sacrality welling from the depths. In Taussig's words: "it is the cut of 
de/facement that releases this surplus, the cut into wholeness as holiness that, in sundering, 
reveals, as with film montage, not only another view via another frame, but released flows of 
energy. ,,83 
It will be useful to draw from the preceding discussion the salient points before continuing. 
The architecture of this theory is built around two key ideas distilled from Taussig's 
discussion ofKwakiutl shamanism, being firstly movement, and secondly, the metonymic 
powers of the body. Positing the face that is both mask and window to the soul as an ideal 
emblem for thinking about these movements within objects, Taussig sets up a dialectic 
between surface and depth, where the surface of things conceals the movements within the 
hidden void. The truth of any object resides in these hidden depths and is thus allied with 
82 Taussig, "Viscerality, Faith, and Skepticism," p. 234. 











secrecy. But secrecy here is allied with sacredness, a suggestion delfionstrated by the problem 
of defacement where we are witness to a suddenness of movement as the defaced object is 
activated and animated by what can be characterised as a surplus of sacred energy emanating 
from within the defaced object itself. Defacement can be understood as sacrilegious 
unmasking, a tearing at the surface that releases this surplus that activates ordinary objects 
and, in a suddenness of movement, charges them with extra-ordinary power, as is 
demonstrated by the workings of sympathetic magic in the burning of national flags, money, 
and similar effigies. Truth that is allied with secrecy therefore requires a theatre that in the 
perfection of its movements will mediate between surface and depth, a mimetic theatre that 
can mediate the release of sacrality concealed behind the fetish surface of the habitual and 
mundane, and so bring about a revelation that will do justice to truth. This notion of a just 
revelation of truth that is concealed, a surfacing ofa sacred surplus, stands in contrast to 
exposure. For where revelation works with a productive tension between surface and depth, 
bringing mysterious insides outside, exposure operates on the surface of things, denying the 
existence of a behindness, or at the very least calling for its abolition in a positivist claim to 
transparency. Revelation will do justice to truth; exposure will destroy it. 
This image of a dialectical tension between surface and depth is brought into sharper focus by 
considering that antithetical image against which our dialectical image issues a consistent 
critique. A recurring theme in Taussig's theory is a critique against the scientific method that 
originates in Enlightenment reason. Having resolved the apparent paradox in shaman healing 
efficacy, he characterises that point of view that sees a paradox as an artefact of 
Enlightenment thinking,84 as ifit were an out-of-place leftover from a previous age. Of the 
four strategies he briefly surveys to understand the paradox, it was the fourth strategy that 











innovatively works with mimesis, movement, and metonymy, that would provide a resolution, 
rather than strategies pivoted on quantitative proportions, psychological dispositions, or 
procedures of verification and falsification. His work on theory both in his Viscerality, Faith 
and Skepticism essay and Defacement is peppered with iconic contrasts between his own 
method and a more scientific approach, the most stark of these, borrowed from Walter 
Benjamin, being his contrasting of revelation with exposure. Yet I would like to return to his 
discussion of faith and scepticism to draw out the contrast more succinctly with the assistance 
of two emblematic statements he makes there. The first concerns "the slippery fish of 
Kwakiutl shamanism" as narrated in Boas's anthropology; "the more you try to pin this fish 
down, the more it wriggles.,,85 The second is the notion of the driving wedge of scientific 
reason that leant such confidence to Evans-Pritchard in southern Sudan in the early 1930s: "In 
the long run, however, the ethnographer is bound to triumph. Armed with preliminary 
knowledge nothing can prevent him from driving a deeper and deeper wedge ifhe is 
interested and persistent. ,,86 
Dealing with the wedge first, the wedge in question is the illuminating light of reason that, in 
cleaving open its object, will lay bare the truth, a getting-to-the-bottom-things that promises 
fraud's exposure. The illuminating light of reason seeks to reach the end of that series of 
questions beginning with "why?" and thus arrive at a complete explanation that leaves 
nothing unaccounted. In this sense it could be said that reason's illuminating light seeks to 
expose any dark comers that may hide secrets. Relating this image to the image of surface and 
depth outlined earlier, it could be argued that reason seeks to render depth transparent, driving 
its wedge ever deeper, until a moment when it has effectively reduced depth to surface, a 
moment of exposure that in the same instant abolishes depth, no more secrets. In this moment 
85 Ibid., p. 228. 











of exposure the elusive truth is apprehended transparently, is captured by scientific reason. 
With no depth and no space to move, not even in secret, its movement arrested and "meaning" 
is apprehended. Yet it was demonstrated earlier that movement is essential to the success of 
this mimetic theatre. In other words, the scientific method of causal reason precludes the 
possibility that the paradoxical coexistence of faith with skepticism in Kwakiutl shamanism 
can be understood because it cannot conceive of its object as dynamic, cannot accommodate 
movement as a quality implicit and absolutely imperative to it's authenticity. 
Methodologically incapacitated in this manner, Boas, Evans-Pritchard and their generation of 
anthropologists and ethnographers could percieve only a succession of individuated 
deceptions as they drove their wedge persistently deeper, tying themselves in ever tighter 
knots as the paradox appeared to become ever more intractable the deeper they drove. 
The slippery fish, however, presents an alternative vision of an object whose incessant 
movements strains the pins that try to apprehend it, slipping past the wedge that would cleave 
it open to illuminate its mysterious insides; an object that cannot be pinned down or otherwise 
apprehended without becoming something else, a specimen or exhibit perhaps; an object 
where movement is intrinsic to its authentic being. No doubt this is why Taussig, in 
examining the fallout poetically no less than philosophically of his neat substitution of fraud 
with mimesis that slips the knotted paradox reported by Boas, comments that "With this, 
perhaps, our fish would stop wriggling and start to swim,,,s7 thereby resolving the paradox 
and retaining its authenticity, "a resolution I find preferable to strains and pins." 
The lesson learnt in this juxtaposition of the driving wedge and the slippery fish is that 
applying a scientific method founded in causal reason to a captured, arrested and apprehended 











Kwakiutl shamanism reveals nothing of significance about its practice. Methodologically 
impoverished scientific reason is forced to conclude that fraud is central to shamanism, in 
which case it rubs up against an affirmed faith in shamanism's efficacy, a paradoxical 
coexistence for which it is unable to account. For it is exactly in the movements of this theatre 
of trickery, the skilled revelation of skilled concealment, that the authenticity of an affirmed 
faith in healing's efficacy is revealed, and if its authenticity is to be witnessed, it can only be 
in the flow of its movements, the swimming fish. 
Movement as an essential aspect of an objects' authenticity is a suggestion that resonates with 
a formulation famously distilled by Friedrich Nietzsche between the dionysian and apollonian 
impulses whose dialectic is the originator of authentic art. As with the contrast between the 
driving wedge and the slippery fish, Nietzsche offers a similar critique, here exemplified in 
his notion of the theoretical man, of whom Socrates is Nietzsche's archetype. Nietzsche 
argues that with Socrates came "the imperturbable belief that, by means of the clue of 
causality, thinking reaches to the deepest abyss of being, and that thinking is able not only to 
perceive being, but to correct it.,,88 Socrates is here identified as "the mystagogue of science," 
the exemplar of this "profound illusion" that diverts attention away from the ecstatic 
conciliation between the dionysian and apollonian impulses, the primordial unity. Theoretical 
man is the enemy of Dionysian wisdom and art, seeking to dissolve myth and 
(substitute) for metaphysical comfort an earthly consonance, ... a deux ex machina of its own, 
namely the God of machines and crucibles, that is, the powers of the genii of nature recognised 
and employed in the service of higher egoism; it believes in amending the world by knowledge, 
88 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth o/Tragedy or Hellenism and Pessimism, trans. W. A Haussman (Edinburgh and 











in guiding life but science, and that it can really confine the individual within a narrow sphere of 
solvable problems where he cheerfully says to life: I desire thee: it is worthwhile to know thee.89 
This previously "unheard of form of existence" that would centuries later drive a wedge into 
Kwakiutl shamanism began its development by first diverting ancient tragedy from its origins 
in the dionysian-apollonian dialectic. This "restlessly onward-pressing spirit of science" 
annihilated myth with its displacement of metaphysical depth with an "earthly consonance" 
between knowledge and scientific optimism, thus driving poetry "as a homeless being from 
her natural ideal soil.,,90 Thus Nietzsche suggests: "For if the artist in every unveiling of truth 
remains cleaved with raptured eyes only to that which still remains veiled after the unveiling, 
the theoretical man, on the other hand, enjoys and contents himself with the cast-off veil, and 
finds the consummation of his pleasure in the process of a continuously successful unveiling 
through his own unaided efforts.,,91 It is exactly the divergent approaches to authenticity 
exemplified by the artist and scientific man that I want to develop through the following 
chapters. Yet the approach developed here is neither that of the artist nor the art historian, 
though it does contain elements of both. Though we will have reason to revisit Nietzsche's 
distinction again, in the following chapter I want to develop these themes in a more materially 
grounded discussion of fakery in religion. 
89 Ibid., p. 136. 
90 Ibid., p. 131. 











Chapter Three: Dialectics 
The previous chapter explored some ofthe difficulties encountered when attempts are made to 
separate fakery from authenticity. Assessments of an object's claim to authenticity on criteria of 
its content or its origination turn up inconclusive. Scientific procedures of verification and 
falsification lead to frustration as the exclusive possibilities of either an authentic or fake status 
seem to slide into one another or simply move beyond the reach of forensic science. When it is 
considered that an object's status pertaining to authenticity or fakery is capable of changing with 
time, a conclusion can be drawn that a pronouncement on such status can be no more than a 
snapshot framed by its temporality. Yet these frustrated attempts to grasp a locus of authenticity 
are each founded on an assumption that authenticity and fakery are mutually exclusive categories, 
an assumption given expression in the image of a driving wedge that would cleave them apart. 
The example of Carlos Castaneda demonstrates that determining just where authenticity ends and 
fakery begins can be more difficult than is implied by an image of reason separating exclusive 
categories. The self-ironical playfulness and conspiratorial wink that appears so crucial to the 
successful emergence of Klingon as a written and spoken language introduces the possibility that 
a productive tension between the two concepts' mutual determinacy (rather than mutual 
exclusion) might offer a more useful direction of inquiry. Michael Taussig comes to a similar and 
more critical conclusion in his study of Kwakiutl shamanism, a slippery fish he prefers to see 











From that discussion I want to carry forward into this chapter certain key ideas. The first of these 
is a synthesis of mutual exclusion and mutual determinacy into the relatively simpler concept of 
opposition. At their extreme poles, authenticity and fakery are related as opposite categories. Yet 
between the poles, authenticity and fakery can configure positively. Simply put, viewed from 
different angles, the same object, the Klingon language for example, can be both authentic and 
fake at the same time. This idea of opposition that accommodates different configurations of 
mutual determinacy I then want to relate as a dynamic tension whereby different configurations 
of authenticity and fakery are imagined as constellating movements of the elements that compose 
the image. Such constellations use the tensions of opposition and contradiction in the 
reconfiguring of those compositional elements. With this image of configuring elements in 
oppositional tension, whether abstractly conceived as constellations or concretely imagined as 
tricks that activate mimetic correspondences, I use the imageric language of Walter Benjamin 
deliberately to invoke his theory of the dialectical image. 
3.1 Dialectics at a Standstill 
Benjamin's theory is a valuable analytical device because it draws critical attention to the fetish 
character of the surface of appearance, the knowledge that the facts of life, so immutable and 
essentialised, are actually so many artefacts, arbitrary and temporal constructions that derive their 
facticity only from the powers of our imagination. This power of imagination can, in a certain 
sense, be recognised as a religious imagination; an imagination that creatively authors the world, 
or at least a particular orientation toward that world, with attendant commitments. Some sense of 











chapter's discussion of sacrilegious unmasking where it was shown how an animating power, 
what Taussig characterises as a sacred surplus, surfaces from deep within socially mediated 
objects in the moment of their defacement, demonstrating the object's fetish character in a 
suddenness of movement that brings cold, inanimate statues to life. This surfacing sacredness 
bursting through a tear in the transgressed surface of the habitual and mundane Taussig suggests 
points to "the mysterium tremendum of a primal religiosity. ,,1 The fetish character of artefacts that 
concretises them into "workaday facts" is indeed a mysterious movement. Yet the dialectical 
image, firmly grounded in materiality and therefore on 'this side' of mystery, may provide some 
critical leverage: "we penetrate the mystery only to the degree that we recognise it in the 
everyday world, by virtue of a dialectical optic that perceives the everyday as impenetrable, the 
impenetrable as everyday.,,2 Later in this chapter, the mysterious workings of the 'artefact' of 
authenticity will be recognised in the constellating movements of Landover Baptist Ministries, 
Objective Christian Ministries, Adult Christianity, and even the Internet search engine Google, as 
they dialectically reconfigure an image of authenticity, an image for a long time assumed to be a 
stable, given, fact of life. 
Benjamin's dialectical image is valuable not only because its optics alerts us to the mysterious 
workings of the fetish and the surplus of sacrality stored therein, but also because by maintaining 
its gaze on material, everyday objects, it implicitly cautions thought against abstraction. The 
I Taussig, Defacement. The notion of a tremendous mystery at the base of sacredness is Rudolf Otto's classic 
understanding of religion. See Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy trans. lohn H. Harvey (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1926). 
2 Walter Benjamin, "Surrealism: The Last Snapshot of the European Intelligentsia," in Reflections: Essays. 
Aphorisms. Autobiographical Writings, ed. Peter Demetz, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Schocken Books, 











visual metaphor implied in Benjamin's dialectical optic stems from its methodological 
imperative. This emphasis on vision in Benjamin's theory, as in the "long-sought image sphere,,3 
opened with his dialectical optic, is appreciated by Susan Buck-Morss, who named her excellent 
study of Benjamin "The Dialectics of Seeing.'.4 Here I have in mind Benjamin's unfinished work 
on the Paris arcades of the nineteenth century, the intellectual project for which this dialectical 
optic was designed. Benjamin attempted a critique of modem progress though the dialectical 
relation of nature and history. He thought that the distortion resulting from a conflation of nature 
and history into the modem concept of progress fulfilled ideological functions. Taking its cue 
from social Darwinists' distortion of Charles Darwin's theories of evolution,S a notion of 
progress that originates in industrial capitalism is inserted into this conflated formula so that 
progress comes to mean the progress of humanity itself, rather than merely advances in ability 
and techno}ogy.6 This conception of progress understood the nature of history to be an unfolding 
of a singular, "straight or spiral,'" trajectory of infinite human perfection, the progression of a 
predetermined and inevitable course of constant improvement. In a fragment from the Arcades 
Project, Benjamin writes: "The doctrine of natural selection ... popularized the notion that 
progress was automatic. Furthermore, it promoted the extension of the concept of progress to the 
entire realm of human activity. ,,8 Progress itself carne to be identified with "a measure of the span 
3 Ibid., p. 192 . 
.. Susan Buck-Morss, The Dialectics o/Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project (Cambridge, Mass. and 
London, England, 1989). 
S Ibid., pp. 58-59. 
6 Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," in Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, ed. Hannah 
Arendt, trans. Hany Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), p. 260. 
7 Ibid., p. 260. 
8 Walter Benjamin, UN: [Theoretics of Knowledge; Theory of Progress]," trans. Leigh Hafrey and Richard Sieburth, 











separating a legendary beginning from a legendary end.,,9 As such, progress enters into the world 
of myth where the passage of time takes the form of predetermination; the course of events is said 
to be "predestined by the gods, written in the stars, spoken by oracles, or inscribed in sacred 
texts."IO Against the utopian image of a heaven-on-earth promised by progress Benjamin posits 
the direct counter-image: "Modernity, the time ofHell.,,11 Benjamin characterises the nineteenth 
century's Golden Age as a catastrophe [ref: 1935 expose, n7] and progress as the catastrophe's 
eternal return; "the fact that 'everything just goes on' is the catastrophe.,,12 Benjamin's 
characterising of modernity in mythical terms continued a nineteenth century German 
philosophical critique that would culminate mid-twentieth century with Max Horkheimer and 
Theodore Adorno's classic, "Dialectic of Enlightenment," but still feature prominently in the 
work of later theorists, most significantly, Jiirgen Habermas. Yet Benjamin's approach to the 
myth of automatic, historical, progress was unique because he intended to articulate his critique 
with the material objects of progress themselves: "The work must raise to the very highest level 
the art of quoting without quotation marks. Its theory is intimately linked to that of montage. ,,13 
In another fragment he states: "The method of this project: literary montage. I need say nothing. 
Only Show:,14 In this sense, Benjamin's ideal book would consist exclusively of quotations, with 
no commentary.IS Such quotation of material objects ("the trivia, the trash") Benjamin assures he 
9 Ibid., p. 27 (N I 3.1). 
10 Buck-Morss, The Dialectics a/Seeing, p. 78. 
II Benjamin, quoted in Ibid., p. 96. 
12 Benjamin, quoted in Jiirgen Habermas, "Consciousness Raising or Redemptive Critique - The Contemporaneity of 
Walter Benjamin," New German Critique, vol. 17 (Spring 1979), p. 38. 
13 Benjamin, "N," p. 3 (N 1.1 0). 
14 Ibid., p. 5 (N I a.S). 
IS FranIYoise Meltzer, "Acedia and Melancholia," in Michael P. Steinberg (ed.), Walter Benjamin and the Demands 0/ 











does not want to inventory, "but let it come into its own in the only way possible: use it.,,16 
Benjamin's idea of quotation is the literary equivalent of configuring constellations where the 
constellated elements are allowed to speak for themselves, a method of literary montage that 
allows the object to come into its own. This idea of forming montages by "quoting" material 
objects fits into what Benjamin calls the pedagogic side of the Arcades project: "to train our 
image making faculty to look stereoscopically and dimensionally into the depths of the shadows 
fh ' ,,17 o IstOry. 
With this theoretical innovation of quoting material objects to image the dialectic, Benjamin drew 
an instructive lesson from Surrealism. He thought that the surrealist techniques of deliberate 
anachronism and montage allowed them to occupy a threshold between what he termed waking 
and dreaming. IS The origin of Benjamin's concept of dream versus waking consciousness 
probably comes from Marx's correspondence with Arnold Ruge. Benjamin prefaces his index of 
notes from the Arcades Project dealing with the theory of knowledge and the theory of progress 
with the following extract from Marx's correspondence: ''The reformation of consciousness lies 
solely in our waking the world ... from its dream about itself.,,19 Following Marx, Benjamin 
characterises as "dream consciousness" the uncritical, non-dialectical mode of thinking that 
accedes to a mythical, predetermined notion of progress, an ideological mode of thought that 
confuses technical progress with the "nature of history." Dream consciousness then is a kind of 
16 Benjamin, "N," p. 5 (Nla.8). 
17 Benjamin, quoting Rudolf Borchardt, Ibid., p. 2 (N1.8). 
18 Ackbar Abbas, "On Facination: Walter Benjamin's Images," New German Critique, vol. 48 (Fall 1989), p. 47; see 
Benjamin, "Surrealism," p. 178. 
19 Marx. letter to Arnold Ruge, quoted in Benjamin, "N," p. 1, original emphasis. See Buck-Morss, The Dialectics of 











false consciousness. Benjamin wanted to configure dialectical constellations by quoting the 
material objects that gave life to myth and thereby exert a critical leverage in "the multitudinous 
images flooding back and forth,,20 to awaken this dream consciousness. Thus Benjamin says: 
"The utilisation of dream elements upon waking is the canon of dialectics.,,21 
Benjamin's theory of the dialectical image is a useful approach to the problem of authenticity in 
Internet religion because it takes fakery seriously. It holds out the possibility that fakery may 
actually perform a kind of religious work, rather than existing as a kind of frivolous and silly 
sideshow to religion with a capital "R". Taking religion seriously entails recognising that fakes 
that are copies of authentic things are not merely imitations of religious forms, say the institution 
of a clerical order or the veneration of one or more deities. Crucial to the success and persistence 
of fake religions is that its imitations must include the religious claims represented by formal 
objects, of which the most essential and powerful is the claim to authenticity. Fake things don't 
merely imitate authentic things; they imitate authentic things' claim to being authentic. This is 
why fake things deserve serious attention, because fakery destabilises and subverts the power of 
authenticity to put forth its own image. This is the same reason why authentic religions, in the 
sense of religious objects whose claim to authenticity is taken seriously, refuse to treat fake 
religions seriously and dismiss them as nagging irritations that get in the way of their authentic, 
serious, religious work. Looking at fakery through the optics of Benjamin's dialectics offers a 
way to trace the implications of fake religion through the twists and turns of its subversive 
imitations to the critical moment of recognition when the dialectic is "saturated with tensions.,,22 
20 Benjamin, "Surrealism," p. 178. 
21 Benjamin, UN," p. 10 (N4.4). 











In this moment, "found wherever the tension between dialectical oppositions is greatest,'.23 the 
configuration of fake and authentic "flash into a constellation, ,,24 marking "the caesura in the 
movement of thought. ,,25 
This is Benjamin's notion of dialectics at a standstill. It marks the moment when the dialectical 
image appears, a moment "identical with the 'moment of recognition,' in which things put on 
their true - surrealististic - face.,,26 Here Benjamin is alluding to the threshold between dreaming 
and waking that he thought the surrealists managed to occupy and for which effort he 
commended them. Yet Benjamin also criticised the surrealists for not going far enough. While he 
drew inspiration from the surrealist techniques of montage and deliberate anachronism that 
alerted attention to the dream nature of the materials so juxtaposed, he remained critical of what 
he perceived as the surrealists' inability to get out of the dream world and back into waking 
consciousness.27 Benjamin's practice of historical materialism wanted to use the energies 
released in this transgressive moment of waking recognition for critical, transformative action, 
"to win the energies of intoxication for the revolution. ,,28 This is the important next step that the 
Surrealists' failed to take: the appreciation that this moment of recognition involves not one, but 
two transformations. The first is the transformation of the object of perception, a transformation 
successfully problematised by the surrealists' liminal position on the threshold. The second is a 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., p. 7 (N2a.3). 
2S Ibid., p. 24 (NIOa.3) 
26 Ibid., p. 9 (N3a.3). 
27 Abbas, "On Facination," p. 49. 











transfonnation of the recognising self, of "the very percept ofrecognition.,,29 This is not merely 
an abstract theoretical idea, but is also very much embodied, as Taussig's discussion of Kwakiutl 
shamanism so emphatically demonstrates - deceptive tricks are transfonned into prototypical 
healing therapies designed for spirits to copy. The first kind of transfonnation, that of the object 
of perception, will be the broad subject of this chapter. The discussion will trace the 
reconfiguring movements of the dialectic and map the transfonnations of objects as those 
movements constellate a critical image. The second kind of transfonnation, that of the 
recognising self, will be the broad subject of Chapter Four. 
In tracing the dialectic, the discussion will follow reconfiguring movements through three case 
studies of websites that claim an authentic religious character. The tracing begins with Landover 
Baptist Church. Landover is a parody of Baptist fundamentalism in the U.S.A. and is the creation 
of an organisation calling itself Americhrist, Ltd. A Tenns of Service Agreement on their website 
runs to some 1300 words and asserts that by browsing the Landover website, the browser, or 
more technically, the user, enters into an agreement with Landover Baptist Church or Americhrist 
Ltd. whereby they consent to the tenns and conditions outlined in this document.3o These include 
limitations on the use of content and materials, a disclaimer that disavows Landover Baptist 
Church of any warranties whatsoever, and a reservation of the right to use any ideas or 
manuscripts submitted to the site without acknowledging or compensating its author, and an 
automatic transfer of ownership of such articles from the submitter to Landover Baptist 
Ministries where such submissions are used. The Tenns of Service Agreement specifically asks 
29 Michael Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 40. 












users not to submit any unsolicited material to the website. Yet for this discussion, the most 
significant statement in the Terms of Service Agreement is that "The Landover Baptist Church is 
a complete work of fiction. It is a satire/parody." We can reasonably assume that the Terms of 
Service Agreement is an authentic disclaimer and that the Landover website does not refer to a 
real congregation existing on 35 acres in Iowa, USA, as is referred to in the site's main 
introduction. Significantly, if the content and claims contained in this Service Agreement are 
authentic, all other content on the website is admitted to be entirely fictitious. That said, 
Landover is beyond reasonable doubt a fake Baptist ministry. 
What is so interesting about Landover is the response its website provokes among browsers, 
almost all of whom seem taken in by its deceptive fakery, at least on their first visit. This is 
certainly testimony to the success of their parody and sets the stage for the next movement in this 
dialectical choreography. A website calling itself Objective Christian Ministries that claims to be 
the online presence of an offline fundamental Baptist congregation, has launched a campaign to 
shutdown the Landover website. Landover responds by parodying their campaign in an article 
calling for the removal from the Internet of a progressive Christian website. Then things take a 
sudden tum when it is widely claimed that the Objective website is a fraud, a hoax, a "meta-
parody" of Landover, and further, that it is conceived and managed by Americhrist, the same 
group claiming credit for the Landover site. The final movement in this tracing comes in the 
example of Steve van Nattan whose critique of Baptist fundamentalism likens their leadership to 
fascists in league with Satan. In Van Nattan's view, he is defending the authentic fundamentalist 
faith against the fascist's deceptive brand that tricks zealous Christians into championing Satan. 
A crucial moment comes when Van Nattan is discounted as another invention of Americhrist, 











authentic and fake things. Though the dialectic can certainly be traced further, for the purposes of 
this discussion, the case-study will stop here. With this case-study, I want to draw attention to a 
quality of mysteriousness, in the sense of "not knowing," that seems to be crucial to the working 
of the dialectic. Rather than understand mystery as an obstacle to the discovery of an object's 
authentic status, as a forensic, scientific method conceives it, it may be that mystery is the crucial 
quality that allows authenticity the possibility to reveal itself through the subjectivity of the 
recognising self. This is the argument proposed in the present chapter and continued in the next. 
3.2 Flooding 
The website of Landover Baptist Church promises "a Christian perspective on local, national, and 
world news!" The website describes Landover as, 
a Bible-believing, Fundamentalist, Independent Baptist Church. We are 125,000 members 
strong. Our Church Campus is located in Freehold, Iowa and rests on 35 acres of some of the 
most beautiful country you'd ever care to set your eyes upon. Our church holds 23 paid 
pastors, 124 paid deacons, 343 full time staff members, LCA (Landover Christian Academy), 
LCU (Landover Christian University), 12 fully equipped chapels, Four 2,000 seat sanctuaries, 
Two 5,000 seat main sanctuaries, the world's largest Christian Mall, a Christian Amusement 
Park (Landover Bible Theme Park and Red Sea World), A PGA 18 Hole Golf Course, 3 
Fitness Centres, 4 Olympic sized swimming pools, Landover Village, Landover Towers, 
Landover Retirement Community, Centre For 2 Churches On Every City Block Foundation, 
Leviticus Landing (A Gated Christian Community), Exodus Acres (Silver Gated 











Fire Department, 100,000 seat amphitheatre, 12 Television studios, 2 radio stations, A 
Christian Circus Camp, Retreat Centre for Republican Candidates, 3 Corporate Christian 
Office Parks, hot springs, 8 cemeteries, and 243 fully certified Christian police officers.31 
Landover Baptists claim to believe in "the WHOLE Bible (1611 KJV)"32 (original emphasis). 
They see the strict adherence to and practice of this belief as the key to salvation in Jesus Christ: 
"As most churches liberalize themselves and reject the commandments written by God in the 
Holy Bible, the Landover Baptist Church continues to do exactly what scripture teaches every 
Christian to do. And that is to keep the temple of the living God a clean vessel, untarnished by 
even a hint of fellowship with the unrighteous.,,33 Practically, this means that "the unsaved" are 
not allowed to enter Landover's churches. This "Bible-based policy against the unsaved" asserts 
that the unsaved defile "God's vessel" and make the church a less than perfectly safe 
environment for Christians to practice their faith. "Why would an unsaved person want to go to 
church anyway? ... Church is not a place for unsaved people. It is a place for Christians to gather 
and be edified in Bible teaching. It is a place for Christian worship and fellowship. An unsaved 
person wouldn't feel comfortable in Church .... If you want to get someone saved, do it outside of 
the church. It's called 'evangelism' .,,34 
Landover claims to evangelise to "over 5000 souls a month outside our church" through 16 
different strategic ministries. For example, Homosexual Outreach Ministry Operation was started 
in 1995 by "ex-sodomite, Brother Bobby" and operates a Landover extension church in San 
Jl http://www.landoverbaptist.orglbeliefs.html(accessed: 26 April 2003). 
32 "1611 KJV" refers to the King Kames Version of the bible inaugurated in England in 161 L 
33 http://www.landoverbaptist.orglbeliefs.html(accessed: 26 April 2003). 











Francisco. This ministry is supplemented by the Homosexual Deprogramming Ministry and 
Christians Are Saving Homosexuals. The ministry to gay men has taught Landover the lesson 
that if "God can change the behaviour of homosexuals, He has shown the people of this church 
that He can change the behaviour of Negroes as well," hence the Ex-Negro Ministry. Other 
ministries include Christian Crackwhore Ministry that offers "Compassionate Conservativism to 
Crack whores," the Personal Testimony Improvement Centre that "allows church members to 
intentionally backslide in order to gain high impact testimonies from the Lord/' Bringing 
Integrity to Christian Homemakers, a Puppet Ministry, and a Christian Hypnotist. 
The extent and success of Landover's various ministries is surely attributable to its dedicated 
staff, "the greatest Church staff in all Christendom." Pastor Deacon Fred is both pastor and 
deacon of the church, heads Media Relations at Landover, and is official spokesperson to the 
unsaved world. Saved at the age of four years, Pastor-Deacon Fred holds a degree in Applied 
Presuppositionalism, four degrees in theology, a degree in Angelology, a PhD in Apologetics, a 
Masters degree in Post Umbilicism, and a BA in Elementary Education. Pastor Deacon Fred is 
assisted by Rev. Wilkins who is completing his fourth book titled, "For the lOoth Time, Here's 
the Gospel." Rev. Wilkins also heads up the "One Church On Every City Block Foundation." 
Little Rev. Nathan De'Angelo is Landover's youngest minister. Rev. De' Angelo first came to 
notice at age four years for his tremendous talents at scripture memorisation and recitation. He 
spent three years at Landover's Gifted and Talented Fundamentalist Baptist Children's Retreat 
Centre before entering the seminary at age seven years to become a fully licensed Baptist 











The Ladies of Landover deserve special attention, not least for their alleged influence in the halls 
of political power. The Ladies of Landover was founded 200 years ago as the Landover Ladies 
Club. Since it's humble beginnings in a prayer group meeting, the Landover Ladies Club and 
later the Ladies of Landover have grown in influence, spending "an annual budget in the 
millions. ,,35 One member of the United States Congress reportedly has described them as "a 
political force to be reckoned with" and they are widely held to be "the largest single voting force 
in the United States today. ,,36 The power and success of the Ladies is largely attributable to the 
tireless work of a few key women. Mrs. Taffy Davenport-Crocket is granddaughter of Georgia 
Sue Gaines in whose memorial honour the prayer meeting that became the Landover Ladies Club 
was established. Mrs. Davenport-Crocket, or Sister Taffy, as she is known to "friends of Jesus," 
holds a Doctorate in Christian Home Economics and a Masters Degree in Women's Leadership 
from Landover Biblical College. Most recently, Mrs. Davenport-Crocket was titled 'Mrs. 
Christian USA'. Judy O'Christian, we are told, spends 16-20 hours per day rebuking lost souls 
and returning them to the fold, or discarding them to Satan, "depending on the severity of their 
actions against God.,,37 Mrs. O'Christian has no formal theological training, but instead received 
"the holy gift of Knowledge" directly from God, earning her a Doctorate in Spontaneous 
Theology. Mrs. O'Christian is Board President of the Ladies of Landover 'First Stone' Club, a 
board member of the Anti-Sodomites League, and Co-chair with Mrs Davenport-Crocket of the 
Ladies of Landover. In contrast to the characters of Taffy Davenport-Crocket and Judy 
0' Christian, Mrs. Betty Bowers is archetypical in her materialism and utterly decadent in her 
lUXUry. Before turning to God, Mrs. Bowers spent many years selling multi-million dollar 
35 http://www.landoverbaptist.orglthestaff/ladies (accessed: 26 April 2003). 
36 [bid. 











mansions. Mrs. Bowers recounts that "God called me out of pandering to the needs of the 
inexplicably wealthy and promised that if I devoted my fabulous business instincts to Him, I 
would one day never have to share a formal, Italianate living room, much less a German SlN, 
with someone more wealthy than I. Praise the Lord!,,38 Thus Mrs. Bowers established the 
Christian Crackwhore Ministry: "As soon as I realized how much cash these industrious little 
tramps were dealing in, it wasn't long before I introduced them to the one thing that could save 
their sullied souls - tithing. ,,39 The Ministry now operates franchises in all the States of the US, 
except Nevada, and recently opened an international Franchise in Bangkok, Thailand, netting 
Mrs. Bowers $200 million on its initial public offering. Mrs. Betty Bowers Ministries Holdings 
exercises complete ownership of its privately-held subsidiaries; Bringing Integrity To Christian 
Homemakers, Saving Love Until The Sacrament, Christians Are Saving Homosexuals, 
Femininity Rescues All Unladylike Dykes, Traditional-families Raging Against Sluts & Homos, 
and Christian Religious Ideas Moulding Education. 
Recalling the Service Agreement outlined earlier, we know that Landover Baptist Church is a 
parody website, an imitation of authentic fundamental Baptists. So what of authentic Baptist 
ministries does Landover imitate? Landover begins by imitating Southern Baptists' strict 
distinction between the saved and the unsaved. Recalling Landover's Bible-based policy against 
the unsaved, evangelism is the religious activity reserved for this category of people. To this end, 
Landover operates an extensive range of evangelical projects and ministries to witness to the 
unsaved. Yet each of these establishes a platform for a further ridiculing of southern Baptists. 
Landover ridicules southern Baptists' social and political conservativism (Homosexual Outreach 












Ministry Operation; Brewsers Homosexual Deprogramming Ministry; Christians Are Saving 
Homosexuals; Ex-Negro Ministry), the extensive financial interests often tied up with church 
ministries (Christian Crackwhore Ministry), the zeal that informs a by-any-means-necessary 
evangelical enthusiasm (Richardo Frezno, Christian Hypnotist), and the folly of the southern 
Baptists laity (Puppet Ministry). Landover also uses acronyms to ridicule Baptists; Homosexual 
Outreach Ministry Operation becomes HOMO, Christians Are Saving Homosexuals becomes 
CASH, Bringing Integrity to Christian Homemakers becomes BITCH and so on. Landover also 
ridicules hypocrisy in Baptism with the Personal Testimony Improvement Centre. Recalling the 
infamous incidents of Rev. Billy Graham's adventures with prostitutes, the Centre "allows church 
members to intentionally backslide in order to gain high impact testimonies for the Lord. ,.40 
Within the category of "the saved", Landover describes characters in the congregation that in 
their achievements and activities would seem to vie for the title of "the most saved." Landover's 
parody uses various devices as indicators here, with each measure parodying an attribute of real 
southern Baptist fundamentalists. Consider the number of titles and degrees held by Pastor 
Deacon Fred, Sister Taffy, and Judy O'Christian. Landover parodies so-called mail-order titles to 
suggest that such titles are gimmicks employed to enhance the credibility to Baptist ministers. 
Yet Landover's parody carries such titular usages to the extreme, for example Judy O'Chrstian's 
Doctorate in Spontaneous Theology. The example of Little Nathan De'Angelo ridicules Baptists' 
tendency to cite the youth of the people through whom God supposedly works as evidence of 
God's unlimited powers: he must be a very powerful god ifhe can equip a nine year old child 
with the knowledge to preach his holy word. The effect is to elevate the ideal of Christian piety to 
absurd heights. A related device used in this parody is lineage. This device goes to the heart of 











familial networks of the southern states and the so-called Bible Belt states of the U.S. Landover 
Church is over 200 years old, and the Ladies of Landover is proud to trace its origins back three 
generations. We are repeatedly told that Sister Taffy, the current co-president of the Ladies of 
Landover, is the granddaughter of Georgia Sue Gaines. In important ways, this fundamentalist 
Christian ministry is portrayed as matriarchal: it appears that women are more active in ministry 
work and substantially more zealous in their Christian faith. This is itself ironic and no less 
satirical since Landover repeatedly affirms the fundamentalist view that men are superior to 
women, even posting a news item to the effect that theological deliberations have established that 
since women were created to be companions to men, women "probably don't have souls". Upon 
entering the kingdom of heaven, men will no longer have need for such companionship: "women, 
like the members of the animal kingdom, will fall by the wayside.1!41 The corollary is a disguised 
homoeroticism implicit in a heaven where men are companions to each other. A theme running 
throughout Landover's parody is that of the proximity of Baptist faith to financial and political 
power. Consider the litany of assets and prestige attached to possession of, or proximity to, this 
wealth: 12 fully equipped chapels, Four 2,000 seat sanctuaries, Two 5,000 seat main sanctuaries, 
and a 100,000 seat amphitheatre. Consider the various 'villages' and 'gated' communities: 
Landover Village, Landover Towers, Landover Retirement Community, Leviticus Landing, 
Exodus Acres, and Apostles Grove that offers "Fine Equestrian Estates For Discriminating 
Christians.,,42 The character of Betty Bowers, multi-million dollar real-estate dealer-turned-
entrepreneurial-Baptist who leads the unsaved to the Lord via tithing, is particularly useful in this 
aspect of the parody. Betty Bowers has her own website, linked to the Landover site, at 
www.bettybowers.com where she is proudly procJaimed "America's Best Christian" above a 
41 http://www.landoverbaptist.orgfnews0500/femsoul.html(accessed: 26 April 2003). 











banner that begins: "love the sinner, hate their clothes." She is portrayed as narcissistic, self-
deceptively sophisticated, and ultimately trashy. This materialism in the character of Betty 
Bowers is echoed in the gambling resort ''The Golden Plate, Christian Casino and Resort;.43 
where all losses are counted as tithes paid to Jesus; as Pastor Deacon Fred says: "quite frankly, if 
a Christian sitting at one of our tables is willing to tithe away their entire life savings, we're not 
going to stop them." At The Golden Plate "it's always Jesus who wins." Much ofthis parody 
surely has in mind Rev. Pat Robertson, the firebrand southern Baptist minister and televangelist 
who owns a racehorse.44 
But the ongoing aspect of Landover's parody is found in its new articles, film reviews, sermons 
and online merchandise, and it is these often updated and added to categories of content that 
ensure Landover's longevity and impact on authentic religion. Crucially, although Landover's 
terms of Service Agreement specifically admits that it is a fiction and entirely made-up, few users 
actually read this document. This is apparent from the amount of mail the Landover site receives 
and that they dutifully publish: every published letter writer takes Landover to task for their 
invective speech and distortion of Christian teachings. In other words, authors of these letters 
believe the Landover web site is authentic, in the sense that they take the site's claims seriously. 
Take for example the response to a review of the recent film version of Tolkein's classic The 
Twin Towers, the second in the Lord of the Rings trilogy, published in December 2002.45 The 
review argues that on the one hand, the gratuitous violence of the film is appealing to true 
Christians because it is suggestive of God's final judgement, "the glorious barbecue of burning 
43 http://www.landoverbaptist.orginews0502/goldenplate.html(accessed: 26 April 2003). 
44 See Cal Thomas, "Pat Robertson's High Horse," The Washington Times, 29 April 2002, available at 
http://www.washtimes.comlcommentary/20020429-9022051.htm (accessed: 26 April 2003). 











flesh that God has promised for all those who don't worship Jesus." On the other hand, this 
violent appeal masks a hidden sexual agenda advocated by the hobbit characters of Tolkien's 
epic. Pastor Deacon Fred points to the "sinful act" that "led to both their palms and feet 
becoming so hairy" (original emphasis). Furthermore, this agenda is homosexual: "sodomy is 
now suggested in nearly every scene where the two creatures appear together." The twin towers 
themselves represent the aroused genitalia of the two most powerful beings in the movie, "The 
imagery is kept discrete only by the merciful fact that both creatures are uncircumcised." This 
review attracted an avalanche ofletters to the site.46 
The responses can be classified into four broad themes; those that express indignation and 
outrage, those that take Landover's interpretation of The Twin Towers to task by trying to 
persuade them otherwise, those that are simply confused and not sure whether the article or 
church is serious in what it is saying, and those that refute Landover's claim to Christian 
authenticity. The first two themes pertain more directly to the review article, the third and forth to 
the website in general. Yet more often than not, offence at the review article served as a 
springboard for a more sustained critique of the Christian claims of the site as a whole. Typical of 
letters expressing outrage is an excerpt from 'Gogeta's' letter: "Holy shit man, this isn't a fucking 
review of The Lord Of The Ring, this isjust a sorry excuse to show that you're homophobic ... if 
you're not gay then why do you care if Frodo and Sam are? I bet you like little boys!!!!!" Brian 
Luining says, "to compare [the movie] with some sexual background is pretty sick. I think you 
should seek help, because if a person like yourself sees the filthy and dirty in each and 
46 Landover has published about 30 messages from its December mailbox, "a small sample" of the total received. 
These can be read at http://www.landoverbaptist.orgimaiI1l202.html(accessed: 26 April 2003). The extracts 











everything, there is something wrong with your mind." Other responses sought to engage 
Landover's interpretation seriously. One anonymous submission asks: "why is this website the 
only place I've seen that relates LOTR to homosexuality? I can't remember the topic coming up 
at all when we studied the books at school." James Gayson argues, "The things you wrote on the 
Lord of the Rings have no honest justification. The author of the series J. R. R. Tolkien was a 
Christian. The hobbits have no homosexual attributes.,,47 These responses appear confused and 
incredulous and unable to make sense of what they have stumbled across. Other responses, 
particularly from Christians, are addressed to the Landover site in its entirety and are angry. Cody 
and Emily Van Pelt charge, "You give us Christians a bad name. Have you read the Bible ... " 
Tina Buchanan thinks Pastor deacon Fred is "the most ignorant person I have ever seen. You 
need to pray long and hard ... " And Michael Berry of Kansas City pleads: "Please remove this 
insane site from the Internet. You people are monsters! ... You can still redeem yourselves in a 
real and meaningful sense by cleaning your thoughts of this kind of destructive superstition, myth 
and supernaturalism." In an extract worth quoting at length, S. G. challenges Landover's 
understanding of the messianic promise of Jesus Christ and claims that Landover is a fraud in 
need of a revival: 
You, sir, are in need of a revival! The welcome banner to your site states that you are 'The 
Largest, Most Powerful Assembly Of Worthwhile People To Ever Exist' That is a load of 
crock! All, not one or two, or a select few, but ALL PEOPLE ARE WORTHWHILE! GOD 
MADE ALL PEOPLE AND ALL PEOPLE DESERVE TO BE TREATED EQUALLY! ... I 
believe that you are a fraud! (original emphasis) 











In fact, so angry has the Christian response been at Americhrist's imitation of their faith through 
websites such as landoverbaptist.org, bettybowers.com and sistertaffy.com that a Baptist Ministry 
called Objective: Christian Ministries has launched a campaign against Landover. Called 
Objective: Landover Baptist Shutdown, Objective has dedicated a page on their website to a 
campaign to remove Landover and Americhrist from the Internet.48 From the Progress Report 
posted on their website detailing the successes and failures of the protracted battle against 
Landover, it seems that Objective has been campaigning at least since March 2000, the first entry 
in the journal, though from the context of that entry it is apparent that the campaign had been 
operating for some time previously.49 The progress report reads like a timeline of an epic struggle 
over religious authenticity, marking both highs and lows as authenticity, here signified by 
Objective who would seek to defend it, wrestles to break free of fakery, signified by Landover, 
whose imitation seems to stick to authenticity like a shadow. 
Objective sees the Landover website as "a blasphemous atrocity."so Objective acknowledges that 
Landover is "all make believe" and cite this as their reason for objecting to it: "Landover is trying 
to pass itself off as a real Baptist church in order to spread misconceptions about Christians in 
general and Baptists in particular." Landover is not a Christian website, but rather one dedicated 
to "anti-Christian hate-speech." Neither is Landover satire: "real satire serves a social good, 
48 The webpage can be found at http://crossspot.netfobjective/shutdown.html(accessed: 26 April 2003). 
49 The first entry in the Progress Report, dated 1 March, 2000, reads: "It is clear that we've got Landover on the 
defensive. Just recently, our protests have resulted in them being forced to add a disclaimer on entrance to their 
site. While this is a victory for our side, it is still not enough. The disclaimer makes no mention of the site's 
deception (the whole point of our protest), it merely warns away children under 18 - which we all know will only 
make them all the more desirous to view the site." The entry concludes with the final stanza of The Lord's Prayer. 











highlighting wrong-doing via exaggeration."S! With Landover's satire however, there is no social 
good. It is "more dangerous than any pornography site since it leads people to reject their only 
hope for salvation!,,52 More than this, Landover deliberately perverts Jesus' message "so as to 
make it unpalatable to people ignorant of the Lord."s3 "What Landover is attempting to do is not 
humour, but to trick people into hating Christians and Christ.',54 In other words, although 
Objective accepts that Landover is not an authentic church, it resists the real consequences that 
flow from its mimicry, consequences it perceives as anti-Baptist - and probably rightly so. 
By way of contrast, the Objective website links to baptist.org, helpfully adding: "this is what a 
real Baptist website looks like."s5 The contrast of Landover's website with baptists.org presented 
a particular problem to Objective over the course of a year from March 2002. In that month a 
search for 'Baptist' in the popular search engine google.com positioned landoverbaptist.org at 
number three in their ranking of sites most relevant to the search term. Yet by September 2002, 
Google ranked Landover's website number one. And much to Objective's consternation, "Google 
still refuses our request to rectify this situation.,,56 Thus Google, "the de facto gatekeepers to the 
Internet" according to Objective, became the de facto arbiters of religious authenticity online. But 
the January 11'\ 2003, entry in the Progress Report cautiously celebrates that the website of the 
Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) has taken the number one position in Google's ranking, 
displacing Landover's website to the number two position. Objective claims that this victory was 
SI http://crossspot.netlobjective/faq.html(accessed: 26 April 2003). 
52 http://crossspot.netlobjective/shutdown.html(accessed: 26 April 2003). 
53 http://crossspot.netlobjective/faq.html(accessed: 26 April 2003). 
54 Ibid. 
55 http://crossspot.netlobjective/shutdown.htmi (accessed: 26 April 2003). 











achieved by using the same strategy Landover allegedly used to win the number one position: 
members of the SBC were encouraged to place more prominent links to other 'authentic' Baptist 
websites on their own site. Thus "Google's software was forced to return the SBC to the top 
spot." But this is a cautious celebration; "the battle is not won" - "how long before Google - who 
are known to have secular leanings - decide to change their software so that it favours 
Landover?" Interestingly, an option to search the Objective website with the Google search 
engine is provided at the bottom of each of their web pages. 
This titanic struggle over religious authenticity has not been confined to the Internet. The 
progress report claims that Objective has pursued their aim to remove Landover from the Internet 
through the channels of the World Intellectual Property Organisation, based in Geneva. The 
substance of their case is reported to be that Landover makes illegal use of Baptist intellectual 
property. Their claim took some encouragement from the similar case of Jerry Falwell who 
claimed that a website parodying him violated a trademark on his name. 57 Other avenues of 
protest have seen pickets outside what was thought to be the San Francisco office of Americhrist 
Ltd. The picket is reported at the March 24th 2000 entry in the Progress Report, with an 
accompanying picture of placard-waving demonstrators. The report also admits however, that the 
offices turned out to be those of an orthodontist unrelated to Americhrist or Landover; "our 
undercover sources were mistaken." The June 7th 2000 entry reports that Objective was fed false 
infonnation and that "we think we may have a traitor in our midst." 











3.3 Flooding Back 
For all the indignation and spirited determination to shut down the Landover Baptist website, 
Objective does not seem to have met with much success. If anything, their efforts appear to have 
strengthened Landover. Amid all the attraction that Objective's campaign has drawn, a website 
calling itself Operation: Objective Landover Baptist Shutdown has emerged. 58 This website 
dedicates itself as "an organisation" to stopping "other 'organisations' from silencing other 
people's words and opinions."s9 If this sounds a little contradictory, an explanation is provided: 
"We would not be targeting Objective: Landover Baptist Shutdown ifit wasn't for the simple fact 
that they are trying to shutdown a website that is expressing their opinion, if it is even their 
opinion." Exactly who's opinion is at stake here - Objective? Landover? Operation: Objective? -
is not entirely clear. Yet what I find appealing about this statement is its demonstration of the 
kinds of paradoxical patterns of thought imitation reproduces. And the pivot seems to remain the 
increasingly vexed problem of authenticity, as when the author of the Operation website claims 
that many of the writers of the Landover website are Christians, even Baptists, and follows this 
by claiming that Jim Carlson, the campaign organiser at Objective, and his colleagues "are false 
Christians." Amid these imitations and reversals, it is wonderfully complimentary to note that the 
Operation website is signed by Rev. Jorge Pataki, seemingly an imitation of New York's 
Republican Governor George Pataki. 
This kind of fakery by impersonation is not limited to the example of Rev. Jorge Pataki, if this is 
an example of impersonation. Over the years that Objective has waged its campaign, messages 
58 See http://www.oolbs.tripod.com (accessed: 26 April 2003) 











have appeared on discussion boards on the Landover website and elsewhere in cyberspace 
purported to be posted by Jim Carlson. As a result, the Objective homepage posted a warning 
framed in a large red box that begins, "BEWARE OF IMPERSONATORS." The notice 
continues: 
... Certain elements in the anti-Christian movement have decided to launch a character 
assassination campaign against Jim Carlson and other OBJECTIVE: Ministries members. 
This campaign is being waged in the Landover guest book, as well as forums on third party 
websites, and consists of impersonated messages involving all manner of obscenities. This is 
the sort of villainy that we have come to expect from the goons behind Landover. Any 
message you read claiming to be from Jim Carlson or any other OBJECTIVE: Ministries 
member that contains vulgarities, sexual innuendo, bad poetry. or other un-Christian 
sentiments is to be considered a FRAUD and ignored. (original emphasis) 
The flooding of images back across the surrealist threshold becomes a steady flow in the next 
reconfiguring movement of authenticity and fakery. Landover has published an article calling for 
the shutdown of the popular website Adult Christianity, supposedly the creation of Poppy Dixon, 
a thirty-something, California-based web designer. 60 In a brief biography available on the Adult 
Christianity website,61 it is reported that she was born and raised in Idaho. She was "bullied" into 
accepting Jesus Christ as her personal saviour at the age of 11 years. She was involved with a 
Christian youth group through her teenage years until she began attending university at age 17. 
At age 21 she "escaped" to San Francisco before taking up her current residency in Hollywood. 
It would therefore appear that the Adult Christianity website gives expression to her critical 
60 http://www.jesus21.com (accessed:: 26 Apri12003). 











reflections on these experiences and her movement from an II-year old reborn Christian girl 
from Idaho to the Christian professional adult woman of cosmopolitan California. Adult 
Christianity bills itself as "post-fundamentalist" and "an antidote to the Christian right" and 
promotes a self-consciously inclusive brand of Christianity. For example, a central tenet is that 
since neither proof nor belief are implicated in a notion of the existence of God, Adult 
Christianity encourages the participation of doubters, agnostics, atheists and "unbelievers of 
every kind.,,62 Similarly, Adult Christianity affirms the social and human value of diversity and 
"the differences between us" and consequently devotes itself to practicing tolerance and 
"protecting the rights of individuals, especially those with the least resources. ,,63 The website 
rejects establishing gender as a criterion for judgements; "What happens between people's legs is 
nobodies' business but their own." Though this statement confuses gender with sex, in the context 
of Adult Christianity'S critique of the fundamentalist Christian right, it can be taken to indicate a 
rejection of that tradition's patriarchy. 
In a Special News Report on the Landover Baptist Ministry's website Landover announces its 
campaign against Adult Christianity under the heading: "Landover Calls for Immediate 
Shutdown of Shameless 'Adult Christianity' Website.,,64 The article is accompanied by two 
photographs, the first of a crowd of demonstrators marching behind a banner that reads "We 
Love Poppy Dixon's Adult Christianity - Gays for Jesus," and the second, of Poppy Dixon and a 
man seated in a limousine above a caption informing us that this "older man" is about to "lose his 
salvation." The article begins with the revelation "by reliable sources" that "former crack whore" 
62 http://www.postfun.com/pfp/tenets.html(accessed: 26 April 2003). 
63 Ibid. 











Dixon conceived of the idea for Adult Christianity while "under the care of Devil loving nuns, 
recovering from a 12 day drinking binge at a seedy convent somewhere in New York City." The 
article goes on to charge Dixon with being friend to "the limp wristed man and broad shouldered 
woman," smoking cigarettes, wearing her hair short, being bossy, not respecting authority "of 
any kind," wearing short skirts, and sometimes dressing like a man. All of this, we are assured, is 
done 'just to upset people." 
The parody here is double-edged. First, the parody mimics Baptist fundamentalists, in keeping 
with the theme of the Landover Baptist concept. In terms now familiar to us, Landover draws on 
homophobia and patriarchy to parody southern Baptist's conservativism by establishing sexual 
taboos and structured gender relations as criteria for founding an objection to Poppy Dixon and 
Adult Christianity. Yet the parody draws its critique and elicits its humour from the incongruity 
of establishing such criteria, though sometimes legitimate terms for articulating difference, 
alongside smoking, being bossy, and wearing short skirts. The humour here is compounded to 
some extent in that Poppy Dixon, antidote to the Christian right, would probably approve of this 
description. Yet Landover's call is surely also a parody of Objective's campaign to shut down 
Landover. One can imagine Objective's consternation; first they are derisively mimicked, then, 
when they object, their objection is mimicked. Along the way their claim to authentic Baptism is 
picked up, carried away, and set adrift on the rising tide flowing back in the mimicking of 
mimicry. For if Baptist fundamentalism is founded on their following to the letter the King James 
Bible, in other words, their mimicking of the exemplary Christian lifestyle set-out therein, then 
Landover, with their "KJV 1611," is mimicking this fundamentalist mimicry. And if 











with Landover's campaign against Adult Christianity, then we have something of a second order 
mimesis. 
There is a sense here of multitudinous images flooding back as an image of an authentic Christian 
lifestyle, so ardently defended by Objective'S imitation of it, returns to us in the image of 
Landover's imitation of Objective's imitation. Yet the tide is about to tum again. In the next 
movement of this configuring choreography, Objective is claimed to be a satirical send-up of 
Christian fundamentalism and "a meta-parody" of Landover, winning Objective admiration for 
the sophistication and careful planning of its imitation! 
3.4 Flooding (Again) 
To track this movement requires visiting a different part of the Objective: Christian Ministries 
website. In addition to the campaign against Landover, Objective identifies Objective: Creation 
Education as another of its strategic projects.65 Managed by Dr. Richard Paley, a Creation 
Scientist and expert in "Divinity and Theobiology," Paley's page on the Objective website lists 
numerous articles outlining the creation science position, refuting arguments for evolution, and 
critiquing the "propaganda" of "those wacky evolutionists." Paley warns against "subliminal 
propaganda" sneaked into popular culture where "constant reiteration" inculcates the 
"unacceptable message" of evolutionism's "false doctrine.,,66 According to Paley, the "pro-
6S The Page for Objective: Creation Education can be found at http://crossspot.net/objective/creation.html(accessed: 
27 April 2003). 











Darwinism propaganda" of the popular Japanese animated character Pokemon is inescapable, 
though he doesn't elaborate. Similarly, blockbuster movies such as Jurassic Park and X-Men 
contribute to evolutionism's "cultural fog.,,67 
However, it is Paley's focussed attack against Apple Computers that has won him credit for 
perpetrating a fraud and a hoax. Apple's pro-evolutionist subliminal propaganda issues from two 
important aspects of the popular operating system's design. The first is that the programming on 
which the operating system is based, called UNIX, is referred to among Apple aficionados as 
Darwin. The choice of name is linked with the second aspect, which is that the Mac operating 
system is provided under open source licence. "Open source" means that the code in which the 
programme is written is available to the user and general public to modify and improve at their 
discretion, i.e. it is open. Programmes that use open source code are generally collaborative. 
Diversely experienced and differently skilled users facilitate the programme's constant 
improvement, i.e. its evolution. For Paley, open source means communist. Paley's charge: 
"Apple Computers promotes Godless Darwinism and Communism." Having set these 
parameters, Paley explores some of the "subliminal" techniques of Apple'S propaganda. The 
most striking feature here is Apple's logo and branding. An apple with a bite taken from it is 
"clearly a reference to the fall." Paley then notes that Apple was founded by "long-haired 
hippies" and has consistently supported "60s counter-cultural 'values,'" has attracted a "cult-like 
following," and exhorts its followers to "think different," which Paley takes to mean "think 
different from our Christian upbringing, to reject all the values that we have been taught and to 
heed not the message of the Lord Jesus Christ!" Further evidence for Apple's propagandistic 











efforts is that the Darwin operating system is represented by a cartoon mascot named Hexley, a 
platypus character carrying a trident. The case against Hexley is confirmed by the UNIX mascot 
that preceded Hexley, a "child-indoctrinatingly-cute cartoon mascot" of a devil complete with 
trident, horns and pointed tail. 
Apple Computers is certainly a big player in the personal computer industry: 800 000 units of 
Apple's iMac were sold in the 139 days following its launch in August 1999, a rate that equals 
one iMac sold every fifteen seconds. A proud Steve Jobs, Apple's interim CEO announced: 
"iMac is truly the Internet-age computer for the rest of us, and it is bringing a lot of new people 
onto the Internet. ,.68 If Paley is correct about MacIntosh's cult-inclined followers, and Jobs is 
correct about the rest of us, it is not surprising the amount of interest Paley's article has attracted. 
An online discussion board hosted by The Mac Observer struggled to decide whether Paley's 
article was serious or a parody, with commentators posting arguments for both positions.69 
"Wsmiii" argues that the intent to parody Baptist fundamentalists and creation science is 
immediately apparent in the name of Richard Paley. Wsmiii points out the similarity with 
William Paley, the 18th century Christian philosopher, who authored the now famous metaphor of 
creation by design with his analogy to a watchmaker: "the watch must have had a maker - that 
there must have existed, at some time and at some place or other, an artificer or artificers who 
formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to answer, who comprehended its construction 
and designed its use.,,70 Other responders have noted details on the Objective website and in 
Paley's article that they think points to a tongue-in-cheek humour. For example, Paley's email 
68 http://www.apple.comluklpr/0105_imacsales.html(accessed: 27 April 2003). 
69 http://www.macobserver.comlarticlel2002/04/22.4.shtml (accessed: 27 April 2003). 
70 William Paley, Natural Theology: or, Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity, collectedfrom the 











pseudonym is drdinosaur, presumed to be too self-ironical for a creation scientist. Similarly, a 
footnote at the bottom of one of Paley's pages states that the fruit Eve was tempted with was 
more likely to have been a fig than an apple, a detail "666" is convinced "diehard creationist 
fanatics" surely would not introduce. Elsewhere in cyberspace discussion boards clocked up 
responses refuting Paley's authenticity as a creationist, convinced that Paley and the entire 
Objective Christian Ministries enterprise is a parody and satire. "Lef:lyman," "thought the site 
was authentic at first, too." That was before he browsed the campaign against Landover. Now he 
thinks that "the whole point of the site is to ridicule Creationism.,,71 "Chowler" was similarly 
taken in by Objective's apparent deception: "it seems this was an elaborate hoax ... Dam. That 
was funny, if not a bit dark."n "It's a spoof," "Feorag NicBhride assures us. Then, with the self-
confidence of one who has seen a few things in their time, he informs us: ''The site's been around 
for a while, meta-parodying Landover Baptist," before quoting from an article by Paley where 
Paley claims that "a strange, persistent, low-frequency waveform" detected by seismic 
instruments on the moon's surface was discovered to be an "echoing voice" speaking ancient 
Aramaic.73 The claim certainly is as outlandish as anything Landover has offered. Yet, while 
some people admit at having been taken in by what appears to them on reflection to be an 
obvious a fraud, others are confident they caught on immediately: "Oh c'mon. I thought everyone 
could figure out that page is obviously a joke. Some people are way too uptight.,,74 A different 
strategy that proves the essential fakery of Paley's anti-Macintosh article is offered by Kaye 
71 http://www.macopinion.com!columns/intelligence/02/04/25/talkl3.html(accessed: 27 April 2003). 
72 http://www.oreillynet.com!cs/user/view/cs_msg/7074 (accessed: 27 April 2003.) 
73 Feorag NicBhride's post can be found at http://www.quicktopic.comlboing/HNtjGirvhsVA (accessed: 27 April 
2003). Paley's article, "'The Moon Testifies," is available at http://crossspot.net/objectivelmoon.html(accessed: 27 
April 2003). 











Uiterwyk who argues that "fundamentalist Christianity couldn't be this much fun!" "Folks," 
Kaye assures us, "it's gorta be a hoax.,,75 
At this point, perhaps a thorough examination of the Objective site is required. Paley maintains 
an archive of articles refuting and otherwise addressing evolution from a Christian perspective. In 
an article "Kangaroos ofthe Middle East,,,76 Paley considers the problem posed to creation 
science by kangaroos. Since the Middle East is the region where Noah's Ark supposedly came to 
rest atop Mount Ararat, and since in the creation science view of the world the Bible is believed 
to be factually correct, Kangaroos must have once inhabited that region. Paley's article intends to 
refute Biblical skeptics' assumed refutation that kangaroos ever lived in the Middle East. His 
argument includes a refutation of the skeptics' supposed argument that the word "kangaroo" does 
not appear in any Arabic language: kangaroos were incorrectly named by Aborigines who "had 
lost all knowledge of their Biblical heritage and thus would not have known the name given to 
the animal by Adam (Gen 2: 19)." Paley is in agreement with Biblical skeptics about a prior 
single landmass comprised of the continental jigsaw. This was the "postdiluvian earth," which he 
claims probably broke up "due to the effects of rapid soaking and drying of the land." He doesn't 
specify how "rapid" this process was, but his argument is that Kangaroos migrated to what would 
become Australia in the interval between alighting from the Ark and the break up of the 
Pangaean supercontinent. Paley intimates that the same argument is applicable to Pandas, now 
resident in central Asia, and presumably sloths, now resident in South America (though he 
75 http://www.macobserver.com!comments/commentindivdisplay.shtml?id= 14438 (accessed: 27 April 2003). 











doesn't cite the specific example). Is Paley serious or is he parodying creation scientists, playing 
up absurdity and pouring on ridicule? "Kluit" claims this story kept himlher laughing for hours.77 
If Objective: Creation Education is a parody of Baptist Fundamentalism and a meta-parody of 
other parodies of fundamentalism, then other strategic Objective ministries must demonstrate 
similar skilful and strategic imitations of Fundamentalism. Viewed from the perspective that the 
entire Objective website might be a parody, it rapidly becomes apparent just how plausible that 
charge is. Take for example Objective: Halloween Reclamation, headed by Dr. Troy Franklin, 
Objective'S "anti-occult expert.,,78 Halloween Reclamation begins with the observation that 
Halloween is a period of spiritual danger, a time "when Satan is out in force." In the next 
movement, we are asked to remember that "all things are created by the Lord," and this includes 
Halloween. The challenge to Christians therefore is to understand how Halloween might have 
been created by God to help Christians further spread his Good News. The direction being taken 
here becomes more apparent when Franklin asks us to "Consider this: at what other time of the 
year do throngs of unsaved children come to your door begging for a treat?" Franklin emphasises 
the vulnerability of "unsaved children" who are being "spiritually abused" by their "atheist and 
pagan" parent's withholding of salvation. With the stakes set at nothing less than spiritual 
salvation, it is the true Christian's duty to reach these chi1dren by whatever means necessary. 
Thus does Halloween Reclamation aim to reclaim Halloween for God, turning the '''witching 
season" into the "witnessing season." 
77 http://www.macopinion.comlcolumnsJintclligence/02/04/25/talkJ9.html(accessed: 27 April 2003) 











Franklin's introduction is followed by a tutorial on "how to HalloWitness." Given that dressing 
up in costumes is central to the Halloween ritual, it makes sense that Hallowitnessing should 
begin here. Dressing up as John the Baptist, Moses, and other biblical characters can "involve 
your whole family." Another possibility is to appropriate familiar Halloween costumes: "a white 
sheet with eye-holes worn over one's head isn't an occult spirit, it's the Holy Ghost." This 
Christian reclamation of Halloween turns on a mimetic theatre of imitation, where the mimetic 
representation takes on not only the outer appearance of the object that it imitates of, but the 
power vested in the object as welL And so children dressed to mimetically represent John the 
Baptist dramatises nothing less than a Christian promise of salvation through the figure of the 
man that John famously baptised in what would become a dramatic ritual theatre of rebirth. 
Mimetic theatre here becomes a stage for a cosmic battle between the forces of good and evil. 
And just as the restoration of cosmic order in the Kwakiutl worldview requires a deceptive 
(which is to say, mimetic) trick, so to in the Objective worldview is a deceptive trick required to 
successfully combat the forces of evil. In other words, to offer "spiritually abused" children the 
Lord's gift of salvation may necessitate trickery to out trick Satan's tricks. Franklin advises 
Christians to conceal "personalised Bible tracts" in sweet wrappers along with the phone number 
of a local church. Helpfully, he suggests mini-Kit Kat bars; their easily unwrapped and re-
wrapped foil lining works well for this purpose. The deception is elaborate; not only does this 
trickery entail writing Bible tracts in miniature to conceal in rewrapped sweets, but also 
displaying "more secular Halloween decorations," a strategic deployment of camouflage that will 
"make your house seem non-threatening to those brainwashed by the occult." 
Entertaining for the moment the possibility that this may be a parody of a by-whatever-means-











theatre of deception. The twists and turns of trickery are fantastical. The first trick is Halloween 
itself. For all the innocuous fun of dressing-up, collecting sweets, or playing tricks that allegedly 
are hannless and mischievous, Halloween is actually a time of occult dangers. Secular forces that 
play pawns to Satan's trickery that cheats innocent children out of their salvation mask this 
essential truth of Halloween. Countering Satan's tricks requires a Christian theatre that gives 
primacy to Christian role-models, John the Baptist, Moses, The Holy Ghost, and so on. In 
extreme cases however, countering Satan can also mean resorting to deceptive trickery, complete 
with camouflage that will deceive Satan's secular forces and allow children to the treat of 
salvation wrapped up in a trick that out-tricks Satan's tricks, complete with telephone number 
where the prize may be collected. 
But if this theatre of trickery and counter-trickery is an elaborate parody of fundamentalism and 
evangelism, then the deception is more complete. The trickery we are alerted to in content 
conceals a trick of fonn, a trick perpetrated by the mimetic movements back and forth between 
real evangelism and fundamentalism, and an imitation through parody of the authentic fonn of 
evangelism and fundamentalism. One way we can speak about Objective is that it is a copy of 
Landover's copy of American southern Baptist's copy (albeit with a fundamentalist flavour) of 
authentic Christianity. Consider Feorag NicBhride's assurance that Objective: Landover Baptist 
Shutdown is a "meta-parody" of Landover Baptist. NicBhride alerts us to the most deceptive 
trick of all: that hallowitnessing and similar strategies that out-trick Satan's tricks are part of a 
still greater trick that deceives us, the visitors to the Objective website, into thinking that 
Objective is an authentic, fundamentalist, Baptist website referring to real people in real places, 
when in fact it is a parody of a parody of fundamental Baptists. NicBhride and others point to 











Middle East to evidence their view that Objective is fake. For NicBhride, as for others, it is 
asking too much to believe that the characters at Objective believe these things; for them, these 
claims are simply too outlandish to be taken seriously. It seems more plausible that Objective 
belongs in a category of similar claims confirmed to be inauthentic. The exemplar of this 
category is of course the confirmed fakes at Landover Baptist. 
This is an intriguing configuration in the development of the dialectic and certainly a highly 
tensioned one. What is so intriguing here is exactly this quality of outlandishness, because it 
requires a careful balance between outrageous excess and plausibility. Where this balance is 
achieved, it is the incongruity of the match that establishes the success of the parody. From this 
point of view, Landover appears a clumsy parody, sometimes so excessive that is sacrifices 
plausibility. A telling example is the character of Betty Bowers and her Christian Crackwhore 
Ministry. Yet as we have seen, many Internet users understand this excess to be utterly plausible, 
thereby ensuring its enduring success. Be that as it may, it is this quality of outlandishness that I 
want to retain for the moment because it is the observation of the same quality in Objective 
Christian Ministries that is cited as evidence that Objective is a fraud, a hoax, a deception, a 
meta-parody of Landover. The characterisation of the relation of Objective to Landover as meta-
parody positions Objective's claim that kangaroos migrated to present-day Australia from the 
Middle east as a parody of Landover's outlandish claim that Tolkein's classic conceals a 
homosexual agenda. The accusation of fraud then emerges from the doubt that Objective's claim 
is actually serious; 'Just a bit too over the top parodic to take seriously" (sic), says Charles Moore 
in his expose of Objective's "hoax."79 Yet while netizens across the Internet dismiss Objective's 
79 Charles W. Moore, "Anti-Apple 'Christian' Website a Hoax" in Applelinks, 23 Apri1200, available at 











claims to authenticity as "over the top," in other words, too outlandish to be seriously considered, 
Steve van Nattan accuses Baptist Fundamentalists such as Objective Christian Ministries of 
fakery on the basis that they are not serious enough. Van Nattan invites us to witness still more 
constellating movements of a dialectic that is reconfiguring in the mimetic flow back and forth 
across a threshold between fakery and authenticity. 
Van Nattan is a piano tuner from east Tennessee, USA. His piano business "practices the ethics 
of The Carpenter of Nazareth" and offers a discount if the client offers home-made pie and 
coffee.so Yet Van Nattan's greatest labour is a website he maintains and the journal he edits, both 
named Blessed Quietness,S) though more familiar to Internet users by its former name, Balaam's 
Ass,82 after the Old testament parable (Numbers 22:21-34). Van Nattan describes his website as 
"Fundamental, Baptist without apology, Friendly, Researched.,,83 I want to use the example of 
Steve Van Nattan, specifically, an article he wrote and published in his journal, to trace another 
configuring movement in the dialectic developed in the course of the present chapter. This tracing 
will be the last before the chapter concludes with a brief discussion. Van Nattan's article is direct 
and unapologetic in its argument and gives sufficient indication to the character and temperament 
of Van Nattan's website and his person to warrant no further introduction here, suffice to say that 
Van Nattan positions himself in opposition to the leadership of Fundamental Baptists in the US 
whom he considers to be fascists in league with Satan. 
80 http://www.stevespianoservice.comltuneturf.htm (accessed: 13 March 2003). 
81 http://www.blessedquietness.com (accessed: 13 March 2003). 
82 http://www.balaams-ass.com (accessed: 13 March 2003). 











In an article titled "Jackboot Baptists: The Deeper Facts," Van Nattan claims "there is a powerful 
cuI tic and antichrist quality in this late phase of Fundamental Baptist activity. ,,84 He likens 
"Fundamental Baptists in general" with "the followers of Adolf Hitler" and claims that "the 
guruistic nature of Fundamental Baptist leadership is primed for a man to rise up in the seat of 
Caesar," before pointing to the eagerness of Fundamental Baptists who "follow hard on the 
heels" of US president George W. Bush, "totally ignoring his hugging of sodomites." The first 
part of Van Nattan's article is a sustained attack against American Baptist leadership. He begins 
by attacking "jackboot ministers" who "micromanage" the lives of their congregation, or "the 
Saints" in Van Nattan's lexicon. Such micromanaging includes the demand that Saints seek the 
jackboot's approval of their dress patterns before sewing the garment. Also, the insistence that 
men wear a three-piece suit to church despite that the congregation is rural and poor. Van Nattan 
asserts they would "all look 100% better if they wore clean coveralls" than appear as "Bozo the 
Clown" in their 1950 suits, the only ones they can afford. He rages: "Fundamental Baptist pastors 
are turning men into snivelling little scum." 
Fundamental Baptists' exclusive deference to the King James Bible comes in for a similar 
lashing. Van Nattan argues that this exclusivity is a "decoy" chosen to lure "the unsuspecting and 
sincere sheep into the fold of the antichrist." Again deceptive trickery is at stake: "what better 
way to deceive a trusting soul than to play on their zeal for the word of God?" Van Nattan quotes 
a friend who expects the antichrist to carry a King James Bible in order to attract the most 
zealous Fundamentalist followers. Van Nattan is not against the King James version; for him it is 
"the only correct Bible." But he argues that the exclusion of "perverted" Bibles precludes the 











opportunity to teach why the King James Version is the only correct one. "How many perverted 
Bibles do you have on your shelf for such research?" he asks, before claiming to own about forty. 
Also in his sights are pastors and missionaries who abuse their positions for personal - and evil 
gains: criminal fraud, use of pornography, child abuse, and so on. These and other strategies that 
attack fundamental Baptist leadership in the U.S. forms the substance of the first part of his 
article, which he concludes with a case-study of Jehovah's Witness. He concludes with a call for 
a return to authentic origins: "I do believe that so many of these Jackboot Neo-Nazi churches 
exist now that it is time to abandon this whole pattern of church life and return to the homes 
where the New Testament Church began." 
Van Nattan begins the second part by saying that he has not given up on church-based religion 
altogether, but urges extreme caution. He then offers a twenty-point guideline detailing "how to 
find a true Bible Based Fundamental Baptist Church." Each point should be met completely if 
one is to have any confidence at all. A selection of considerations include: age of pastor and 
congregants - at least over 40 years; size - less than 100 members; missionaries - no more than 
five; meetings - no more than three times a week, though congregants will "be in and out of 
one's homes regularly;" temperament - plenty of singing, "dignified" shouting, in a "subdued 
church, down a country lane;" witnessing - no "(running) to sinners just to amuse themselves," 
but instead one to one "as they tum up in the flow of Hfe;" and humility - men line up second, 
"ladies" thoughts are "sought without inviting them to take authority," and children are included 











This template for authenticity in Baptist Fundamentalism stands in stark contrast to the allegedly 
inauthentic and fascist temperament of the kind of Baptist Fundamentalism practiced by the likes 
of George W. Bush, who was witnessed by Rev. Billy Graham before beginning his assent to the 
seat of Caesar. Where the former is described as humble, contained, and private, the latter, which 
has its home in congregations like the Southern Baptist Convention, so ardently defended by the 
Objective Christian Ministries website, is characterised by large, media productions of mass 
public theatre. In Van Nattan's view, the former is authentic because it is focussed on God, while 
the latter is a fake because it pretends to focus on God when in fact it focuses on its own desires 
and aspirations. 
If Van Nattan's argument seems straightforward and uncomplicated, its significance for the 
reconfiguring of the dialectic is found in an online discussion at Unks Wild Wild West.85 A 
contributor to that discussion claims Van Nattan's article is "a very subtle parody." "Anita" 
counters that "Betty Bowers is a parody website. I don't think this one is," before outlining her 
reasoning and referring along the way to other articles on Van Nattan's website. The first 
contributor responds: "Balaam's Ass is affiliated with the same group who produced the 
Landover Baptists page, Americhrist, Ltd., as well as Betty Bowers and Sister Taffy," and in an 
apparent reference to Objective Christian Ministries continues, "They've even produced pages 
that are critics of these pages (parodies of course)." Here we are moving closer to the 
constellating moment as this flooding back and forth across the threshold saturates the dialectic 
with tension. Anita replies: 
85 "Neo-Nazi Jackbooted Baptists," available at http://www.greenspun.comlbboardiq-and-a-fetch-











I must be desensitised. I'm sure I started out thinking 'You MUST be joking. Nobody really 
believes stuff like that, right?' Next thing ya know ... I might even learn that the Jim Jones 
thing was just another fraud like that moon landing. That wasn't meant as sarcasm, BTW. I 
REALL Y am questioning now why I read some sites and threads and actually think some 
folks are serious. I've lost the ability to discern. (original emphasis). 
Anita's lament is anticipated by both Benjamin's theory of the dialectical image and Taussig's 
understanding of the workings of mimesis: that the flash of recognition at the constellation of the 
dialectic entails a transformation of the recognising self, "the very percept of recognition,,,S6 so 
that Anita, who started out thinking she could distinguish a joke from a serious commitment, 
complains that she has now lost the ability to discern. Anita is not alone. "Peter Errington," who 
admits he also thought Van Nattan's article was authentic in the sense of being intended 
seriously, says in his post to the forum that he sympathises with Anita's lament, as surely did 
everyone else reading the forum when they noted the aptly named Mr. Errington's email address 
at petere@ricochet.net. 
It seems to me that mystery, the kind of not knowing implicated in an inability to discern 
authentic from fake things, along with transformation, the kind of movements that keeps one step 
ahead of attempts to arrest their movements and otherwise capture their illusive meaning, emerge 
as central to the problematic of authenticity in religion. I want to conclude this chapter with a 
discussion that brings together these important aspects of the problematic. 










3.5 Mystery and Transformation 
We penetrate the mystery only to the degree that we recognise it in the everyday world, by 
virtue of a dialectical optic that perceives the everyday as impenetrable, the impenetrable as 
everyday. 87 
The tracing of a dialectic of authenticity through the reconfiguring movements of Landover, 
Objective Christian Ministries and Van Nattan's Blessed Quietness has brought with its 
constellations an appreciation that mystery, in the sense of "not knowing," may be a crucial 
quality of the dialectic itself. There is a distinct sense of anticipated wonder at what the next 
configuring movement may reveal. At the same time, as the tracing proceeds, the dialectician 
learns from experience that this revelation is unlikely to resolve the mystery. On the contrary, the 
revelation attendant with each tum of the dialectic likely will deepen mystery still further. 
Following Benjamin's theory of dialectics at a standstill, the dialectician perseveres, confident 
that this deepening of the mystery with the intensification of dialectical tension is preparing them 
for a flashing moment of recognition wherein the mystery will be revolved and something 
comparable to authenticity's magical aura will be revealed. Mystery therefore seems central to 
the problem of authenticity, not in the negative sense that overcoming "not knowing" is the 
central goal of authentic knowledge, but in the positive sense that it might be mystery that allows 
authenticity its remarkable trans formative power. 
Mysteriousness is of the utmost importance. It speaks of a space behind the apparent surface of 
things, a space that has captivated the imagination of philosophy, art and religion, among other 











disciplines, for a very long time. Some might say that it is the fundamental concern of these 
pursuits. The captivation is surely due in no small part to the seeming resistance of appearance to 
penetration. And so the surface of appearance, where most of us spend most of our time, is also a 
concealing surface. Occasionally we think we catch a glimpse of "the hidden void," as Taussig 
has called it, in dreams, through psychoanalytic techniques, with the assistance of hallucinatory 
drugs, or, for want of a better term, through religious experience. Yet while access to that 
mysterious space is gained by these routes, I think the mystery is less concealed, though no less 
mysterious, than we may think. We are witness to its magic everyday. Few things are as 
commonplace in the everyday world as the vexed problem of authenticity. And few things are as 
mysterious in their everyday ability to bring about magical transformations as fake things, be 
they sculptures that are fake queens that somehow, mysteriously, as ifby magic, become real 
queens reclining in naked splendour beside an Australian lake, or religious websites that are fakes 
that magically and mysteriously become so real that their transformation transforms even 
criticism of their deception into deceptive fakery. Mysterious indeed! 
I have conveyed this idea of mystery with the image of hidden movements beneath a familiar 
surface to suggest that an authentic understanding of an object cannot be content with the familiar 
and similar surface of appearance, but rather must comprehend that surface as constantly 
reshaping in response to the movements beneath it. In a similar way that the surface of the ocean 
is reshaped by the movements within its vast, hidden depths, so must the search for authentic 
understanding engage in a kind of physiognomy to arrive at a truth, however transient it may be. 
And as the sailor at sea must be flexible in their adjustments to the moving ground beneath their 
feat, so must an authentic understanding be flexible to the shifting contours of the surface upon 











appearance as both a concealing surface and a moving surface is anathema to an empirical 
rational notion of authenticity that backs up its demand for transparency with a promise to expose 
anything that remains concealed. Such an operation of exposure attempts to penetrate the 
concealing surface as if it were a veil to be lifted, an image so enticing in the ease with which it 
promises knowledge of mystery that advocates of this formulation may be forgiven the 
confidence they invest it with. The difficulty of course is that the image of a veil as the surface of 
appearance concealing mystery is flawed for the simple reason that it does not conjure an image 
of that surface as in contact with what is conceals. In fact it deliberately separates the surface of 
concealment from what is concealed with the deceptively alluring image of a concealment that 
can be abolished with a tug. This is why the imperative to appreciate the concealing surface as a 
moving surface falls by the wayside: in this erroneous formulation, whatever movements take 
place behind the veil do not disturb the blank impassivity of the veil itself, like a curtain that 
conceals the movements of stagehands as they prepare the next act. Yet from the preceding 
tracing of mysterious imitations in the examples of Landover, Objective Christian Ministries, and 
even Steve van Nattan, we know that the surface of appearance is a dynamic surface shaped by 
the dramatic movements within its concealed depths. The correct image is one that perceives the 
surface of appearance as the surface of mystery itself, an image that reminds us as we skate across 
its dramatically changing surface that we truly are at sea, both with regard to the incompleteness 
of our knowledge of the great mysteries concealed beneath its fluctuating surface as well as with 
regard to the imperative to be flexible if we are to retain our balance and perspective. 
I have argued that mysterious transformations of objects can be read off the changing contours of 
its everyday surface. The dialectical process that traces these movements by paying attention to 











everyday world and the everydayness of impenetrable mystery. Michael Taussig points to the 
next step: that this moment of recognition also precipitates a transformation of the recognising 
self. If that is the case, I wonder how one would know? What does a transformed self look like? 
And if it is something that we are looking at, we are confronted with the same problem of 
appearance that we now know is also a concealing surface. Then we can expect that the changing 
surface of the subject will give some indication of the mysterious movements within its hidden 
depths, where transformations are worked out. In this sense, the transformation of the self 
sparked by their recognition of the impenetrability of everyday appearances and the everydayness 
of concealed mystery might contain an intuition that is itself the key to revelation, the disclosure 
of a mystery concealed by the everyday surface of appearance. The prospect that the key to 
discovering, if not uncovering, a locus of authenticity resides in the body of the recognising self 
rather than with the object of disputed authenticity marks the definitive break between a forensic, 
scientific method of inquiry into problems of authenticity, a method that would go about 
exposing all claims to authenticity to the illuminating light of reason, and a method that would 
allow authenticity the space to reveal itself. 
In following this shifted emphasis, in the following chapter I want to explore the question of 
humour in fake religions. Humour is after all a welling of energy deep within the belly before 
forcing itself out in a rush of surfacing energy that in its release transforms the body's surface via 
an uncontrolled bodily eruption. If the suggestion is that the moment of recognition necessarily 
implies a transformation of the recognising subject, and that this transformation may be read off 
the surface of their body, then the transformations of the body's surface brought about by an 












Chaptel Four: Incongruity 
If the image of authenticity and fakery's dialectic traced in the previous chapter achieved 
nothing else, it likely brought at least a smile to the readers face, perhaps even a chuckle or 
two, ifnot outright thunderous laughter. What else is one to do when faced with Objective's 
strategic appropriation of Halloween that advocates secular camouflage for Christian homes 
while their enthused tenants copy bible tracts in miniature on the inside of unwrapped sweet 
wrappers? Or the fascist tendencies of fake Baptist fundamentalists, as evidenced by President 
Bush's hugging of sodomites? Or the homosexual agenda purportedly advanced by the film 
version of The Twin Towers? This laughter producing effect of the dialectical image is not 
frivolous or incidental. As will be shown, laughter is crucial to the completion of the 
dialectic's critical circuit, and therefore of the utmost importance in uncovering, even 
discovering, a locus of authenticity in fake religion on the Internet. 
In this chapter, I want to move the argument advanced in the previous chapter from a concern 
with the surface of appearance that conceals to an exploration of the surface of appearance 
that reveals. In making that movement I want to activate a mimetic correspondence between 
the concealing surface of the image and the revealing surface of the body. The connection 
mediating this mimetic correspondence is laughter, the kind that wells up from deep inside the 
belly, transforming the surface of the body as it rises. In tum, the surface of the body 
transformed by this interpenetration of image and body reveals, physiognomically as it were, 











In making this argument, I pick up Chidester's suggestion that laughter is an index of 
comparison. 1 But I want to develop this claim further with the suggestion that laughter is also 
a register of transformations within the body of the recognising self As an index of 
comparison, laughter responds to the image composed of dialectical tensions; as a register of 
transformation, laughter reveals something of the mysterious movements within the 
recognising body and thereby becomes a kind of physiognomy of the recognizing self. 
There are then two movements perceived here, or perhaps a double movement. The first 
involves seeing laughter as a movement on the surface of the body that is mimetically 
connected with concealed movements within a dialectically constellated image of fakery. At 
the same time, a second movement sees laughter as a kind of physiognomy, an opening of the 
body that reveals within its concealed depths an interpenetration of body and image. Seeing 
these movements in the connections and correspondences between body and image then 
requires a kind of double vision, an ability to see the mysterious workings ofthe dialectic 
upon the surface of the body and at the same time to see upon the surface of the body a 
transformation of the recognising self within the body. Significantly, though these twin 
movements can be separated conceptually, it is important not to loose sight of their mutual 
implication. 
Yet if laughter is so crucial here, how can this importance be theorised? In Chapter Three it 
was shown that the dialectical image emerges when the tension between dialectical 
oppositions is greatest. This image, saturated with contradictory and ambivalent tensions, is 
the constellation of waking. And it is in this moment, when the perceiving subject recognises 
I David Chidester, "Christmas in July: Laughter, Pain, and Incongruity in the Study of Religion," in Dan Cohn~ 
Sherbok and Christopher Lamb (eds.), The Future of Religion: Postmodern Perspectives (London: Middlesex 











the constellation of waking, that the dialectical image emerges. The importance of laughter is 
signalled by the observation that this moment of recognition is simultaneous with a burst of 
laughter. To grasp the significance oflaughter that occurs at the moment of waking requires a 
digression to Benj amin' s critique of surrealism, briefly introduced in the previous chapter. As 
was seen there, this critique is double-edged, at once praising the "anti-aesthetic impulse" of 
surrealist techniques that achieved a "profane illumination,,,2 and at the same time criticising 
the surrealists' failure to get out of the dream and back into waking consciousness.3 Benjamin 
lauded the surrealists for working out the method of a revolutionary dialectic of seeing, but 
criticised them for not transforming that method into "bodily collective innervation," an 
interpenetration of image and body geared for "revolutionary discharge.'.4 From Benjamin's 
critique of surrealism, we learn that without bodily involvement in the image, the image is not 
dialectical. Bodily involvement in a sense authenticates the dialectical image. 
In the opening discussion of this chapter, I use Benjamin's critique of Surrealism's 
shortcomings to demonstrate that the locus of authenticity in Benjamin's image of 
revolutionary critique is the interpenetration of image and body that completes the critical 
circuit between the recognising subject and the object of recognition. Such a dynamic is then 
correlated with the interpenetration of image and body that laughter physiognomically 
reveals. I argue that: 1) the mysterious and concealed transformations of an image of authentic 
Baptists traced previously registers on the surface of the body of the recognising subject as 
laughter; 2) the physiognomy of laughter reveals an interpenetration of image and body and 
2 Miriam Hansen, "Benjamin, Cinema and Experience: 'The Blue Flower in the Land of Technology,'" New 
German Critique, vol. 40 (Winter 1987), p. 193 
3 Abbas, "On Facination," p. 49. 











thereby a transfornli:ltion of the recognising self, "the very percept of recognition;" 5 and 3) the 
embodied recognising self, now skilled in the mimetic play of images, is thus awakened from 
their dream. This first discussion of the chapter therefore draws critical attention to the 
problem of laughter and humour in fake religion. 
The chapter's second discussion looks more closely at this problem of humour. In developing 
Peter Berger's incongruity theory of humour it will be shown that laughter is produced out of 
the contradictory tensions between concepts and the objects thought through them. This 
observation opens the possibility that laughter might be an implicit quality of dialectical 
images which are, if nothing else, structured by incongruities. Yet an unexpected twist to the 
story is discovered via Berger's theory that the experience of the comic adumbrates authentic 
religious experience. Berger's suggestion is quite simple: that when we laugh, we dwell in a 
counterempirical world without pain. To laugh, according to Berger, is to see the world from 
the divine point of view, which is to say, the transcended perspective. Laughter is redeeming. 
This is indeed an unexpected twist because it opens the possibility that fake religions, widely 
acknowledged to be extremely funny, may be a gateway to authentic religious experience. 
Consideration of this possibility returns the discussion to Benjamin's theory of dialectics at a 
standstill, the third discussion of the chapter. That discussion will reconsider Benjamin's 
theory from the perspective of his theology, which we will discover, by his own admission, 
soaks his critical thought. The chapter will conclude with a transposition of Berger's theory of 
redeeming laughter onto Benjamin's theory of dialectics at a standstill. That concluding 
discussion will show that authentic religious experience is central to both. 











The chap~er then is structured by three discussions. The first looks at the recognising subject's 
bodily involvement with the dialectical image and points to a locus of authenticity in the 
image of critique. The second discussion theorises this bodily involvement under the rubric of 
humour and laughter which we unexpectedly find leads us back to authentic religion. The 
third discussion returns us, appropriately, to Benjamin's dialectics, now considered from a 
religious perspective. The central argument developed through these discussions, both 
implicitly and explicitly, is that fake religions may encapsulate authentic religion, not in their 
imitation of religious forms, but in the crucible of subjective experience levered out of the 
space between incongruently related objects. For ifreligious experience invokes 
transcendence, between empirical and counterempirical worlds, surfaces and depths, 
concealment and revelation, fakery and authenticity, then incongruity may emerge as central 
to religious experience. Both Benjamin's theory of dialectics at a standstill and Berger's 
theory of redeeming laughter pivot on incongruity. So if fake religion's claim is to be 
authentic, then this claim can be proved as much as I am suspicious of that word - on the 
theoretical grounds provided by the transposition of Berger's theory onto dialectics at a 
standstill. This argument, developed implicitly throughout this chapter, will take centre stage 
in Chapter Five. 
4.1 Bodily Involvement Authenticates the Image of Critique 
Much of the formulation of Benjamin's theory of dialectics at a standstill is recognisable in 
his critique of surrealism. In significant ways, Benjamin's reflections on the profane 
illumination promised by surreal art helped him clarify his idea of the dialectical image. For 











consciousness meant that the only authentic form of cdtique is via the dialectical construction 
of images. Yet it was via his critique of surrealism that Benjamin arrived at the crux of his 
theory of dialectics: that the emergence of the dialectical image is dependent on bodily 
involvement in the critical image composed of juxtapositions. 
In the discussion that follows, I want to unpack Benjamin's critique of surrealism to show 
how he arrives at this crucial formulation. Yet this critique of surrealism also prepares the 
ground for a new argument. If the dialectical image is the authentic form of critique and if the 
emergence ofthe dialectical image is dependent on bodily involvement in the image, then this 
quality of bodily involvement may point to a locus of authenticity in the image of critique. If 
this hypothesis is correct, then it would be of the greatest significance to find instances of 
bodily involvement of the perceiver in the image of fakery. Testing this hypothesis will be the 
subject of the discussion following Benjamin's critique of surrealism. First, however, it is 
necessary to understand why and how bodily involvement in the image is significant. 
4.1.1 Benjamin's Critique o/Surrealism 
An explanation of Benjamin's critique of the surrealist project must begin with what 
Benjamin admired in it. Benjamin was drawn to surrealism because he identified with the 
surrealist's critical understanding of modernity. Against the nineteenth century's established 
belief that modernity's essence was the rational demythification and disenchantment of the 
social world, Benjamin identified with the surrealists when he argued that under conditions of 











it "a reactivation of mythic forces.,,6 The advent of capiialism, with its plethora of commodity 
fetishes, meant that Europe had fallen into "a new dream-filled sleep .. 7 in which commodified 
objects appeared as dream images. For Benjamin, this signalled a threat of the greatest 
magnitude because not only did it subvert the ideals of reason, but it also imperilled the very 
possibility of criticism. In a short, but important piece from One Way Street Benjamin writes: 
Criticism is a matter of correct distancing. It was at home in a world where perspectives and 
prospects counted and where it was still possible to take a standpoint. Now things press too 
closely on human society. The 'unclouded,' 'innocent' eye has become a lie.8 
If the ever-closer pressing of modernity's dream images meant that gaining an appropriate 
critical distance had become an impossibility, the Marxist critique, with its "overwhelming 
valorization of rational forms ofrepresentation,,9 became impossible. As such, the Marxist 
critical enterprise had reached an impasse and was unable to proceed with rational 
demystification in the orthodox Marxist mould. Benjamin recognised that this kind of rational 
demystification was no longer the critic's task. Instead, the critic should appropriate the 
authority of such mystifications for deployment against ideology, should "appropriate the 
distorted and distorting powers of ideological transposition for ideologically disruptive 
ends." 10 
6 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, ed. Rolf Tiedeman, trans. Howard Eiland and Keven McLaughlin 
(Cambridge, Mass. and London, England: Belknap Press, 1999), p. 391 (KIa.S); Buck-Morse, Dialectics of 
Seeing. pp. 253-4. 
7 Benjamin, The Arcades Project. p. 391 (KIa.S). 
8 Walter Benjamin, One Way Street. and Other Writings, trans. Edmund Jephcott and Kingsley Shorter (London: 
NLB Verso, 1979) p. 89. 
9 Margaret Cohen, "Walter Benjamin's Phantasmagoria," New German Critique, vol. 48 (1989), p. 87. 











Benjamin saw a way forward in the immanent Htethod of Surrealist art whose writings he 
distinguished from literature; "demonstrations, watchwords, documents, bluffs, forgeries if 
you will, but at any rate not literature."ll These forgeries, in Benjamin's analysis, were not to 
be read in the sense that one reads literature, but instead were geared for experience, 
specifically, for what Benjamin termed profane illumination, "a materialist, anthropological 
inspiration, to which hashish, opium, or whatever else can give an introductory lesson."12 As 
we have seen previously, Benjamin praised the surrealists' techniques of deliberate 
anachronism and montage, imagistic techniques by which they managed to enter dream 
consciousness and make a home on the threshold of flooding images. This kind of immersion 
Benjamin equates with intoxication and regards as necessary if one is to trace the dialectic to 
its moment of fission where it comes to a standstill in a moment of critical recognition, at 
which point one is awakened from dreaming and is able to step outside of intoxication. This 
kind of "loosening of the self by intoxication" that then allows one to "step outside the 
domain ofintoxication,,13 Benjamin uses as a metaphor for the Marxist revolutionary project: 
"To win the energies of intoxication for the revolution - this is the project which Surrealism 
circles in all its books and enterprises.,,14 
Benjamin thought that access to the long-sought image sphere, where "nearness looks with its 
own eyes,,,l5 was through the profane illumination promised by surreal art. But Benjamin 
went further than the surrealists when he theorised that this image sphere to which profane 
II Benjamin, "Surrealism," p. 179. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. On this question of intoxication in Benjamin's work, see Hermann Schweppenhauser, "Propaedeutics of 
Profane Illumination," in Gary Smith (ed.), On Walter Benjamin: Critical Essays and Recollections 
(Cambridge, Mass. and London, England: MIT Press, 1988). 
14 Benjamin, "Surrealism," p. 189. 











illumination would initiate us opens a revolutionary space "in which political materialism and 
physical nature share the inner man,,,16 a space where the collective becomes a body. 
Remember that Benjamin is interested in how the new technologies of photography and 
cinema, with their variety of close-ups, slow motion and mUltiple angles, open critical 
possibilities in their montage-like image of reality. To recognise this critical potential then 
requires a certain kind of perception, for which Benjamin thought dada art gave an excellent 
training. With dada, art "became an instrument of ballistics. It hit the spectator like a bullet, it 
happened to him, thus acquiring a tactile quality."I? With the advent ofthese new 
technologies, film becomes that ballistic instrument. It banishes the contemplative mode of 
perception and replaces it with moving images whose motion perception cannot arrest, "the 
distracting element of which is also primarily tactile."ls So too with the advertisement in a 
world of commodified things pressing ever closer: "[The advertisement] abolishes the space 
where contemplation moved and all but hits us between the eyes with things as a car, growing 
to gigantic proportions, careens at us out of a film screen." Now notice how Benjamin links 
authenticity, criticism, and tactility: The "genuine advertisement" that "hurtles things at us 
with the tempo ofa good film" is a critical image of "the most real, the mercantile gaze into 
the heart of things. ,,19 This notion of tactile appropriation that mimetically connects image and 
body is missing from the theory of profane illumination in the surreal concept of art. 
Recognising this is the crucial next step that the surrealists failed to take. This quality of 
tactility in so important because it signifies bodily involvement in the image, the crucial 
interpenetration of body and image that leads to bodily collective innervation. In the 
concluding few lines of his essay on surrealism, Benjamin gives this important formulation: 
16 Ibid. 
17 Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in Illuminations: Essays and 
Reflections, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry 20hn (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), p. 238, my emphasis. 
18 Ibid. 











Only when in technolcgy body and image so interpenetrate that all revolutionary tensior! 
becomes bodily collective innervation, and all the bodily innervations of the collective 
become revolutionary discharge, has reality transcended itself to the extent demanded by 
the Communist Manifesto.20 
Benjamin's critique of surrealism is that this interpenetration of body and image, theorised 
through tactile appropriation, was not fully realised; that the new subject-object relation that 
such an interpenetration promised could not properly materialise; and therefore that the 
critique issuing from surrealist artworks did not transcend reality to the extent demanded by 
the orthodox Marxist programme. Hemmed in by things pressing ever closer and unable to 
manage a critical distance suitable to rational demystification, Benjamin praised the 
surrealists' approach to history via myth and dream that managed to open (as opposed to 
recover) a space for critique. But he criticised their failure to appreciate that a complete 
critique of modernity's dream consciousness cannot be achieved by contemplation alone; it 
must implicate the body of the subject ifit hopes to bring about the kind of innervation 
required to awaken from the dream. This failure to "take the important next step" meant that 
the surrealists never got out of the dream and back into history.21 Benjamin, however, is 
concerned with "the dissolution of 'mythology' into the space of history;" he wants to find 
"the constellation of waking ... 22 Ultimately, his complaint against surrealism is that 
surrealism's failure to include a notion of tactile appropriation in the theory of profane 
illumination made any critique issuing from its art undialectical and therefore incomplete. 
20 Benjamin, "Surrealism," p. 192. 
21 Abbas, "On Fascination," p. 49. 











Tactile appropriation is crucial to Benjamin'S theory of dialectics at a standstill atld upon 
scrutiny it is clear why. Bearing in mind that the moment of recognition is in the moment 
when the dialectic is at a standstill and that this moment is transitory and fleeting, it is crucial 
to Benjamin's theory that there should be a remainder after the moment has passed. Without a 
remainder, the critique that emerges with the dialectical image would be similarly fleetingly 
and transitory and dream consciousness would persist as before. Without a remainder, the 
entire theory of dialectics at a standstill becomes nonsensical; the constellation composed of 
dialectically related opposites becomes saturated with tension whereupon the dialectical 
image emerges in a flashing moment of recognition and mimetic connection between body 
and image - and then what? No remainder. No waking. Dream consciousness persists. In 
other words, it is crucial to waking consciousness that a residue of the recognition remain 
with the recognising subject. This remainder is the appropriation and it is tactile because it 
resides on the surface of the body. 
I want to correlate surrealism's incomplete understanding of dialectical criticism and 
Benjamin's theory of the dialectical image that completes it with fakery's critique of 
authenticity being imaged here. Ifwe characterise as authentic Benjamin's theory of the 
dialectical image that dissolves myth and awakens the perceiving subject in a moment of 
recognition, and characterise as deceptively inauthentic the surrealists' incomplete concept of 
criticism that only managed to plunge them further back into myth and dream, we note that 
the distinguishing element is this question of bodily involvement in the image. An argument 
can then be made that this quality of bodily involvement with the object of perception that 
allows the dialectical image to emerge (and also distinguishes it from incomplete critiques 
such as that issuing from surreal art) presents a locus of authenticity in Benjamin's theory of 











involvement in fakery, for if such instances can be found, then we mighi have identified a 
locus of authenticity in the image of fakery itself. Benjamin theorises this crucial quality of 
bodily involvement with the idea of tactile appropriation, and so tactile appropriation is a 
useful way to begin thinking about bodily involvement in the image of fakery. 
Looking back at the argument formulated so far, it is clear that a variation of tactility has been 
implicit and sometimes explicit throughout. Yet the instances I have in mind occur in the 
earlier discussion about imaging fakery, before the argument shifted focus to bodily 
involvement in that image. Since tactility is a special kind of contact reserved for speaking of 
the body, the appropriate characterisation of these earlier examples is the more general idea of 
contact that includes but is not limited to tactility. Copying, for instance, suggests a kind of 
contact between the copy and the thing copied. In a sense, copying is the glue that binds 
together the forces in the dialectic, a kind of mimetic contact adhesive that relates them as 
oppositional. The surrealist threshold between waking and dreaming similarly suggests a kind 
of contact, an edge where waking consciousness and dream consciousness meet. The image of 
a concealing surface shaped by the mysterious movements within its hidden depths is also 
suggestive of contact, and is complimented by the brief critique of a counter image of mystery 
concealed behind a veil. There it was argued that the image of a veil is inappropriate exactly 
because a veil is not in contact with what it conceals. Yet contact between fake and authentic, 
between dreaming and waking, between surface and depth, are all examples drawn from the 
image of fakery itself. Although these examples demonstrate that this idea of contact has been 
more extensively implicated in the preceding argument than might previously have been 
appreciated, the argument being made here requires a quality of contact be found between the 
image of fakery and the body of the perceiver. This is where the question of contact is refined 











as with these three examples, distracts us from noting the obviou~ fact that when fake 
religions on the Internet often provoke laughter and that such laughter is a thing of the body. 
Humorous laughter then surely signifies the involvement of the body in the image and thereby 
opens the possibility that a measure of tactile appropriation may transpire. 
In the following section of this discussion I want to develop this idea further by looking at 
laughter provoked by images of fakery. I argue that laughter may be understood as a 
transformation on the surface of the body that is mimetically connected with transformations 
of the dialectically constellated image of authenticity and fakery. This laughter reveals, 
physiogniomicallyas it were, the requisite interpenetration of body and image that allows the 
dialectical image to emerge. As such, laughter that completes the critical circuit between body 
and image establishes a locus of authenticity in the image of fakery's critique. 
4.1.2 Laughter and Tactile Appropriation 
Fake religions constitute many if not most of the listings under categories of religious humour 
in web directories such as maintained by Yahoo! Google, and many others.23 Fake religions 
are humorous. People laugh at fake religions. Recall Kluit's post at The Mac Observer forum 
that Richard Paley's claim that kangaroos migrated to Australia from the Middle East kept 
himlher laughing for hours.24 Kaye Uiterwyk's comment that "fundamentalist Christianity 
couldn't be this much fun!" and that the Objective website "is a real pisser" makes a similar 
point.25 Similarly, Landover's review of The Twin Towers or Objective's Christian 
23 http://sg.dir.yahoo.comiEntertainmentiHumourlReligion; 
http://directory.google.comiTop/SocietylReligion_and _ SpiritualitylHumorl (both these websites were accessed 
3 July 2003). Similar listings can be found on the websites of altavista. com and lycos.com, 
24 http://www.macopinion.comicolumns/intelligence/02/04/25/talkl9.html (accessed: 27 April 2003) 











reclamation of Halloween provoke laughter. Whether they intend to or not, these things are 
funny. 
I think that this kind of humorous laughter evidences tactile appropriation. This might seem 
intuitive; laughter is afterall seen on the surface of the body and an image of fakery is the 
object of that laughter. It therefore seems natural to conclude that something has passed 
between image and body. Yet to theorise this argument is somewhat more difficult. Still, 
contrasting the image of fakery that is a dialectical image and therefore an authentic image of 
critique with surreal art that is not is a useful way to begin. Initially, fakes are not that 
different from surreal art, at least theoretically: both appropriate the most essential claim of 
the objects of their critiques (authenticity, for fakery; progress, for surrealism); both compose 
montages with their appropriations; for both, these montage-like compositions are structured 
by ambivalent and contradictory tensions that draw critical attention to these claims; 
ultimately, their montage images become critical constellations that problematise and 
destabilise the self-assured confidence with which religious objects or commodity objects of 
130 years ago puts forth its own self-image, which is to say, images its most essential claim. 
But this is where fakery leaves surreal art behind and emerges as a dialectical image. Where 
surreal art fails to find the constellation of waking, fakery seeks the flashing moment of 
mimetic connection between image and body so that it's critique may be completed and, in a 
sense, authenticated. Fakery uses the play of mimetic images flooding back and forth across a 
threshold between fakery and authenticity to tighten the ambivalent tensions that hold 
together the reconfiguring constellations of its dialectic. In this way, fakery pushes toward the 
critical moment of recognition. Ultimately the constellation becomes saturated with tension 
and comes to a standstill in a flashing moment of mimetic connection between image and 











connection signals a recognition on the part of the perceiver and at the same time reveals a 
new self transformed via their bodily involvement in the image. The transformation of the 
recognising subject with the emergence of the dialectical image establishes a new subject-
object relation. The completion ofthis critical circuit between body and image marks the 
completion of the critique. 
Laughter clearly is of the greatest significance in this formulation. Recalling Taussig's 
characterisation of the face as both mask and window to the soul and therefore at the 
intersection of revelation and concealment,26 the significance of laughter in this formulation 
returns attention to the problem of double vision introduced at the beginning of this chapter. 
To theorise the importance of laughter in the emergence of fakery as a dialectical image 
requires an ability to see the mysterious workings of the dialectic upon the surface of the body 
and at the same time to see upon the surface of the body a transformation of the recognising 
self within the body. Yet is this not what tactile appropriation means? If the critique emerges 
from the juxtapositions of claims to authenticity attached to religious objects copied from the 
realm of authenticity, and the recognition of this critique then registers on the surface of the 
body, then clearly tactility is at stake. And if laughter reveals, physiognomically as it were, a 
recognising self transformed via their interpenetration with the image, and transformed in 
such a way that they are now engaged critically with the most essential claim of religious 
objects, then clearly a kind of appropriation has transpired between self and image. 
Previously it has been suggested that bodily involvement in the image of critique points to a 
locus of authenticity in the image of fakery. I want to conclude this discussion of laughter and 
tactile appropriation with an explanation of this idea of authenticity in fakery. Following 











Benjamin's observation that the method of rational demystification is made impossible by the 
suffocating pressing of the commodity form, the immanent method of dialectical images 
becomes the only method of critique still possible. The dialectical image is therefore the 
image of an authentic critique. Yet Benjamin's critique of surrealism shows that the 
emergence of the dialectical image is dependent on the involvement of the body of the 
perceiver in the image of perception; without this involvement, the critique is incomplete and 
even deceptive, as is the case with the surrealists whose incomplete critique plunged them 
deeper into myth and dream despite their allusions to waking. It is in this sense that bodily 
involvement via tactile appropriation can be said to authenticate fakery's image of critique: 
tactile appropriation distinguishes fakery as a dialectical image, which, under the suffocating 
conditions of the commodified world, we know is the image of an authentic critique. 
Laughter, in this formulation, is the key to understanding how tactile appropriation works. 
And tactile appropriation, as has been said before, is the key to transforming the recognising 
subject and thereby bringing about a new subject-object relation. That new relation is 
naturally the goal of the critique and the reason for its articulation in the first instance. And so 
it is tempting to say that we have come full circle and back to the beginning. But this is only 
half the story. The flashing moment of recognition that is simultaneous with a mimetic 
connection between body and image is significant in ways beyond marking the emergence of 
the dialectical image. 
As was seen at the conclusion of chapter three, the moment of recognition contains an 
intuition of an immense and powerful mystery residing within and animating everyday 
objects. If Rudolf Otto is correct that religious experience is the intuition of the tremendous 
mystery at the base of the holy, could it be that the dialectical image ofreligious fakery, now 











experience? If the play of mimetic images frustrates the demands of reason for transparency 
in its objects, then such play also intensifies the mystery and increases its allure. And as with 
the intensification of dialectical tensions that finds resolution in the flashing moment of 
recognition, this moment also resolves the mystery, however fleeting such a resolution may 
be. For in the transitory and fleeting moment of recognition, the perceiving subject can 
comprehend the tremendous mystery at the base of the holy. But unlike the emergence of the 
dialectical image, with this fleeting comprehension there is no remainder, at least not in the 
critical sense that restructures the subject-object relation as with Benjamin's notion of 
authentic critique. What remains is what was there all along, which is the attraction of 
concealment driven by the desire for revelation the allure of the tremendous mystery 
residing within and animating everyday objects. However misplaced reason's methods often 
are - for example, imposing criteria on religious objects so that fakery may be exposed, rather 
than exploring people's embodied involvements with objects so that religious authenticity 
may be revealed - it is this desire for a revelation that cannot be more than fleeting without 
destroying its very mysteriousness that ensures the persistence of religion. Far from being the 
frivolous and silly entertainment that Google, Yahoo! and other custodians of the Internet 
imply, fake religions are crucial to religion as a realm of authentic human experience. This is 
not because their authentic critique attempts to subvert that realm and do away with it 
altogether (although often that is their explicit intention), but because, independent of their 
intentions, fake religions contribute to the mystery of religion and thereby increases its allure. 
This idea that humour in fake religion might be a gateway to authentic religious experience is 











into religious experience?7 Yet Berger's theory is a particular instance of a broader category 
of theories that locate their explanation of humour and laughter in a recognition of incongruity 
between objects. Berger's theory is also a departure from these theories because it links the 
recognition of incongruity with a theologically formulated conception of the relationship 
between god and man (albeit in a narrowly Judeo-Christian vision). But to appreciate the 
relevance of his theory for the argument being made here, it is necessary to understand the 
general formulation of incongruity theories of humour. The following discussion will 
therefore begin with a brief sketch of the incongruity theory and how it fits into the broad 
discourse on theories of laughter and humour, before focussing attention on Berger's theory 
which uses the incongruity theory to theorise a link between the comic and religious 
experience. 
4.2 Incongruity and Redeeming Laughter 
4.2.1 Humour and Incongruity 
Theories of humour that look for humour's explanation in a recognition of incongruence 
between objects and ideas are classified as incongruity theories of humour. This theory simply 
states that our sense of humour is the recognition of incongruity in the order or pattern of 
things. In Pascal's words: "Nothing produces laughter more than a surprising disproportion 
between that which one expects and that which one sees.,,28 Similarly for Schopenhauer, 
laughter is caused by "the sudden perception of the incongruity between a concept and the 
27 Peter L. Berger, Redeeming Laughter: The Comic Dimension of Human Experience (Berlin & New York: 
Walter de Gruyter, 1997). 
28 Blaise Pascal, quoted in John Morreal, Taking Laughter Seriously (Albany: State University of New York 











real objects which have been thought though it in some relation, and laughter is itself just the 
expression of this incongruity. ,,29 Certainly this kind of incongruity accounts for a great deal 
of humour. For example, ajoke that did the rounds a few years ago asked: Did you see me at 
Princess Diana's funeral? I was the one who started the Mexican wave! Pascal probably 
would have laughed at a discrepancy between the solemn mourning one would expect at the 
princess's funeral and the image of a Mexican wave rippling through the crowds. For 
Schopenhauer, humour results because the object (Mexican wave) being subsumed under the 
concept (funeral) is incongruous. 
Early versions of the incongruity theory, before humour became an independent subject of 
study, are found in the philosophical treatise that emerged with modernity in Europe. The 
earliest version of an incongruity theory is probably Kant' s. 30 Schopenhauer added to Kant's 
theory,3l but, in keeping with his general metaphysics, is disparaging of the elevation of 
concepts above perceptions.32 For Kierkegaard, humour marks the boundary between the 
ethical and religious spheres, just as its close relative, irony, distinguishes the aesthetic from 
the ethical sphere.33 During the twentieth century humour became a subject of study on its 
own. Henri Bergson's book-length treatment of the topic similarly conceives of humour as a 
kind of incongruity. His theory that laughter is a social corrective against people who don't 
behave in a flexible and context-sensitive way points to an incongruity between people and 
29 Arthur Schopenhauer, quoted in Morreal, Taking Laughter Seriously, p. 17. 
30 See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans. James Creed Meredith (Chicago: Encyclopredia 
Britannica, cl952), Part I, Div. 1.54. 
31 See Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, trans. R. B. Haldane and John Kemp (London: Kegan 
Paul, Trench, Triibner, 1896), Book 1, § 13. 
32 This observation is made by John Morreal in his introduction to an extract from Book I, § I3 of 
Schopenhauer's The Word as Will and Idea, in John Morreal (ed.), The Philosophy of Laughter and Humour 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987). 
33 See S0ren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans David F. Swenson (Princeton, New 











machines in the machine-like behaviour of human beings.34 Freud's theory of psychic energy, 
often classified in another category of humour theories called hydraulic or relief theory, also 
demonstrates an incongruity, in Berger's words, "between the demands of censorious morality 
and the blind urges of our libidinal nature.,,35 Most contemporary theories of humour pivot on 
a recognition of incongruity and are variations on the incongruity theory. 36 
Of course, incongruity theories are not without their difficulties. For example, Roger Scruton 
points out that satire depends on congruity between two objects.37 Also, it is plain that not all 
laughter results from humour; people laugh when tickled or when a sudden fright has passed. 
The common and enduring critique is that incongruity does not account for all examples of 
humour. Conversely, not all instances of incongruity are humorous. These are fair comments 
and merit attention. Yet for all the merits of these and similar criticisms, one cannot help but 
be struck by a resonance between the incongruity theory of humour that theorises the 
production of humour in the recognition of incongruity between objects, and the dialectic at a 
standstill marked by a recognition of a critical constellation saturated with ambivalent and 
contradictory tensions; both pivot on an incongruous and tensioned relation between objects. 
34 See Henri Bergson, Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, trans. Cloudesley Brareton and Fred 
Rothwell (London: Macmillan, 1921). Bergson's theory is also often cited as an example of another popular 
theory of humour called the superiority theory. Bergson's laughter is mocking and suggests that the person 
laughing feels superior to the person laughed at. Bergson's theory is an instance of the superiority theory, but 
can can also be analysed as an instance of the incongruity theory and be applied as such, as Chidester has 
profitably done (see Chidester, "Christmas in July.") For a discussion of the superiority theory of humour, see 
Morreal, Taking Laughter Seriously. 
35 Berger, "Redeeming Laughter," p. 208. See Sigmund Freud, Jokes and their Relation to the Unconcious, trans. 
James Strachey (London: Routledge, 1960). 
36 See for example, Michael Clark, "Humour and Incongruity," in John Morreal (ed.), The Philosophy of 
Laughter and Humour (Albany: State University of New York, 1987); and John Morreal, Taking Laughter 
Seriously (Albany: State University of New York, 1983), pp. 139-155. 
37 Roger Scruton in John Morreal (ed.), 1987, The Philosophy of Laughter and Humour (Albany: State 











This resonance poses two questiolls: Does the burst of laughter that marks both these 
moments suggest that completing the critical circuit between body and image amounts to 
"getting the joke"? Following on from here, if the moment of recognition contains an intuition 
to the tremendous mystery lurking beneath or behind the surface of appearance, could 
"getting the joke" contain such an intuition as well? 
Thinking on the first question posed, the moment of recognition that marks the emergence of 
the dialectical image does mean "getting the joke." In this sense, we can say that the outraged 
authors of the many letters received at Landover Baptists did not get the joke. Similarly, we 
might say that many readers of The Mac Observer perceived an incongruity when they 
laughed at Objective's equation of Apple computers with godless communism. But in tracing 
fakery's dialectic to a standstill and looking for a tactile appropriation in the moment of 
recognition, the intention was to find in fakery an authentic image of critique, not to theorise 
humour. In this sense the moment of recognition at the flashing moment of mimetic 
connection amounts to more than simply getting the joke. But the resonance between the 
dialectic at a standstill and incongruity theories of humour that find their common ground in a 
burst of laughter is significant in ways beyond the narrow intentions of either theory. Here I 
have in mind the implications of such a resonance suggested by the second question above. 
It has previously been shown how the reconfiguring movements of fakery's dialectic is seen 
upon the surface of the image; how with each new constellating movement, the appearance of 
the image is transformed. Along the way, the Internet surfer oscillates between convictions 
that they are looking at an authentic religion, then fake, then back again, until eventually they 
lament their lost ability to discern. Yet a mystery is surfacing with each oscillation, or 











surfing across the transfonning surface of appearance whose intuition of this tremendous 
mystery is sharpened at each tightening turn. Though they are ultimately left guessing and 
confused and lament their lost ability to discern, the dialectic at a standstill is pregnant with 
the possibility and potential that the emergence of the dialectical image will also herald the 
revelation of this concealed mystery. From the historical materialist's perspective, the 
constellation of waking does herald a revelation of sorts, what Benjamin has theorised as a 
profane illumination, which, in a register different from Benjamin's Marxist one, may be 
closer to the intentions of many of the fake religions we are concerned with here. But I am 
interested in how fakes might contribute to religious mystery, might contribute to mystery as 
the source of religious experience. Peter Berger's suggestion that the experience of the comic 
signals religious experience is therefore of particular interest. 
4.2.2 Redeeming Laughter 
Berger's central argument is that the comic, which is the proper object of the sense of 
humour, can be a signal of transcendence (208).38 I say "can be" because Berger is adamant 
that often the comic contains no such signal at aU, or at least, the person enjoying the comic 
experience does not recognise this signal and fails to pick it up, so to speak. The brief 
summary of his argument below is followed by the discussion of its implications for the 
present inquiry into religious authenticity. I will therefore reserve my comments and analysis 
for that discussion. 
Berger observes that the comic posits "a different reality in which the assumptions and rules 
of ordinary life are suspended" (205). For a brief moment, what was previously familiar 
38 Berger, "Redeeming Laughter." For the duration of this discussion, where this text is cited the convention will 











becomes unfamiliar, previously natural becomes unnatural. "At its 1110st intense," Berger says, 
the comic "presents a counterworld, an upside down world" (207). But he is quick to point out 
that there is nothing overtly religious in this kind of transcendence; that it is a transcendence 
of a secular kind, a "transcendence in a lower key" (205). In making this point, Berger 
emphasises the transitoriness of this kind of transcendence. Ultimately, the empirical world 
must reassert itself and show that this counterempirical world is an illusion, and so the 
painless world of the comic is proved illusionary by the hard facts of tragedy (210). In this 
transitory moment, however, one stands in another reality, in a world without pain. This 
transitoriness therefore contains an intuition of transcendence "in a higher key," (205) of 
redemption in the full religious sense. People speak of "redeeming laughter," meaning that 
jokes make life easier to bear, because they recognise in the transitory comic moment 
qualities of redemption. There are then two meanings that can be attached to the comic, one 
secular, the other religious. And while there is no automatic nor necessary passage between 
them, there is a basic link that might or might not be recognised in that brief moment, which 
is the intuition in the lower key of transcendence in the higher key. 
Berger's formulation poses the obvious question: how does one move from the secular to the 
religious meaning? The key for Berger is what he terms "an epistemological reversal" (210) 
brought about by faith. To understand this, it is necessary to recall what the world looks like 
from the perspective of faith. Faith reverses the reality-illusion dualism so that the empirical 
world appears to be a temporary reality that will be superseded in due time. In Berger's 
words, faith "puts the empirical in question and denies its ultimate seriousness" (210). The 
world from the perspective of faith is a world redeemed, is a world where people's alienation 
from god is overcome, is a world without pain. Seen from the perspective of faith, the 











laugh, therefore, is to see the world as if from God's point of view. It is in this sense that 
Berger suggests that the painless world of the comic adumbrates the religious world (210) and 
the experience of the comic presages religious experience. 
Berger then examines three archetypal instances of the comic that never cease to amuse very 
young children and probably many adults too. They are the pratfall, jack-in-the-box, and 
peekaboo. Berger suggests that the pratfall is an exemplar of "the incongruence between 
human pretensions and human reality." He illustrates his claim with the example ofThales of 
Miletus who fell into a ditch while pondering the stars. Says Berger: "The Thracian maid's 
laughter implied an insight into the human condition that went far beyond this particular 
philosopher's momentary embarrassment" (211). In other words, in the moment of the 
philosopher's embarrassment, the Thracian maid enjoyed an intuition of a counterworld 
without pain, a world made whole again. The jack-in-the-box is the reverse figure; Jack 
denies the pratfall, repeatedly jumping up no matter how often he is pressed down. The jack-
in-the-box therefore is an image of redemption, a soteriological paradigm that stands in 
contrast to the pratfall's anthropological one. In this "slightly reckless formulation," Jack 
becomes Christ and the whole game of jack repeatedly jumping out of his box becomes a 
symbol of the resurrection (211). 
But Berger reserves special attention for the game of peekaboo. The game, as most people 
know, involves a child and a mother. The child sees the mother, then the mother disappears. 
The child becomes anxious until after a brief moment, the mother reappears. The child 
expresses their reliefby laughing or smiling. This scenario, for Berger, contains "in a 
wondrous nutshell" "the drama of redemption as seen in the light of faith" (211). He explains 











gliulpse of him and then he promptly disappears" (211). Religious faith, in this scenario, is the 
hope that he will reappear, "providing that ultimate relief, which precisely, is redemption" 
(211). Existence then is the pain of estrangement, to which reunification is the joy of 
redemption. It is in this sense that Berger makes his argument for the comic experience as a 
signal of transcendence: " ... the painless worlds of the comic can now be seen as an 
adumbration of a world beyond this world. The promise of redemption, in one form or 
another, is always a world without pain" (p. 210). 
This image ofa cosmic game of hide and seek dramatised in the game ofpeekaboo I find the 
most compelling image of Berger's theory because it is exactly the image of a movement 
between revelation and concealment with which this discussion of authenticity in religion has 
been concerned. I want to hold onto this image and the dramatic movements it contains for a 
minute while I pick up another aspect of Berger's argument: that this image ofthe comic 
world in tension with the empirical world resonates with Benjamin's dialectical image 
composed of similar tensions. Such a resonance has been remarked on previously, where it 
was noted that humour emerges out of the recognition of incongruity between objects and that 
the dialectical image emerges at a moment of recognition of a constellation saturated with 
tensions. For both, it is the relation of objects that precipitates this critical moment. This 
resonance can now be further elaborated, for there is surely a resonance between the 
movements between worlds that Berger suggests and the transformation of the recognising 
self that is central to Benjamin's theory. At the recognition of humorous incongruity, the 
recognising self is transported from the empirical world of everyday familiarity to the 
counter-empirical world presented by the comic, the latter disclosed as "lurking behind or 
beneath" (207 -8) the former. For Benjamin, the transformation of the recognising self is 











empirical world of the comic is identifiable with waking consciousness and in its turn dream 
consciousness is identifiable with the empirical world. With this formulation in mind, recall 
the image ofpeekaboo and the cosmic game of hide and seek that it encapsulates. The 
empirical world is the surface of appearance where most of us spend most of our time. But it 
is its very empiricism that denies that it is a concealing surface. This denial is perpetrated by 
the method of forensic science that would drive reason's wedge ever deeper, a violent getting-
to-the-bottom-of-things that in its relentless exposures denies mystery any space to move. Yet 
we know that the empirical claim is essentially false and that mystery does lurk concealed 
behind empiricism because we transcend this surface when we laughingly enter the comic's 
counter-empirical world lurking beneath it. In that moment, when we see the world from 
God's perspective, that is, from the transcended perspective, we feel as if awakened from a 
nightmare dream where we were estranged from God, our mother in Berger's description of 
peekaboo, and can now revel in the joy of their reappearance and our redemption. 
At this juncture an objection to this formulation might be proposed. As Berger warns, the 
empirical world does reassert itself and the painless world of the comic is displaced by the 
empirical experience of pain. The comic experience is transitory; one does stop laUghing. An 
objection to the transposition of Benjamin's dialectical image onto Berger's image ofthe 
comic may be raised at this juncture: that the authenticity of Benjamin's image of critique is 
dependent on tactile appropriation and most significantly, that a residue remain. Waking 
consciousness is not theorised as transitory, as with Berger's comic experience. This is a 
mistaken objection, as the concluding discussion of this chapter will show. My argument is 












If Berger is explicit in his explanation of how comic experience is related to religious 
experience, Benjamin is as explicit about how his theory of dialectics relates to theology. Yet 
somehow Benjamin's explicitness seems less helpful: 
My thinking relates to theology the way a blotter does to ink. It is soaked with it If one 
merely read the blotter, though, nothing of what has been written would remain.39 
There is something beautifully fitting about this statement from a writer who eschews 
descriptive inventories in favour of literary montage on the grounds that the former arrests the 
mysterious movements of the objects so exposed, while the latter's constellations uses 
mysterious movement in a way that allows mystery to reveal itself. But if Benjamin's 
thinking is soaked with theology, his work is by no means typically theological. As Marsha 
Hewitt has noted,40 his Theses on the Philosophy of History, Benjamin's most deeply 
theological work, uses explicitly theological language for thoroughly materialist purposes. 
These materialist purposes, we have seen, constitute Benjamin's critique of modernity's re-
enchantment of social experience via a conception of human progress that assumes the 
character as well as authority of myth. In the closing discussion of this chapter, I want to 
consider Benjamin's image of dialectics at a standstill as a theological formulation and the 
flashing moment of recognition as an image of redemption. 
4.3 Benjamin's Political Messianism 
If Benjamin's general concern is a critique of the modernist understanding of history, it seems 
that a consideration of the structure of his understanding oftime in relation to history is a 
39 Benjamin, UN," p. 18 (N7a.7). 











useful place to begin this enquiry into Benjamin's political messianism. With a grasp of the 
structure of Benjamin's thesis, the discussion will then look at subjective experience, which, 
under the conditions of modernity's abstractions and reifications, Benjamin theorises as the 
crucible for revolutionary action. It is this moment of a transforming subjective experience 
that is the locus of his political messianism. 
4.3.1 Empirical History and Messianic Time: 
"The authentic concept of universal history is a messianic one. Universal history, as it is 
understood today, is the business of obscurantists:.4) This short fragment contains the basic 
structure of Benjamin's thesis. Clearly, there are two registers of time employed here; the first 
is messianic, the second is empirica1.42 Importantly, these two registers are not one above the 
other or one superimposed onto the other, as in an allegorical formulation. Benjamin 
understands them as distinct and disconnected, at least until revolutionary political action cuts 
across history's secular continuum to blast it open, "a leap into the open air ofhistory.'.43 This 
dual register of time is represented in figyre 1.44 
41 Benjamin, "N," p. 36 (Nl8.3). 
42 Buck-Morss, TheDialectics o/Seeing, p. 242. 
43 Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," p. 261. 






















Action Fig. 1 
Empirical history is the view of the past from the perspective of the historicist. Tbis 
perspective sees history as a chronological accumulation of events and the historicist as 
chronicler of that accumulation. The attitude of the historicist is one that "lets history run its 
course." Crucially however, "its discourse imitates that course,',45 which is to say that the 
historicist sees in history humanity's future, a necessarily utopian vision that in the same 
instant obscures the present. "The historicist chronicler of world history" obscures history by 
confusing the present with "the age of its messianic redemption.,,46 The critique of inauthentic 
empirical time is that historicism is "premature," in the sense that "it takes for granted that 
history can already be told in its totality:,47 Historicism's approach to empirical history 
assumes that the present is history's culmination. Historicism, today's understanding of 
history, is therefore tantamount to ideology. As Irving Wohlfarth has succinctly put it: "In 
identifying the utopian telos with the present, historicism betrays it.',48 
4S Irving Wohlfarth, "On the Messianic Structure of Walter Benjamin's Last Reflections," Glyph, vol. 3 (1978), 
p.166. 
46 Ibid.,p. 167. 
47 Ibid., p. 171. 











Messia.'1ic time is the ~econd register of time in the structure of Benjamin's thought. As the 
authentic concept of history, it is a corrective to the historicist's ideologically inflected 
understanding of history and is the perspective of the dialectical materialist who regards it as 
their task "to brush history against the grain.,,49 If historicism characterises the discourse of 
today's empirical understanding of history, then historical materialism can be characterised as 
the discourse of messianic time. The dialectical materialist sees it as their task to disrupt the 
course of empirical history and therewith to bring about a "reformation of consciousness" that 
for Benjamin, following Marx, consists in "waking the world ... from the dream about 
itself."SO As we have seen, Benjamin's notion of dialectical thinking seeks the flashing 
moment of recognition and mimetic connection. Yet the full significance of dialectics at a 
standstill now comes into focus, for with the emergence of the dialectical image comes "a 
revolutionary chance to fight for the oppressed past."SI Articulated in theological terms, the 
dialectical materialist in this moment "recognizes the sign of a Messianic cessation of 
happening,,,S2 a disruption of the course of empirical history that blasts open history's 
continuum. This kind of disruption is the figure of a movement from the register of empirical 
history to the register of messianic time, accomplished through revolutionary action that cuts 
across the straight path of history's continuum (see fig 1).53 Dialectics at a standstill is the 
theoretical statement of this transcendent revolutionary action; how Benjamin conceived the 
actualisation of this action bears some explanation. 
49 Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," p. 257. 
so Marx, letter to Ruge, in Benjamin, "N," p. 1. This quote from Marx's correspondences prefaces "Konvolut N" 
of Benjamin's notes on the theoretical aspects of the Arcades Project and is thought to be the source of 
Benjamin's formulation of dialectics as a tension between dream consciousness and awakend consciousness. 
51 Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," p. 263. 
52 Ibid., p. 263. 











Before traciHg Benjamin's political messianism through the actualisation of revolutionary 
action, it is important to clarify at the outset an objection that might be raised at this point. 
Clearly this formulation of revolutionary action that cuts across empirical history and into 
messianic time implicates a utopian vision. Since it is the utopianism of historicism's account 
of history that renders it inauthentic, it stands to reason that such utopianism is equally 
problematic in the historical materialist's account of history. This is a valid, but mistaken 
point. As Buck-Morss has expertly shown, though utopian desire is the motivation for 
revolutionary action, revolution should not be understood as the culmination of history. 54 
Rather, it is "a Messianic break from history's course."S5 In other words, revolutionary action 
is the disruption of the straight path of empirical history and therewith a liberation from its 
oppressive ideological powers. Utopianism for the dialectical materialist emphasises the 
urgency of the present, rather than the promise of the future. With this distinction in mind, the 
emphasis on "now-time" in Benjamin's notion of revolutionary action brings into focus his 
political messianism that little bit more. 
4.3.2 Revolutionary Action and Experience 
The crucible of revolutionary action is a personal, SUbjective experience. It is the uniqueness 
of this experience, wherein the dialectical materialist "grasps the constellation which his own 
era has formed with a definite earlier one," that gives the lie to historicism's image of a fixed 
and "eternal" past. 56 Benjamin distinguishes between the discourses of empirical history and 
messianic time: "Historicism gives the 'eternal' image of the past; dialectical materialism 
supplies a unique experience with the past."S7 A crucial distinction comes into focus here: on 
S4 See Ibid., p. 240-245. 
55 Ibid., p. 243. 
56 Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," p. 263. 











the OIie hand is the historicist who is orientated toward a utopian future that can be discerned 
in the present because contemporary progress, measured in straight trajectory of improvement 
from the "eternal past," promises to deliver that utopia; on the other hand is the historical 
materialist who remains orientated toward their sUbjective experience of the present by 
forming constellations between present and past that in turn becomes a crucible for 
revolutionary action. This kind of experience achieves a rescue of a past oppressed by 
historicism's image of a fixed eternal, and at the same time achieves a "reformation of 
consciousness" along the lines of Marx's aim to wake the world from the dream about itself. 
In formulating this notion of critical experience, Benjamin found critical leverage in Marcel 
Proust's idea of memory, specifically the memoire invoiontaire, which Benjamin adopted as 
the image of a unique experience of contact between present and past. 
Memory is a constellation between present and past. Yet the difficulty with memory is that it 
involves intellection, which means that the memory is thought through concepts that in turn 
obscure the quality of sensuousness that is the memory's magic and the reason for its 
significance in the first instance. Samuel Becket articulates this problem in a passage from his 
extraordinary work on Proust: 
The most successful evocative experiment can only project the echo of a past sensation, 
because, being an act of intellection, it is conditioned by the prejudices of the intelligence 
which abstracts from any given sensation, as being illogical and insignificant, a 
discordant and frivolous intruder, whatever word or gesture, sound or perfume, cannot be 
fitted into the puzzle of a concept. But the essence of any new experience is contained 
precisely in this mysterious element that the vigilant will rejects as an anachronism. It is 
the axis about which the sensation pivots, the centre of gravity of its coherence. S8 











Benjamin is interested in memory as a sensuous experience. In pursuing this experience, 
he is not only concerned to avoid the prejudices of intelligence, he is determined to use 
the sensuous experience of memory's constellation between present and past as a means 
to critique the act of intellection, for it is this modernist tendency toward intellection 
and abstraction at the expense of sensuousness that conceives of history as a 
chronology, a continuum, and an object of empirical knowledge. The difficulty then is 
how to tap into the "mysterious element" and experience memory sensuously as a direct 
and unmediated contact between present and past. This is where Benjamin drew 
inspiration from Proust's memoire involontaire. 
The memoire involontaire is a spontaneous recollection triggered by an encounter in the 
present with a seemingly insignificant object from the past. Proust's famous example is the 
taste of a Madeleine; "I raised to my lips a spoonful of the cake ... a shudder ran through my 
whole body and I stopped, intent upon the extraordinary changes that were taking place."s9 
Proust is flooded with memories of his childhood, his aunt, and the ''taste of dead leaves or 
faded blossom she so relished." In his poem "Proust's Madeleine," American poet Kenneth 
Rexroth recounts his experience of idly performing a coin trick for his daughter, whereupon 
"Suddenly everything slips aside." 60 He sees his father, hears him whistling a tune, smells the 
cigars and whiskey on his breath. Becket describes this kind of recollection: 
... the central impression of a past sensation recurs as an immediate stimulus which can 
be instinctively identified by the subject with the model of duplication (whose integral 
purity has been retained because it has been forgotten), then the total past sensation, not 
59 http://www.foodreference.com/htmllqmadeleine.html (accessed: 17 July 2003). 
60 Kenneth Rexroth, "Proust's Madeleine," available at 











its echo nor its copy, but the sensation itself, annihilating every spatial and temporal 
restriction, comes in a rush to engulf the subject in all the beauty of its infallible 
proportion. ,,61 
For Proust, this kind of direct and unmediated contact between present and past is not merely 
the fortuitous return of the past in memory; it resurrects the sensations of objects, which then 
become like ciphers, "hieroglyphic characters," a "magic scrawl," an "inner book of unknown 
symbols. ,,62 The recollection of these tactile sensations therefore entails a kind of self-
transformation as one sets about deciphering the significances, for Proust, the taste of dead 
leaves or faded blossom, for Rexroth, the smell of whiskey and cigars. The memoire 
involontaire is a kind of engagement with the very essence of things that Becket likens to 
religious experience, the "stunned by waves of rapture" that flood the subject.63 In this 
fleeting moment the "radiant essence" of the thing the memoire involontaire metonymic ally 
invokes, Proust's childhood, Rexroth's father, "emerges from the series of forgotten days." 
One can see in Proust's memoire involontaire Benjamin's image of dialectics at a standstill as 
well as his fascination with the smallest items of history, the seemingly insignificant ''trash.'' 
Yet notice that the image of the memoire involontaire contains all the crucial qualities that 
later would constitute the terminal points of Benjamin's theory of dialectics: constellations-
in memory, the present era forms a constellation with the past; a flashing moment - the 
suddenness of the memoire involontaire and rushing sensation that comes with it; tactility-
the taste of a Madeleine or flipping a coin recalls the taste of dead leaves or the smell of 
61 Becket, Proust, p. 54. 
62 Proust, quoted in Max Pensky, "Tactics of Remembrance: Proust, Surrealism, and the Origin of the 
Passagenwerk," in Michael P. Steinberg (ed.), Walter Benjamin and the Demands of History (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1996), p.174. 











whiskey and cigar on breath; sensuous cuntact - direct and unmediated, between present and 
past; a disruption of movement - "I stopped," "suddenly everything slips aside;" a 
transformation of the experiencing (recognising) self-Proust shudders and becomes intent 
upon "the extraordinary changes," Rexroth is moved to write a poem. But ifthese elements 
constitute terminal points for his theory, Benjamin is most interested in the subjectivity of the 
experience, specifically, the brooding melancholia of Proust himself. Recall that Benjamin the 
dialectical materialist is interested in the reformation of consciousness through the immanent 
method of dialectical images that brush history against the grain. Benjamin therefore is 
interested in how Proust's brooding subjectivity that appears necessary to his memoire 
involontaire can be transformed for critical purposes. As Max Pensky has put it, Benjamin is 
interested in "the reconstruction of mournful subjectivity as an optical equipment in the 
laboratory of time.,,64 Benjamin reconstructs this mournful subjectivity into "heroic 
melancholy," a reconstruction whereby subjectivity becomes an optical apparatus that in tum 
presents an opportunity for a "truly disclosive relation with objects.',65 In the image of Proust, 
Benjamin finds "a model for a historiographic sensibility" that is ''based on memory as the 
moment of awakening; ,,66 says Benjamin: "Proust's method is actualisation, not reflection.,,67 
Benjamin develops and applies the Proustian "presence of mind" for his own purposes. In 
Benjamin's hands, this mind is not so much orientated toward the past as much as toward our 
relation to the past from our subjective location in the present. Benjamin knows that "to be 
plunged in memory is to be lost to the present.,,68 His intention is actualisation in the present, 
64 Pensky, "Tactics of Remembrance," p. 116. 
65 Ibid., p. 111. 
66 Pensky, "Tactics of Remembrance," p. 111. 
67 Walter Benjamin, "The Image of Proust," in Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. 
Harry 20hn (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), p. 211. 











not reflection on the past, and it comes "in a flash too instantaneous to be called self-
reflexive. ,,69 This image of a flash is familiar from the discussion of dialectics at a standstill in 
Chapter Three and elsewhere in the present chapter; in the present context, this flash assumes 
the character ofthe actualisation of an authentic and direct relation with the past, one that is 
not filtered by historicism's cognitive processes, but instead mediated by tactile sensation. 
This kind of actualisation is Benjamin's concept of "genuine historical memory," and it "takes 
the form of messianic contacts between the present and specific moments of the past.,,70 It is 
the same flash that marks the moment of recognition and the establishment of a mimetic 
connection between the object perceived and the body of the perceiver, and therewith the 
emergence of the dialectical image. If Benjamin's reflections on Proustian memory are 
"dedicated to the salvation of the present,,,7) then it is not surprising that Gershom Scholem 
should describe Benjamin's dialectical images as "theological symbols."n The issue at stake 
with both Benjamin's use of Proust ian memory and his own innovation of dialectical images 
is that they brush history against the grain, they both cut across the path of empirical history 
and a mythically conceived trajectory of progress. By disrupting the continuum of empirical 
history in this manner, the experience of the memoire involontaire, thought through the optics 
of Benjamin's dialectics, enters into the parallel register of Messianic now-time. It is to a 
consideration of this concept of now-time that our attention should now turn. 
4.3.3 Now Time (Jetztzeit) 
The messianic import of historical materialism's critique of "today's understanding of 
history" is succinctly captured in the following sentence from Thesis Fourteen of The Theses 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., p. 152. 
71 Ibid., p. 163. 











on the Philosophy of History: "History is the subject of a structure whose site is not 
homogenous, empty time, but time filled by the presence of the now [Jetztzeit].,,73 In a 
footnote to this statement, Benjamin's translator notes that his concept of "now" (Jetztzeit) is 
closer to the mystical nunc stans than Gegenwart, which simply means "present." In an 
important essay on Benjamin's contemporaneity, Jiirgen Habermas, who thought this 
statement expressed the central tenet of Benjamin's idea of a present in which time comes to a 
standstill, uses both Jetztzeit and nunc stans to indicate the concept of "now time.,,74 At the 
messianic cessation of happening, the historicist's constellation of natural history and eternity 
gives way to the historical materialist's constellation of history and Jetztzeit.75 These 
constellations, or rather, the crystallising of the former into the latter, marks the transcendence 
between secular history, ''the sequence of (catastrophic) events that mark human times 
without fulfilling it," and revolutionary "now-time," wherein every moment "is irradiated 
with the anticipation of redemption. ,,76 
It is the personal experience of a unique subjectivity in this moment, earlier theorised as the 
transformation of the recognising self, which heralds the reformation of consciousness that 
wakes the world from the dream about itself. This moment is the culmination of dialectical 
thinking and the crux of Benjamin's theory of dialectics at a standstill. Everything comes 
down to this crucial moment and timing is of the utmost importance. Benjamin writes in 
Thesis Eleven: ''To articulate the past historically ... means to seize hold of the memory as it 
flashes up at a moment of danger. ,,77 The danger here is not merely that the moment may pass 
before the memory is perceived in all its tactile sensuousness. The urgency to experience the 
13 Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," p. 261. 
74 Habermas, "Consciousness Raising or Redemptive Critique," p. 38. 
75 Ibid., p. 39. 
76 Buck-Morss, The Dialectics o/Seeing, p. 242. 











sudden metoflymic rush of the memory as tactility is attributable to the oppressive powers of 
historicism's consciousness that would abstract the experience into concepts and processes of 
intellection. Bowing to this false consciousness is to be complicit with historicism's 
reification of experience and to perpetuate the utopian myth of progress; "the same threat 
hangs over both: that of becoming a tool of the ruling class.78 It is not an understatement to 
say that for Benjamin, the history of the world and the salvation of humanity pivots on this 
moment, for the passing of this opportunity without seizing it amounts to handing victory to 
the Antichrist: 
The Messiah comes not only as the redeemer, he comes as the subduer of the Antichrist. 
Only that historian will have the gift of fanning the spark of hope in the past who is firmly 
convinced that even the dead will not be safe from the enemy if he wins. And this enemy 
has not ceased to be victorious.79 
This then is the image of Benjamin's political messianism. Yet it remains to be directly 
addressed how Benjamin's theology is related to his thought. From the preceeding discussion, 
it is clear that questions of redemption situated within a cosmic battle against evil are at stake. 
Yet I don't think the problem of theology in Benjamin's thought is as cryptic as his analogy 
with an ink-soaked blotter implies. 
4.4 Redeeming Laughter and Political Messianism 
In this concluding discussion of the chapter I want to relate Benjamin's political messianism 
with Berger's redeeming laughter. Before I do that however, it is useful to recall the opening 
78 Ibid. 











discussion of the chapter. There it was shown, via Benjamin's critique of surrealism, that the 
element of dialectics at a standstill that authenticates the image of critique is the involvement 
of the body of the recognising subject with the image of perception. Benjamin theorises this 
element of bodily involvement through the notion of tactile appropriation, an interpenetration 
between body and image whereby the mysterious reconstellating movements concealed by the 
image's surface of appearance registers on the surface of the body. In turn, the surface of the 
body reveals, physiognomically as it were, the mysterious transformations within the 
recognising self. Drawing on Taussig's notion that the face that as both mask and window to 
the soul stands at the intersection of revelation and concealment, this formulation of tactile 
appropriation opens the possibility that laughter may evidence the kind of bodily involvement 
that authenticates Benjamin's image of critique. In Chapter Three is was noted that many 
browsers of fake religions' websites reported that they found these sites and their content 
extremely funny. Indeed, fake religions are routinely categorised in the humour and 
entertainment directories maintained by Google and Yahoo. It therefore may be that the 
dialectical image of fakery in religion conforms to a Benjaminian concept of authentic 
critique. 
The second discussion of this chapter sets out to further explore this humorous quality. 
Following the incongruity theory of religion, the first significant discovery here was a 
correlation between the structure of humour and the structure of the dialectical image; both 
pivot on a tensioned and contradictory relation between objects. Yet Berger's theory of the 
comic initiated an unexpected loop back to an encounter with religious authenticity via his 
suggestion that the comic is an adumbration of religious experience. I say odd because if fake 
religion is comical and the comical adumbrates authentic religious experience, the possibility 











reflection however, it was appreciated that perhaps this is not so unexpected after all. 
Recalling the concluding discussion of Chapter Three, there it wsa shown that with the 
reconfiguring movements ofthe dialectic comes a growing intuition of a tremendous mystery 
surfacing from deep within the object of perception. This observation was the point of 
departure for the third discussion of the chapter, where Benjamin's dialectical image was 
reconsidered from the point of view of Benjamin's theology. There it quickly became 
apparent that Benjamin's dialectical critique of modernity's re-enchantment of social 
experience is soaked with messianism. Dialectics at a standstill, theorised in secular terms in 
Chapter Three, finds its theological counterpoint in now-time (Jetztzeit). Similarly, the 
transformation of the recognizing self finds its counterpoint in redemption, and the political 
critique of ideology finds its counterpoint in a confrontation with the Antichrist, who has 
never ceased to be victorious. 
By way of concluding this chapter, there are two significant relationships between this 
chapter's 2nd and 3rd discussions that I want to bring into focus. The first is between Berger's 
comic and Benjamin's dialectical image; the second is between their respective experiences of 
religion. This second relationship returns attention to an objection anticipated at the end ~fthe 
discussion of Berger's comic experience (discussion two) where it was suggested that 
Berger's emphasis on the comic as an adumbration of the religious might temper the 
transposition of his theory of redeeming laughter onto Benjamin's theologically-soaked 
theory of dialectics at a standstill. In the context of Benjamin's political messianism, this 
objection can now be properly addressed. Before doing so however, I want to relate Berger's 











There is a structural correlation between Berger's understanding of the comic and Benjamin's 
image of dialectics in that they both pivot on a relation between objects. By pivot I mean to 
suggest that the comic and the dialectical image come into focus when the tension in the 
relation between their constitutive objects becomes untenable. For Berger, this untenability is 
captured in the concept of incongruity; for Benjamin, it is captured in the idea of saturation. 
For both, at this critical moment there is a transcendent departure from empirical reality and 
an entrance into a different world (Berger's counter-empirical world) and register of time 
(Benjamin's messianic time). Both transcendent realms are conceived in religious terms. 
Recalling the enduring metaphor of surface and depth, it might be said that this movement 
from empirical reality to a theologically conceived counter-empirical world with its own 
messianic register of time is a penetration through the surface of appearance into the 
mysterious concealed depths. Recalling that Berger says that the counter-empirical world is 
disclosed as lurking behind of beneath the empirical surface, this penetration heralds a 
revelation that can be likened to religious experience. 
In addition to these structural similarities, Berger's and Benjamin's theories are similarly 
focussed on their subjects' experience of transformation. For Berger, this is the experience of 
dwelling in a counter-empirical world without pain. Recalling Berger's suggestion that to 
laugh, that is, to enter into and dwell in a counter-empirical world, is to see the world from the 
divine perspective, the central argument of Berger's thesis comes into focus: the experience of 
this counter-world is the joy of reunification with the divine. The crucial image that conveys 
this experience is the game ofpeekaboo that dramatises the cosmic game of hide and seek that 
God plays with his creation. Benjamin describes the corresponding experience in his theory 
through the image of Proust, specifically, the experience of the memoire involontaire that 











experience of direct contact, an engagement with and participation in the very essence of the 
object. For Benjamin, Proustian subjectivity reconstructed for purposes of revolutionary 
action and theorised through the idea of heroic melancholy becomes an optical apparatus 
suitable for a truly disclosive relation with objects. This theme of disclosure is a central motif 
in both Berger's and Benjamin's theories and is pictured in explicitly religious terms. It is 
clearly a revelation of sorts; that the separation from the divine is temporary (Berger's 
argument) and that the utopian present touted by progress is fallacious and deceptive 
(Benjamin's argument). In other words, the empirical world is a false world that conceals 
divine truth. This divine truth concealed by the surface of appearance cannot be seen in the 
ordinary sense. Rather, it is disclosed in a transcendent moment in which the recognising self 
is transformed. The joys of reunification, dramatised in the cosmic game of peekaboo, and the 
stunned waves of rapture that encapsulate the experience of the memoire inv%ntaire, find 
common ground in the reformation of consciousness that consists in the world waking from 
the dream about itself. 
A second relationship between Berger's theory of redeeming laughter and Benjamin's theory 
of dialectics at a standstill links their respective ideas on religious experience. Berger 
emphasises that the comic is an adumbration of reunification with the divine. In other words, 
for Berger, the comic is an anticipation of the purest form of religious experience and is a 
sampling of what is to come. Yet if Berger means only that the comic is an anticipation of 
reunification, an objection might be raised to the transposition of Berger's theory onto 
dialectics at a standstill. This objection might go something as follows: if the comic is only an 
adumbration of religious experience, an anticipation rather than the experience itself, it surely 
cannot sit well with Benjamin's political messianism and his image of authentic critique that 











so crucial to waking, is to be achieved. There are two approaches available here that will 
refute this criticism. The first focuses on Berger's understanding of adumbration, the second 
focuses on Benjamin's understanding of now-time. 
Berger's understanding of adumbration as anticipation does not preclude authentic religious 
experience. The distinction, in Berger's theological formulation, between the comic and the 
joy of reunification as authentic religious experience is one of temporality, which is to say 
that the experience of ultimate reunification with the divine is permanent whereas the comic 
experience that adumbrates it is transitory. Berger makes this distinction himself when he 
notes that the empirical world does reassert itself, one does stop laughing. Yet in that 
transitory moment in which one dwells in the counter-empirical world, the upside-down 
world without pain, one does see the world as if from God's perspective and one is reunited 
with the divine. It is its transitoriness that gives the experience of reunification its anticipatory 
character; what is anticipated is not reunification per se, but rather, reunification's 
permanence. 
A second refutation ofthis objection should point out that Benjamin's notion of religious 
experience, articulated through the image of Proust's memoire invoiontaire, is itself 
impermanent and therefore transitory. For Benjamin, the crucible for religious experience and 
subjective transformation is now-time, the messianic cessation of events wherein history is 
redeemed and the Antichrist subdued. Yet now-time is transitory. The Antichrist, who has 
never ceased to be victorious, must in the next moment be subdued again. The utopian vision 
of reunification with the divine, as Buck-Morss has shown, is the motivation for revolutionary 
action, not the revolution itself. Now-time must be transitory, for if it were not, then his 











perpetrates, which is to confuse the utopian telos with the present. 1, a sense, Benjamin's 
notion of dialectics at a standstill and the transfonnation of the recognising self in this 
moment of messianic time is a kind of adumbration of the revolution to come, the revolution 
that will defeat the Antichrist and end history, which in Benjamin's theologically-soaked 












Chapter Five: Conclusion 
5.1 Of Churches and Cults 
The Church of Virus describes itself as "a memetically engineered atheistic religion." 1 It 
positions itself in opposition to irrational religion, by which it means "traditional religion." 
The core ideas informing this religion are evolution and memetics, which together establish a 
platform for one of the religion'S "primary design goals:" the objective of survivability 
through adaptation. Taking its cue from the observation that religions fade "because they 
become obsolete," David McFadzean, the inventor ofthe Church of Virus, designed this new 
religion on the premise that it should be able to continuously integrate "better (more accurate, 
more useful) concepts" so that the religion's relevance is maintained. By continuously 
integrating "better concepts," the religion "could conceivably achieve true immortality." The 
intention is to build into the religion's design an evolutionary mechanism, similar to Darwin's 
natural selection. Since the kind of natural selection at stake here is not competition between 
species of animals, but instead between ideas, Richard Dawkin' s theory of memetics is 
employed to give expression to the conceptual framework. Briefly, a meme is an evolutionary 
replicator that replicates through imitative behaviour. As such, a meme is also often defined 
as a unit of cultural information. Most commonly, "meme" is used in the notion of a meme-
complex, a group of mutually supporting memes that together form an organised belief 
system. Fashion styles, social movements, and political and religious beliefs are all examples 
ofmeme-complexes.2 McFadzean's Virus religion is a meme-complex, drawing on ideas from 
I The website of the Church of Virus can be found at http://virus.lucifer.com (accessed: 1 August 2003). 
2 See Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); more recently, see Susan 











philoSGphy, science, technology, politics, and religion. McFadzean {lames his new religion 
Virus because, he admits, he deliberately wants to antagonise people through the negative 
connotations associated with "virus." He wants people to know that this idea is "designed to 
infect them" so that they may replicate it and contribute to its evolution. Hence the welcome 
message on the church's homepage: "closed irrational minds maybe offended; open rational 
minds may be infected." 
IfMcFadzean's "neo-cybernetic philosophy" is exceptionally innovative in the way that it 
synthesises religion, evolution, and memetics, it still does exhibit some features of the more 
familiar form of religion. For example, the church canonized Charles Darwin, St. Charles, on 
February 12th, 1996, the 186th anniversary of his birth. McFadzean also outlines three qualities 
that mark a good Virion, the so-called Three Virian Virtues. The first of these is Reason; "if 
truth is the goal, rationality is the way." "A good Virion," says McFadzean, "will endeavour 
to hold a consistent set of beliefs and act in accordance with those beliefs." The second virtue 
is Empathy; "the glue that binds society." Empathy is so important because it is the basis for 
many of the qualities that people hold in the highest regard, such as kindness, charity, and 
foregiveness. The ability to be empathetic "confers a distinct advantage in any social 
situation." The third virtue is Vision, by which is meant the capacity to think beyond the 
wants and needs of the individual.3 These Virian Virtues stand in opposition to the Three 
Senseless Sins. Dogmatism signifies "the abdication of reason," and the convictions to which 
it leads "are the enemy of truth more than lies." The second sin is Apathy. McFadzean's 
3 Though McFadzean does not elaborate, it seems that with this idea of vision, he means something along the 
lines of a perspective that will resolve the tension between perfectly rational individual action and perfectly 
rational collective action. This tension and even contradiction was famously theorised by Garret Hardin's 
concept of the tragedy of the commons, and has been used to explain the logic of the Cold War nuclear arms race 
and more recently, global environmental degradation. See Garret Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," 











statement here is brief: "There can be no logical argument against apathy;" obviously, if one 
is apathetic, one has no interest in arguments against apathy. Apathy, says McFadzean, is the 
key to leading a meaningless life. The third sin is hypocrisy. One has committed this sin when 
one's behaviour is inconsistent with one's beliefs. Hypocrisy therefore undermines the first 
Virion Virtue, which is to maintain a consistent set of beliefs and act in accordance with them. 
Besides these virtues and sins, and the canonisation of Darwin, the other obvious feature of 
Virus that signifies its religious character is that it is brought together under the name of a 
church. This seems contradictory for an innovation that styles itself in opposition to the 
traditional image of religion. Unfortunately, McFadzean does not explain this, and so we can 
only surmise that he chose to gather his religion under the idea of a church because that is the 
dominant image of religion in North America, where McFadzean lives. 
Clearly, the Virus religion is centred on praise for reason and rational thought. This exaltation 
of reason is, however, linked with a central concern of religion, which is to provide a sense of 
meaning and purposefulness to its followers. In the Church of Virus, this sense of meaning is 
found in a super-rationalist orientation toward the world that understands everything as a 
system. In this worldview, all systems are comprised of components that are themselves 
systems. The upper limit therefore is the universe (since there is no rational way of knowing 
whether the universe is not a component of a still larger system, a multi verse), and the lower 
limit is a quark (since quarks are the smallest known units of energy and therefore cannot be 
comprised of components.) The view of the world from the Virion's perspective is of physical 
and temporal patterns, which is to say, information. At all levels, this system is changing. Yet 
in the Virion's worldview, change is not accidental or chaotic, but rather a function of 
processes of variation and selection. In other words, what is witnessed at the level of 











all systems, from cellular development to human culture. Evolution is the single activity 
occurring at all levels of the system. 
As a view of the world, this is not problematic. But if a feature of religion is to provide 
participants with a sense of meaning, one may wonder where meaning fits into the Virion 
worldview. Following the logic of this broad concept of systems evolution, things simply 
mean what they cause. So, the meaning of something is the effect that thing has wrought on 
the system at different scales. The meaning of an individual's life is the sum total of how that 
person's existence has influenced, either directly or indirectly, people around them and the 
environment in which they move. The trick to creating a meaningful life therefore lies in how 
one influences the world around you. 
There is nothing inherently problematic in claiming a religious character to this worldview, 
and it is a worldview that has in one form or another been expressed prior to the invention of 
the Church of Virus. Yet some more of this worldview may be discerned through the 
numerous websites and information pages that the church's website links to, a large 
proportion of which are to pages dealing with memetics and transhumanist philosophy. 
Transhumanism. as will be shown. emerges as the anchor of the Virion worldview. 
Specifically, the goals of the Extropy Institute, where David McFadzean is Electronic 
Communications Officer responsible for administering and maintaining the archives of their 
mailing lists and discussion boards, seem to have inspired a great deal of the Virion 
worldview.4 According to extropian philosophy, humanity is a transitory stage in the 
evolutionary development of intelligence. Extropianism advocates the use of science to 











accelerate human evolution into a "transhurnan" phase, or "posthuman condition.,,5 The 
posthuman is defined as a "human descendant who has been augmented to such a degree as to 
be no longer a human.',(j Physically, the posthuman body will enjoy infinite youth and energy 
and will be marked by an increased capacity to author how one wants to be in the world, 
including factors such as one's physical shape, size, appearance and location. Other 
programmable variables might include preferences of environments, experiences, and 
sensations. Yet actually having a body is only one among a range of possibilities available to 
the posthuman. More generally, the posthuman condition is marked by the absence of 
physical, biological, neurological, mental, or emotional deficiencies and limitations. The 
posthuman will be self-constituting, will be in control of their own destiny and able to define 
their own reality.' Extropianists represent a branch of trans humanist thinking and like other 
variants oftranshumanism, "favor reason, progress, and values centered on our well being 
rather than on an external religious authority."s The institute defines an Extropian as someone 
"who seeks to overcome human limits, live indefinitely long, become more intelligent, and 
more self-creating.,,9 
Besides McFadzean's longstanding involvement with the Extropy institute, he also names 
himself a staff member at Internet Infidels, the managers of the popular web portal The 
Secular Web. The goal of The Secular Web is "to defend and promote a nontheistic 
worldview which holds that the natural world is all that there is, a closed system in no need of 
5 http://www.extropy.org/faq/index.html (accessed: 2 August 2003). 
6 http://www.imminst.org/twaigoframe.php?adm=O&id=15&ids;20(accessed: 3 August 2003). 
7 For overviews of transhumanism, see the Transhumanity website, published by the World Transhumanist 
Association, at http://www.transhumanism.com. Also, see the Transhumanist Links Exchange at 
http://www.imminst.org/twa (accessed: 3 August 2003) and The InCipient Pasthuman pages at 
http://www.imminst.org/twaigoframe.php?adm=0&id=15&ids;20 (accessed: 3 August 2003). 












a supernatural explanation and sufficient unto itself."lo McFadzean professional background 
is engineering; he holds a Master's degree in Science from the University of Calgary, Alberta, 
and is a member of the Association of Professional Engineers, Geologists, and Geophysicists 
of Alberta, a member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, and a member of 
the Planetary Society. 1 1 
The worldview ofthe Church of Virus, following the influences of its creator, shares the same 
basic orientation toward the world as the transhumanist philosophy of extropianism: a super-
rationalist orientation that sees the world as essentially made up of evolving patterns of 
information, which taken together, add up to the evolution of intelligence; a perspective on 
humanity that sees it merely as one of those patterns, composed of subsystems, or meme-
complexes, and itself part of still larger system; a championing of scientific endeavour as a 
means to speed up the rate of evolution of these patterns at all scales; a commitment to 
transcending humanity and bringing about a posthuman condition. 
Certainly, more could be said about intersections between the transhumanist worldview of the 
Church of Virus and certain structural features of religious worldviews in generaL For 
example, parallels may be drawn between the church's advocacy of a posthuman condition 
and images of redemption in Judeo-Christian scripture. Alternatively, ideas of immortality 
and omniscience in the Virion world view could be said to echo notions of enlightenment and 
transcendence of human limitations in models of religion drawn from central and East Asia. 
To pursue these kinds of structural comparisons might compliment an approach to Virus that 
looks for typical features of religion, such as saints and the prescription of certain do's and 
10 http://www.infidels.org/index.shtml (accessed: 1 August 2003). 
II This and all other personal infonnation I have obtained at McFadzean's personal website, except where 











don'ts. Fruitful as these inquiries might be, I want to follow a different approach. I want to 
contrast the Church of Virus with another religion drawn from the realm of fake religions on 
the Internet, which is to say religions whose authentic status is ambivalent. As with the 
Church of Virus, I will give a brief overview of this religion, and then unpack some ofit's 
background. Thereafter, I will compare and contrast this religion with the Church of Virus. 
The Cult of the New Eve is a religious group formed around the shared belief that the world is 
enjoying the Second Genesis that marks the dawn ofthe Second Biological Age. 12 According 
to the cult, the Second Genesis is "a time of glory" and "tremendous liberation" when the 
impossible becomes possible and the supernatural becomes natural. The key to this liberation 
is genetics and molecular science. According to the cult's view ofthings, after science 
corrected the "misconceptions" surrounding the "fairy tale Eve of the Bible," Biblical Eve 
was replaced by Mitochondrial Eve, named after the genetic trait that traced her DNA to 
Africa between 100 000 and 400 000 years ago. Mitochondrial Eve heralded the First 
Biological Age. Today that age is ending as the Second Biological Age is ushered in by 
genetic science. The Second Genesis began in 1953 with James Watson and Francis Crick's 
discovery of DNA and culminated with the Human Genome Project that mapped the blueprint 
of human genetic structure. The New Eve, "the vessel of knowledge that is spawning the 2nd 
Genesis," is the unnamed woman whose blood was the sample for the Human Genome 
Project. It is this blueprint for humanity that will liberate humanity from its limitations coded 
in its genetic structure. With the advent of the Second Genesis, humanity is at last in a 
position to realise the promises of religion. The Second Biological Age will be a time of 
"miraculous cures, the elimination of disease, the conquest of death," all achievable through 
"gene therapy." With the Second Genesis, humankind has been reborn, able to engineer life in 
12 The website of the Cult of the New Eve can be found at http://www.critical-art.netfbiotechicone/coneWeb 











whatever manner it decides; says the cult, "We will remake all the plants and animals to serve 
our needs more efficiently. Essentially, we will reseed the earth and change the nature ofHfe." 
On the cult's website are listed a number of the New Miracles already witnessed around the 
world, including animal cloning, mice that glow in the dark, the incubation of a goat's foetus 
in an artificial womb of synthetic amniotic fluid, and the choice now available to prospective 
parents to choose the sex of their child. 
On the cult's website, the browser will also find a link to words of inspiration from Genomic 
Scripture, "a collection of wisdom, prophecy, and inner vision from leading scientists in 
medicine and molecular biology." There the visitor will read how Dr. Lee Silver of Princeton 
University likens DNA with the Christian concept of the soul, and Dr John H. Campbell who 
predicts that it is human destiny to elevate itself to the level of a god and beyond. On the same 
menu on the cult's website, visitor can read prophecies of the New Eve, including one of a 
"The Woman Clothed in Cathode Rays" who holds in her hand "the sacred vial of redeeming 
blood." As a trumpet proclaimed her name, a voice was heard saying: "The New Eve has 
come among you to heal your wounds and renew your tissues. There shall be no more death 
there, no suffering, no pain. There shall be no more weeping, or mourning. New Eve will 
wipe away all tears." Another prophecy is of the Sacred City: "And Behold! A lovely and 
shining light: the New Eden; and the city was like a crystal, with myriad facets, gleaming 
towers and glittering domes; To the East stood Roswell, the sacred Temple of the letting of 
the Blood; to the West sparkled the waters ofthe holy lake; To the North thundered the Great 
Fall of healing baptismal waters; To the South lay the road to Eden the place of origin of the 
New Eve." This prophecy configures a sacred landscape that places the city of Buffalo at its 
centre. The Temple of the letting of the Blood refers to the Roswell Park Institute where the 











Niagara Falls; Lake Erie lies to the west; and the rest of the United States to the south. On the 
main page of the cult's website is a link to the Buffalo Campaign. Visitors are invited to add 
their names to a petition to the mayor of Buffalo requesting that a monument be erected to 
"the Unknown Donor (known to us as the New Eve)" in the city's centre. The petition further 
calls on the mayor to change the city's name to New Eden and thereby "claim its rightful 
place as the New Jerusalem of the Second Biological Age." 
Perhaps most interesting on the cult's website is a notice to beware of the false Eves. Under a 
section titled "Exposing the False Eves," the cult describes four pretenders to the title of Eve. 
These are Biblical Eve, Goddess Eve, Android Eve, and Virtual Eve. According to the cult, of 
all the false Eve's, Biblical eve has the largest following, despite the absence of any evidence 
of her existence. In the absence of evidence, her followers turn to the "delusions" and 
"fantasies" of faith. The cult's chastisement of Goddess Eve is tempered to some extent by 
their recognition that Goddess worship has had some practical value "as a means to galvanise 
women and reinvest them with a sense of the divine feminine principle." Still, the cult argues 
that Goddess worship "must now be fully secularised," a task they suggest the New Eve is 
perfectly suited to. The New Eve heralds an age where the instability of race and gender has a 
literal meaning, not merely a social construction. Android Eve, who's heyday was the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, is the least threatening of all the false Eves for the 
simple reason that robotic technology reached its end some time ago and has become a 
"harmless piece of nostalgia for the mechanical age." 
Yet it is Virtual Eve on which the cult pours scorn and fury. Of all the false Eves, Virtual Eve 
is to be feared and despised the most. Though she has yet to appear, "her simulacra sit on the 











cult, is because although she has appeared only in the crudest of virtual fonus - "cheap 
prototypes" and "various feminine avatars" - she has already attracted numerous followers. 
Each follower hopes to fulfil the "evil Cartesian prophecy," the suggestion that mind can be 
separated from matter, by following Virtual Eve into cyberspace and so beginning the 
migration of human consciousness from the body to "a virtual elsewhere." In the cult's view 
of things, the separation of mind and body is the promise of death: "consciousness is 
decentralised throughout the body; it cannot be gathered and transferred." The cult alerts 
visitors to its site that "uploading" is the name given the technique whereby this separation of 
mind and body is achieved and that the people preparing for this "demonic process" are the 
extropians. According to the cult, the extropians' "psychotic babble" is a menace; there's is 
not a cult oflife, but a cult of death; they are suicidal, "like lemmings running toward a cliff." 
They are also heretical. From the perspective of the Cult of the New Eve, the extropians deny 
the wonders and New Miracles that have been brought about by the New Eve. The religious 
zeal of the cult's critique of extropianism is captured well in an extract worth quoting at 
length: 
... people stiIl believe that uploading is our posthuman future ... What outrage! The body 
is not a prison; it does not stop consciousness from expanding. We are limited only by our 
capacity for knowledge. Thanks to the New Eve, we now have the knowledge to grow the 
Tree of Life. We can shape the body so that it is the most perfect phenomenon on the 
planet. No one will want to leave it for the pleasureless silicon universe of ones and zeros. 
The New Eve is our future. The extropian menace is nothing but death, and the 
posthuman era nothing but the lie of techno-fetishists. We invite you to join to Cult of the 
New Eve, and help us eradicate the foolish ideology of self-destruction that the extropians 











This tension between the competing worldviews of the Cult of the New Eve and the Church 
of Virus is instructive to the present inquiry into the problem of authenticity in religion in a 
number of significant ways. But before I turn attention to these tensions, I want to catalogue 
some of their contrasting features. Most strikingly, we notice that where the cornerstone of the 
worldview of Virus is memetics, for the Cult of the new Eve, it is genetics. As cornerstones of 
their respective worldviews, these terms signify the general orientations respectively of each 
of these religious groups. Where the former is orientated toward a disembodied world that 
sees human bodiedness as an impediment to human evolution, the latter's orientation is 
toward a view of the world that gives primacy to the human body as the site of religious 
conviction. Both religions develop this distinction further. The Church of Virus claims that 
the body needs to be abandoned ifhuman limits are to be overcome; the Cult of the New Eve 
claims that with the recently acquired knowledge of human genetic code, it is through the 
human body's very materiality that any limitations on human development will be 
transcended. Their respective orientations toward the human body in turn signify these 
religions' respective views on the nature of religion. For Virions, religion is about evolution, 
not only in the narrowly biological sense, but in all the temporal patterns of information that 
are the essential structure and nature of reality. Significantly, the human body holds little 
importance for religion, except insofar as how the body as a pattern of information influences 
other patterns it interacts with. For followers of the New Eve, however, the body is pivotal to 
their religion; it is the site of religious manifestations, the medium through which the new 
miracles and wonders are revealed. 
I want to transpose this image of contrasted religious worldviews onto the argument that has 
been advanced through the preceding four chapters because I think it illustrates a number of 











fake religion can be understood as issuing a critique against the concept of authentic religion, 
in much the same way that the Cult of the New Eve issues a critique against the extropian 
menace. However, to appreciate the full significance of the cult's critique and its illustrative 
encapsulation of the central arguments of this thesis requires that we take a closer look by, 
somewhat paradoxically, stepping further back. 
The Cult of the New Eve is not a fake religion in the sense that the Church of Virus or any of 
the other fake religions surveyed in the introduction to this thesis represent fake religions. The 
Cult of the New Eve is an installation piece created by Paul Vanouse and Faith Wilding, both 
members of The Critical Art Ensemble (CAE).13 The art work is intended as a critique of the 
promissory rhetoric ofbiotechnoiogy in the public sphere. In a position paper published on 
the CAE's website, 14 Vanouse and Wilding begin with the assertion that under the hegemony 
of capital, "science is the institution of authority regarding the production of knowledge." As 
the key knowledge producer for capital, science is embroiled in capital's mystifications of 
social reality. Science comes to define the human role in the cosmos and supplants religion as 
"a key mediator of the public's relationship with nature." This usurpation of the place of 
religion, while secular in rhetoric, is religious in its utopian vision. Vanouse and Wilding 
identify four main categories of this promise: democracy, liberty, efficiency, and progress. 
Democracy is the suggestion that everyone will be empowered by technology; to which 
Vanouse and Wilding counter that class structure replicates itself in technology. Liberty is the 
suggestion that technology will free people from drudgery; countered with the argument that 
workloads always increase with the intensification of technology. Technology supposedly 
also improves efficiency; countered by the argument that increased efficiency is desirable to 
IJ http://www.critical-art.netl(accessed: 4 August 2003). 












increase the speed of capital accumulation. Taken together, these promises add up to a 
definition of progress that presents itself as an advancement of the common good when in fact 
it means little more than the expansion of capital. 
With this critical perspective, Vanouse and Wilding tum their critical eye toward the 
biotechnology industry and its scientific specialists. They note that biotech has attempted its 
parade of utopian promises previously, when Darwin's theories of evolution, truly Copernican 
in their implications, made a crucial contribution to science's supplanting of religious 
authority. Yet the science of biology then was not yet powerful enough to act in favour of the 
social revolution that the theory of evolution offered. Instead, "the horror show of eugenics" 
came to pass and with it, "the utopian mask fell from capital's face." The atrocities 
perpetrated in the name of eugenics have come to be collectively identified with the Nazi 
project, with the consequence that for the new generation of geneticists and molecular 
biologists, as Vanouse and Wilding put it, "the utopian rhetoric that once served other science 
and technology producers so well is now tainted." In response to this, they suggest that the 
biotech industry, including not only scientists, but also capital's media and marketing agents, 
has appropriated the promissory rhetoric of Christianity to persuade the non-specialist public 
of the utopian nature of the new biotechnologies. This is a fascinating tum of events because 
science, a new religion according to some, is not merely analogous to religion in the sense 
that it defines humanity's relation to the cosmos in utopian terms. Rather, science now 
assumes religion's rhetoric in giving expression to that relation. The symbol of that rhetoric, 
according to Vanouse and Wilding, is Eve, for Eve, as symbol of primordial beginnings, holds 
the key to unlocking utopian ends. And so the quest for the New Eve begins. The first 
instance of such an appropriation is Simian Eve, an African australopithecus believed to be 











previously. Now, at the dawn of the Second Biological Age, Vanouse and Wilding introduce 
the New Eve, their critical commentary on the appropriation of this Christian promissory 
rhetoric by biotechnology in the interests of capital. The CAE choose to image their critique 
in a cult deliberately to draw attention to the problem of authority and legitimacy: 
The CAE has taken this rhetoric and moved it from the context of the most legitimate and 
authoritative socio-economic constellations, and placed it in the context of the least 
legitimate of all social constellations a cult - in order to give the public a new 
perspective of this peculiar strain of social representation. 
This is a crucial statement, for it contains all the elements that have made up the argument 
advanced through the preceding five chapter's discussion of the relationship between fakery 
and authenticity in religion; constellating movements re-place and re-contextualise and so 
create incongruities out of which emerge new perspectives that ask critical questions of the 
legitimacy and authority of unquestioned hegemonic regimes. This statement also implies that 
self-representations put forward by these regimes can be deceptive and that to perceive what 
these representations may deceptively conceal requires a different perspective, one brought 
about by the movements of re-p I acing and re-contextualising that in tum rearrange the surface 
of appearance and therewith reveal, physiognomically as it were, a kind of knowledge that 











5.2 Of Forensics and Incongruities 
I submit that the Cult of the New Eve relates to the Church of Virus in the same way that fake 
religion relate to authentic religion, which is to say that the former represents a critical 
intervention in the regime of the latter. In this formulation, authenticity is identifiable with a 
scientifically designed paradigm that adjudicates authenticity's claims against certain criteria. 
The method of this adjudication is scientific and empirical and is founded on the assertion that 
reason and rational reflection, for example via independent verification or falsification, will 
produce only positive results, which is to say, conclusive judgements. In this sense, the 
adjudication of authenticity can be likened to police work, where the detection of deception 
and fraud is the defining labour. This conception of authenticity I have previously gathered 
under the idea of forensics. Yet the signifier of forensics is appropriate in ways besides 
denoting police work, for like a police force, this scientific rendering of authenticity also 
exerts a certain force in the way that it orders reality. And like police forces, this ordering is 
undertaken in such a way that it reinforces its own authority. It is in this sense that 
authenticity might be likened to a regime and fakery to a critical intervention in that regime's 
self-perpetuating authority. Fakery's interventation does not identify alternative criteria for 
authenticity's adjudication. Instead, fakery destabilises the very possibility that such criteria 
may be established. The importance of instability can be conveyed with the image of 
incongruity between things and can be positioned in counterpoint to forensics. And if! may 
be permitted to extend the analogy still further, if forensics that connotes police forces 
signifies the regime of science's ordering of reality, incongruity that destabilises that order 
signifies its overthrow. To put is simply, if authentic reality designed in the image of science 
is a police state, then fakery's intervention is the coming revolution. Fakery does not intend to 











status of the authentic is shown to be a dream, an impossible ideal. It is via this showing that 
the authority to which authenticity lays claim simply evaporates. In this sense, there is no 
such thing as authenticity, only authentic critique. 
The possibility of this critique originates in the critique's deliberate identifying itself with the 
least legitimate of social constellations. So, the Cult of the New Eve's critique ofbiotech's 
appropriation of Christian promissory rhetoric is possible because its critique is identified 
with a cult, the dialectical opposite of Christian institutions and, in a religiopolitical sense, the 
least legitimate of religious formations. In a similar manner, the critique issuing from fake 
religion is possible because as fake, it is identified with the dialectical opposite of authenticity 
and therefore occupies the least legitimate of positions under authenticity'S hegemonic 
regime. If the possibility ofthis critique originates with its incongruous positioning in relation 
to the object ofits critique, the strength of this critique originates in its appropriation and 
incongruous recontextualisation of the central problematic of its object. The Cult of the New 
Eve appropriates the Christian promissory rhetoric of biotech and recontextulialises it in the 
relatively illegitimate social constellation of a cult. Fake religion lays claim to the status of 
authentic religion and in so doing recontextualise this most essential of all religious claims in 
incongruous constellations of imitation and parody. Similarly, we might recall that the 
surrealist critique appropriated images of progress that were then recontextualised in 
anachronous montages. 
If the origin of authentic critique is incongruity and the strength of its critique flows from 
incongruous recontextualisations, the success of these critiques pivots on their respective 
audience's recognition of this incongruous recontextualisation of their object's most essential 











the crucible of authentic critique. That discussion showed that the involvement of the body of 
the recognising subject with the incongruous image composed ofrecontextualised 
appropriations was essential to the authenticity of the critical image. If the surrealists' critique 
of modernity's trumpeting of progress failed on account of their inadequate attention to 
bodiedness, the humorous quality attached to fake religion offers the authenticating leverage 
to sustain its critique. It is therefore more than a fortuitous coincidence that bodiedness is 
central both to the Cult of the New Eve and to the image of fake religion theorised through 
Benjamin's dialectical optic and Berger's redeeming laughter; the Cult of the New Eve is 
emphatic that their religious worldview is not merely focussed on materiality, of which the 
body is their archetypal example (this is the perspective of coincidence), but additionally, that 
their focus on the body as the site of religious orientation stands in counterpoint to a 
scientifically formulated religious orientation focussed on abandoning the body for the 
pleasures of a "virtual elsewhere" (the "more than fortuitous" perspective). The fact that the 
Cult's religious orientation is similarly scientifically formulated through the discourses of 
genetic science and molecular biology does not undermine this reading, but instead reinforces 
it; remember that the cult is an art installation rather than a fake religion and that their use of 
"genomic scripture" is the imitative deployment of its appropriation. 
The tension between the Cult of the New Eve and the Church of Virus therefore neatly 
demonstrates the tension between fakery and authenticity in religion theorised and argued 
through the preceding discussions. Having succinctly encapsulated this tension in this manner 
of analogous emblematic contrasts, we are now in a position to step back from the emblems 











From this wider perspective, one such contrast that demands consideration is between the 
emphasis and de-emphasis of the body. The primacy of the body has been a recurring theme 
throughout the discussions of this thesis. Yet it is surely significant that the question of 
bodiedness recurs wherever the issue of paradox, contradiction, of incongruity is raised. From 
Taussig's discussion ofthe paradoxical coexistence of faith and scepticism in Kwakuitl 
shamanism in Chapter Two, through Benjamin's reflections on the dialectical image that 
emerges in a flashing moment of mimetic connection between body and image in Chapter 
Three, to Berger's analysis of redeeming laughter that is a variation of an incongruity theory 
of humour in Chapter Four, bodiedness is allied with incongruity. We have also seen the 
nature of this alliance, for if incongruity is the crucible for sUbjective critical engagement with 
social reality, the quality of bodied ness in that engagement is the locus of its authenticity. If 
body and incongruity together make up the defining elements of authentic critique, the 
critique itself gives the lie to the forensic claim that authenticity exists as a stable category of 
knowledge independent of its social mediation. In other words, the body-emphasising 
perspective of authentic critique draws critical attention exactly to the body de-emphasising 
tendencies of forensic perspectives on authenticity. And so we return to a central argument of 
this extended discussion; that there is no such thing as authenticity, only authentic critique. 
From this brief discussion, it becomes clear here that a number of correlations and oppositions 
are emerging, for example, church and cult; forensics and incongruities; disembodiedness and 
bodiedness. In each of these binaries, the correlations are between the first terms of each, and 
the oppositions between first and second terms. We might note that some of these oppositions 
and correlations have been recurring themes in many discussions throughout the preceding 











shown, such a tabulation instructs us further. With the exception perhaps of the first and last 
pair, the tabulation below is in no particular order. 
authenticity fakery 
forensics incongruities 
reason and rationality dialectical images 
disembodiedness bodiedness 




arrest I apprehension movement 
trick as deception trick as technique 
abstraction sensuousness 
Perhaps it is because of the centrality of Benjamin's thinking throughout the present inquiry, 
yet looking at this tabulation, I am struck that these terms appear to form a constellation. No 
doubt more pairs could be added. Still, I think this constellation as it stands images the 












5.3 Of Constellations and Conclusions 
The principle idea that has guided these discussions is the argument that authenticity as a 
qualitative attribute of religion can only be recognised through revelation. This idea of 
revelation should not be understood in a theological sense, but in its aesthetic sense, which is 
its proper meaning and the source of theology's borrowing. The emphasis on "only" here is 
crucial, because - and this is the difficulty with authenticity attempting to apprehend 
authenticity by any other means renders it inauthentic in the same instant. Authenticity is 
sublime; one is struck by it unexpectedly, it happens to you. And in the following moment, 
when one gathers one's wits and turns attention to it, it is gone. One is left to make do with 
the traces, which, like any record, can only approximate the authentic object, but never 
recreate it. And herein lies the catastrophe: the heroic quest for authenticity goes about 
collecting these traces, cataloguing them, assembling them, ordering them, even exhibiting 
them, and so building out of authenticity's traces an elaborate edifice. The catastrophe is the 
mistaken belief that with these traces, a locus of authenticity may be found. And it is 
catastrophic because authenticity's edifice demands that this locus be actively sought, as a 
matter of the utmost urgency, an ultimate concern of sorts. And so with a great rush, these 
new heroes set about the world armed with authenticity's traces for yardsticks. Yet we know 
that their quest is doomed, for authenticity will not be exposed. Therefore, at every turn our 
heroes find more traces, but not the illusive Holy Grail itself. And so the edifice looms greater 
still, until soon the imposing presence of the edifice replaces authenticity's absence. Our 
heroes are no longer concerned with finding authenticity, but instead tinker with its traces and 
develop out of them still better methods for exposing the illusive object oftheir efforts, now 
long since forgotten. At the same time that authenticity's edifice is transformed into a 











into a villain, judged guilty in absentia for the crime of resisting arrest. And how else can it 
be, for the new regime's laws, the same that govern the on-going construction of the heroic 
monument, do not tolerate the kind of dynamism and spontaneous movement that are 
essential to the kind of revelation that will do justice to authenticity. With this judgement, 
authenticity, out of whose traces the new regime's monument to itself is built, is separated 
from Authenticity, the new god, always out of sight, always out of reach, never experienced, 
but always praised with the faith that one day the faithful will be reunited with their god. This 
faith also says that this day draws closer with every heroic contribution to Authenticity'S 
monumental edifice. 
At the same time, authenticity moves about largely undetected, waiting for opportune 
moments wherein it may reveal itself to unsuspecting passers-by. In that briefest of moments, 
they are transported outside of the tyranny of reality, which is to say, the view of the world 
determined by their new god's oppressive regime. In this sense, the recognition of authenticity 
is a gift and the recognising subject is its grateful recipient. The gift itself is an intuition that 
reality is tyrannical and that authenticity is concealed by its surface. The new gods and their 
heroic investigators are oblivious to this fact, while authenticity, who prefers to remain 
concealed, is more than satisfied with this arrangement. For behind the surface of appearance, 
there is infinite space to move. And with the entirety of appearance as its canvas, authenticity 
can paint the most beautiful aesthetic experiences for whomsoever is fortuitous to move 
across its surface at that moment. 
Yet the fortuity of receiving authenticity's gift is not merely a question of accident; a question 
of being in the right place at the right time. In this regard, the story told above is somewhat 











the sublime experience of authenticity is that authenticity may be less concealed than we may 
often think. The recognition of authenticity is a sense that can be trained and developed. What 
it requires is the critical capacity to recognise the tyranny of reality, or at least, to recognise 
the regimes that structure how we perceive the real; the pedagogic side to Benjamin's Arcades 
Project: to train our image making faculty to look stereoscopically and dimensionally into the 
depths of the shadows of history. And this is where the really made up becomes so helpful, 
because fakery, both really made up and self-consciously imitative of the real, draws attention 
to the essential quality of artifice that weaves the surface of appearance, where most of us 
spend most of our time. By drawing attention to artifice in this way, fakery disrupts these 
regimes. And by resisting the ability of these regimes to make definitive pronouncements on 
their authenticity, fakery subverts these regimes. 
With all of this in mind, what can we say about the vexed problem of authenticity in religion? 
On the issue as to whether there is such a thing as authentic versus fake religion, there is both 
a positive and a negative answer. As an abstract concept, obviously the answer is no. There is 
no way to make that distinction, no criteria to be derived, no measure to be applied. But this is 
not the question with which this thesis has been concerned. The affinnative answer is a little 
closer to what these discussions have been concerned with and is established by the 
perspective that likens religious authenticity to aesthetic experience. But this perspective is a 
somewhat deceptive approach to the question because it is focussed on individual and 
subjective experience rather than the social institution or phenomenon of religion; to talk 
about authentic versus fake experience rapidly becomes absurd and so talk about 
phenomenons and social institutions in non-abstract ways is impossible. Which returns us to 
the point made earlier, that there is no such thing as authenticity. At the same time, the point 











critique. This is where fake religions become significant, for following Berger's theory of 
redeeming laughter, we have seen that fake religions can meet the criterion of authentic 
critique established by Benjamin's critique of surrealism. So where do authenticity and 
religion intersect? Religious authenticity resides in its capacity for providing critical self-
reflective engagements with that overarching and dominating experience called reality. But if 
religion, phenomenologically speaking, is a significant feature of the social, political, 
economic, and other structures of that overarching experience and more often than not 
contributes significantly to its tyranny, this critical capacity is challenged to find ways to 
critique itself as a part of its enduring critique of the whole. And this is where fake religion 
finds its moment. For through our laughter, religion's misappropriated and fetishised power is 
broken at the same time that its revelatory, critical, authentic powers are reaffirmed. 
From surrealism, through aesthetic experience, to religion's role as mediator of critical, self-
reflective engagements with the tyranny of reality, religion and art have been mutually 
implicated through much ofthe preceding discussions. Indeed, both deal in a notion of truth 
as secret and concealed and consequently subsist in revelatory experiences. Following the 
argument imaged in the constellation described above, their similar concern with revelation 
finds its counterpoint in scientific exposures. Nietzsche knew this distinction when he wrote: 
If the artist in every unveiling of truth remains cleaved with raptured eyes only to that 
which still remains veiled after the unveiling. the theoretical man, on the other hand, 
enjoys and contents himself with the cast-off veil, and finds the consummation of his 
pleasure in the process of a continuously successful unveiling through his own unaided 
efforts. 15 











While we may note here how tht.:oretical man, by which Nietzsche means scientific man, 
having heroically exposed truth, remains content with its traces at the same time that he casts 
about for a new unveiling with which to consummate his pleasures, it is really with the artist 
that Nietzsche is concerned. For the artist knows, along with Nietzsche, that to "see" truth 
requires the development of physiognomic skills. Benjamin is a little more cautious, though 
he agrees with Nietzsche's artist. His caution stems from his materialism, which alerts him to 
the fact that the veil in question is not merely the distinction akin to that between the physical 
and metaphysicaL For whatever claims this veil might have on metaphysical status, Benjamin 
knows very well that its maintenance and perpetuation is the material empire built of abstract 
thought. Still, both Benjamin and Nietzsche's artist know that to break its power entails 
sensuous knowledge, the kind of bodied knowledge available only through revelatory 
expenence. 
In this vision of things, sublime experience appears increasingly indistinguishable from 
religious experience. For one thing, both religion and art share a torturous relationship with 
authenticity. And yet art and religion's relationship with tyrannical reality is similar ifnot the 
same. For one thing, authentic religion, camouflaged by fakery in which it takes refuge, is a 
bit like Nietzsche's artist who cleaves to that which remains concealed and mysterious. 
Authenticity, in this sense, consists in concealment. At the same time, while both religious 
formations and artworks are often, if not usually, significantly short of authentic, when they 
get it right, they disrupt reality's tyranny. This kind of disruption they achieve by tearing the 
surface of appearance, defacing it so to speak. This kind of defacement is not an exposure or 
dramatic unveiling that destroys authenticity, but rather, a renting of the surface of the 
habitual and mundane, which is to say, the ordinary and coercive, that allows the tremendous 











surplus of sacred substance, that disrupts tyranny. At the same time, however, the recognition 
of this tremendous disruption reinvigorates social experience with religious significance. The 
vexed problem of authenticity in religion subsists in the confluences between an impulse 
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